{
  "id": 6141450,
  "name": "PORTER SEED CLEANING, INCORPORATED et al v. Mitch SKINNER",
  "name_abbreviation": "Porter Seed Cleaning, Inc. v. Skinner",
  "decision_date": "1981-04-29",
  "docket_number": "CA 81-23",
  "first_page": "230",
  "last_page": "235",
  "citations": [
    {
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      "cite": "1 Ark. App. 230"
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    {
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      "cite": "615 S.W.2d 380"
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    "name_abbreviation": "Ark. Ct. App.",
    "id": 13370,
    "name": "Arkansas Court of Appeals"
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      "reporter": "Ark.",
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      "cite": "267 Ark. 874",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
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      "year": 1979,
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      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
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      "year": 1979,
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    {
      "cite": "310 S.W. 2d 803",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.W.2d",
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        8724857,
        8724988
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    {
      "cite": "228 Ark. 876",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
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        8724988
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:52:32.500580+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "PORTER SEED CLEANING, INCORPORATED et al v. Mitch SKINNER"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "James R. Cooper, Judge.\nThis is an appeal from a determination by the Workers\u2019 Compensation Commission that at the time of decedent\u2019s death, his minor son was entitled to receive maximum dependency benefits. At the hearing before the Administrative Law Judge, it was stipulated that the decedent was an employee of the appellant and that his death arose out of and in the course of his employment.\nIt is not disputed that the decedent and his wife were separated at the time of death. The testimony indicated that decedent and claimant saw each other several times a week and that he did provide approximately $100.00 per month for his child. He also carried insurance on his son through his employer. The parties were never divorced nor was there ever a court order establishing support payments.\nSeveral recent cases have dealt with a similar problem as is presented in this case. These cases followed the amendment to Ark. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 81-1315 (c) (Repl. 1976). That amendment changed the statute, so that it provided that death benefits were payable to persons who were \u201cwholly and actually\u201d dependent upon the deceased employee. Prior to the amendment benefits were payable to persons wholly dependent. In Chicago Mill and Lumber Company v. Smith, 228 Ark. 876, 310 S.W. 2d 803 (1958), the Arkansas Supreme Court stated that:\nWe believe the Legislature used the term \u2018wholly dependent\u2019 in the sense of applying to those ordinarily recognized in law as dependents and this would certainly include wife and children:\nIn the first case decided after the amendment, Roach Manufacturing Co. v. Cole, 265 Ark. 908, 582 S.W. 2d 268 (1979), the Court reaffirmed its decision in Chicago Mill, supra. The Court found that although the wife had made no efforts to secure support, nor had the husband paid any support during his eleven month absence, the child still had a reasonable expectation of support. The Court found that the child was actually dependent upon the father although he had contributed no support. In the Roach case the Arkansas Supreme Court determined that the Legislature intended, by inserting the phrase \u201cand actually\u201d, to change the conclusive presumption of dependency established under prior case law and required some showing of actual dependency. Thus, following Roach, a child to whom a parent owed a duty of support, and who had a reasonable expectation of support was \u201cwholly and actually\u201d dependent upon that parent.\nIn Doyle\u2019s Concrete Finishers v. Moppin, 267 Ark. 874, 596 S.W. 2d 1 (Ark. App. 1979), the Arkansas Court of Appeals dealt with a similar situation. The father was obligated under a divorce decree to pay $108.00 per month in support though the actual amount paid exceeded that sum. The sole issue in the case was whether the minor child of a deceased worker, whose death was the result of a work-related injury, was entitled to the maximum benefits under the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act as a matter of law, or entitled only to the extent to which the minor child is actually dependent upon the deceased parent.\nThe Court discussed Chicago Mill and Roach, supra, and determined that dependency was a matter of fact rather than law, and therefore that the partial dependency provisions of the Act applied. The Court further pointed out that Roach did not solve the problem, for the holding there\n... affirms the Commission\u2019s award of maximum benefits to a dependent minor who was receiving nothing from the deceased parent \u2014 it did so on a finding that there was substantial evidence to support the Commission\u2019s award of maximum benefits to the minor child, who was found to be \u2018wholly and actually\u2019 dependent upon the decedent.\nThe Court went on to agree that appellant\u2019s argument was logical, since Roach indicated that the partial dependency provisions must apply whenever a dependent was not totally supported by the deceased parent. The Court expressed concern that if that interpretation were adopted there would be a distinction drawn between children residing with both parents as opposed to those who were not.\nThe Court further stated that it could envision a situation where a minor child, regardless of his living situation, might have independent resources, and therefore might not be dependent upon the parents for purposes of the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act. The Court concluded that a minor child, receiving some support, was entitled to no less in benefits than a child (as in Roach) who was receiving nothing but who had a reasonable expectation of support. The award, was affirmed on a finding of substantial evidence to support the determination by the Commission that Brad Moppin was actually dependent upon the decedent at the time of death.\nThe Arkansas Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the Moppin decision by the Court of Appeals. In Doyle\u2019s Concrete Finishers v. Moppin, 268 Ark. 167, 594 S.W. 2d 243 (1980), the Court determined that the question of dependency of a minor child was one of fact. The Court pointed out that, following the amendment of Ark. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 81-1315 (c), the purported dependent must be wholly and actually dependent on the decedent. The Supreme Court reviewed its holding in Roach, and stated that:\n... when the widow and the child, as here, are not living with the employee at the time of his death, \u2018there must be some showing of actual dependency\u2019 ....\nThe Court found that the child was \u201cactually\u201d dependent on the decedent because of the obligation to make support payments (and his actual payment of it plus other sums) and because of the reasonable expectation of future support. The Court then stated:\n... Certainly, if, as in Roach, the child who received no financial support was entitled to maximum benefits, it must be said that a child, as here, who receives some financial support, should be entitled to no less than the maximum benefits. ...\nThe Court then indicated that ordinarily it would remand the case to the Commission for a factual finding as to dependency but found that action unnecessary since under the facts, the Commission could have made only one finding, that the child was wholly and \u201cactually\u201d dependent upon the deceased. The opinion of the Court of Appeals was affirmed.\nIn the third case decided following the 1976 amendment, Continental Insurance Company v. Richard, 268 Ark. 671, 596 S.W. 2d 332 (Ark. App. 1980), the Court dealt with a situation where the decedent regularly contributed to the support of his mentally deficient child. The Court stated:\n... Since he did this, the test of \u201cwholly dependent\u201d is met with the definition in the Chicago Mill Company case, supra, which was reaffirmed by the Roach case, supra. The test of \u201cactual\u201d dependency has been satisfied beyond the definition of the Roach case in that Frank Richard contributed to the support of his child and the child was \u201cactually\u201d dependent upon his father.\nUnder the holding in Chicago Mill, and Roach, supra, persons who are ordinarily recognized in law as dependents, including a wife and children, and to whom the employee owes a duty of support, are \u201cwholly dependent\u201d under our Workers\u2019 Compensation Law.\n\u201cActually dependent\u201d, in light of the prior cases, does not require total dependency. All that is required is a showing of actual support or a reasonable expectation of support. Roach, Moppin, and Richard, supra. Since the Commission found actual support, no more is required in this case.\nThat determination of fact by the Commission carries the weight of a jury verdict. Taylor v. Plastics Research and Development Corp., 245 Ark. 638, 433 S.W. 2d 830 (1968). That determination is supported by substantial evidence, and therefore we must affirm. American Can Co. v. McConnell, 266 Ark. 741, 587 S.W. 2d 583 (Ark. App. 1979).\nAffirmed.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "James R. Cooper, Judge."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Chester C. Lowe, Jr., for appellants.",
      "Jesse B. Daggett, for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "PORTER SEED CLEANING, INCORPORATED et al v. Mitch SKINNER\nCA 81-23\n615 S.W. 2d 380\nCourt of Appeals of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered April 29, 1981\n[Rehearing denied June 3, 1981.]\nChester C. Lowe, Jr., for appellants.\nJesse B. Daggett, for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0230-01",
  "first_page_order": 250,
  "last_page_order": 255
}