{
  "id": 6142739,
  "name": "Curtis Perry JONES v. STATE of Arkansas",
  "name_abbreviation": "Jones v. State",
  "decision_date": "1981-05-13",
  "docket_number": "CA CR 80-83",
  "first_page": "318",
  "last_page": "322",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "1 Ark. App. 318"
    },
    {
      "type": "parallel",
      "cite": "615 S.W.2d 388"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ark. Ct. App.",
    "id": 13370,
    "name": "Arkansas Court of Appeals"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 34,
    "name_long": "Arkansas",
    "name": "Ark."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "262 Ark. 476",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
      "case_ids": [
        1675954
      ],
      "weight": 2,
      "year": 1977,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ark/262/0476-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "260 Ark. 807",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
      "case_ids": [
        1616704
      ],
      "weight": 2,
      "year": 1976,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ark/260/0807-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "264 Ark. 223",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
      "case_ids": [
        1668726
      ],
      "weight": 2,
      "year": 1978,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ark/264/0223-01"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "analysis": {
    "cardinality": 438,
    "char_count": 8356,
    "ocr_confidence": 0.831,
    "pagerank": {
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      "percentile": 0.6639867806964808
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    "sha256": "3c4eea8bac3919e34bf8e95a3012c5c2af32d6dff92e4e8961d5c88004769ddb",
    "simhash": "1:8ece828ec4141d75",
    "word_count": 1420
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:52:32.500580+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "Curtis Perry JONES v. STATE of Arkansas"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "James R. Cooper, Judge.\nAppellant was tried on December 28, 1979, before a jury on a charge of first degree murder. Following trial, he was found guilty of the lesser included offense of manslaughter, and was sentenced to 10 years in the Arkansas Department of Corrections. From that verdict and judgment comes this appeal.\nThe appellant was convicted of manslaughter in the shooting death of his stepfather, John Otis Jones. The appellant and some friends had been in a room off the back porch of the house listening to music. Appellant and his stepfather got into an argument, apparently about the volume of the music, and harsh words were exchanged. The decedent went into a bathroom, and appellant went into his bedroom and got his pistol. The parties met on the porch and the decedent threatened to knock appellant\u2019s brains out with a bed slat he had in his hand. The decedent moved toward appellant with the board and appellant shot him twice, causing his death.\nAs his first point for reversal appellant argues that the trial court erred in refusing to allow evidence of decedent\u2019s violent character to demonstrate appellant\u2019s state of mind. The proffered evidence related to the fact that some two days prior to the shooting the mother of appellant and wife of decedent, Dorothy Jones, had been choked by the decedent and that Curtis Jones, appellant here, was aware of this prior violence. The trial court refused to allow appellant\u2019s mother and sister to testify about this prior act.\nAt trial, defense counsel indicated that appellant was protecting himself and his mother at the time of the shooting and that the evidence was being offered as something which was \u201cdirectly connected with it, an event, even on the Friday night immediately preceding the killing on Sunday afternoon at 2:30, ...\u201d There was no indication by counsel at that time that the evidence was being offered to show appellant\u2019s state of mind at the time of the shooting.\nAlthough the appellant was charged with first degree murder he was convicted of a lesser included offense of manslaughter under Ark. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 41-1504 (Repl. 1977).\nTo convict on manslaughter the killing must have been one which would have been murder but for \u201cextreme emotional disturbance for which there is reasonable excuse.\u201d Reasonableness of the excuse is to be determined by reference to appellant\u2019s perception of the circumstances at the time of the killing. Ark. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 41-1504 (Repl. 1977).\nUnder Ark. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 41-506 (Repl. 1977) justification is a defense to the use of physical force where the person is defending himself or a third person if he reasonably believes the other is about to use unlawful physical force.\nUnder Ark. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 41-507 (Repl. 1977) deadly physical force may be used if the person reasonably believes the other is about to commit a felony involving force or violence or is about to use deadly physical force.\nThe appellant argues on appeal that his state of mind at the time of the shooting was an essential element of his defense of self-defense and therefore the trial court was in error in refusing to allow his mother and sister to testify about the violent act committed by decedent two days earlier.\nWe find this argument to be without merit and believe the trial court correctly excluded the testimony as to the specific instances of aggressive conduct on the part of decedent. Rule 405 (a) of the Uniform Rules of Evidence provides that a trait of character may be proved by testimony as to reputation or by testimony in the form of an opinion and that on cross-examination inquiry may be made as to relevant specific instances. Testimony was adduced as to decedent\u2019s reputation for violence.\nRule 405 (b) provides:\n(b) Specific Instances of Conduct. In cases in which character or a trait of character of a person is an essential element of a charge, claim, or defense, proof may also be made of specific instances of his conduct. [Ark. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 28-1001, Rule 405 (Supp. 1977).]\nThus, the question here is whether the trait of character of decedent was an essential element of appellant\u2019s defense of self-defense. There is little question in this case that decedent was the aggressor, though there was evidence from which the jury could have found provocation by appellant. We hold that decedent\u2019s character as an aggressive person was not an essential element of appellant\u2019s defense of self-defense. \u201cOne might plead self-defense after having killed the most gentle soul who ever lived.\u201d McClellan v. State, 264 Ark. 223, 570 S.W. 2d 278 (1978).\nCommunicated threats and declarations of hostile purpose made at a point close in time to the killing may be admissible as part of the res gestae in self-defense cases. Brockwell v. State, 260 Ark. 807, 545 S.W. 2d 60 (1976). In Brockwell, the appellant was defending his daughter and his home from one who had made threats against the daughter the same day and near the time of the killing. Here, appellant was not a party to the choking incident (although he was aware of it) and there is no evidence in the record to indicate that he was defending his mother. In fact, appellant testified that he was not defending his mother. The evidence of prior acts was not admissible as part of the res gestae.\nIn the case at bar we are not even dealing with the appellant testifying as to his knowledge of prior violent acts. That type testimony has been held to be relevant in determining appellant\u2019s reasons for his apprehension of imminent danger. Pope v. State, 262 Ark. 476, 557 S.W. 2d 887 (1977). Appellant did not attempt to testify about the choking incident but did testify that his fear of imminent injury was based on prior threats against him by decedent with the same board. Appellant was able to fully develop his defense of justification and to show the reasonableness of his apprehension. We do not find any prejudice in the exclusion of the proffered testimony of the. mother and sister.\nFor his second point for reversal, appellant argues that the trial court erred in modifying AMCI 4105. Appellant argues that the trial court replaced in its entirety a paragraph of that instruction. This actually was not the case. The Court inserted a paragraph from AMCI 4104 which dealt with the question of provocation. Ark. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 41-506 (Repl. 1977) and AMCI 4104 provide that a person is not justified in using physical force if he provoked the use of unlawful force by the other person. Ark./Stat. Ann. \u00a7 41-507 (Repl. 1977) and AMCI 4105 enumerate the situations where the use of deadly physical force may be justified. No mention of provocation is found in Ark. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 41-507 (Repl. 1977) or AMCI 4105, but obviously the provocation restriction on the defense of justification applies equally to the use of \u201cphysical force\u201d and \u201cdeadly physical force.\u201d \u201cDeadly physical force\u201d is defined under Ark. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 41-501 (Repl. 1977) to include \u201cphysical force.\u201d\nThe Court could have given both instructions, but the majority of AMCI 4104 would have been a repetition of AMCI 4105 and the trial court apparently felt it would be less confusing to the jury and would accurately state the applicable law to combine the two instructions. We agree with the approach taken by the trial court. We find no prejudice against the interests of the appellant by the combination of the two instructions nor do we find any misstatement of the law.\nAppellant argues that the addition of the paragraph regarding provocation somehow gave the jury the impression that appellant was the aggressor. There is a great deal of difference in aggression and provocation and we do not see any basis for the claim that this instruction gave the impression that appellant was the aggressor. There was evidence from which the jury could have found that appellant had provoked decedent by virtue of the argument and obscene language directed back and forth between the two parties prior to the shooting.\nWe find no error on either point raised by appellant and therefore we affirm.\nAffirmed.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "James R. Cooper, Judge."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "E. Alvin Schay, State Appellate Defender, by: Linda Faulkner Boone, Deputy Defender, for appellant.",
      "Steve Clark, Atty. Gen., by: Leslie M. Powell, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "Curtis Perry JONES v. STATE of Arkansas\nCA CR 80-83\n615 S.W. 2d 388\nCourt of Appeals of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered May 13, 1981\nE. Alvin Schay, State Appellate Defender, by: Linda Faulkner Boone, Deputy Defender, for appellant.\nSteve Clark, Atty. Gen., by: Leslie M. Powell, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0318-01",
  "first_page_order": 338,
  "last_page_order": 342
}