{ "id": 6136615, "name": "SILVICRAFT, INC. and GEORGIA CASUALTY AND SURETY, INC. v. J. A. LAMBERT", "name_abbreviation": "Silvicraft, Inc. v. Lambert", "decision_date": "1983-11-23", "docket_number": "CA 83-232", "first_page": "28", "last_page": "34", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "10 Ark. App. 28" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "661 S.W.2d 403" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark. Ct. App.", "id": 13370, "name": "Arkansas Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "267 Ark. 926", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1719945 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/267/0926-01" ] }, { "cite": "2 Ark. App. 185", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6139960 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/2/0185-01" ] }, { "cite": "218 Ark. 136", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1612072 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1950, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/218/0136-01" ] }, { "cite": "262 Ark. 575", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1675925 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/262/0575-01" ] }, { "cite": "4 Ark. App. 247", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6140599 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/4/0247-01" ] }, { "cite": "260 Ark. 486", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1616706 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/260/0486-01" ] }, { "cite": "5 Ark. App. 264", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6142297 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/5/0264-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 523, "char_count": 8925, "ocr_confidence": 0.836, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.0445966085008933e-06, "percentile": 0.9840706929245682 }, "sha256": "2a013aa7c19921610eba40cc1666324373a454d8cadcd54589e91e7ee4e0344c", "simhash": "1:00f943829d0a0e04", "word_count": 1455 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:52:08.069200+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Cracraft and Glaze, JJ., agree." ], "parties": [ "SILVICRAFT, INC. and GEORGIA CASUALTY AND SURETY, INC. v. J. A. LAMBERT" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "James R. Cooper, Judge.\nIn this workers\u2019 compensation case the Commission affirmed the administrative law judge\u2019s findings that the appellee was an employee of the appellant Silvicraft rather than an independent contractor; that the appellants were estopped from denying coverage to the appellee; and the \u201cvendor\u2019s\u201d provision in the appellants\u2019 workers\u2019 compensation insurance policy was in contravention of Ark. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 81-1338 (c) and therefore void as against public policy. From that decision, comes this appeal.\nOn September 8,1981, the appellee injured his legwhile cutting pulpwood for the appellant Silvicraft. The appellee had no written contract with Silvicraft. The appellee testified that he started to work for Silvicraft in April, 1980, and that until his accident, hauled pulpwood only for Silvicraft. He testified that he was directed to the timber he was to cut; that his promissory note for a pulpwood truck was cosigned by Silvicraft\u2019s manager; and that when equipment broke down Silvicraft repaired it and held the repair charges out of his check. However, he also testified that he hired his own helpers, bought his own gasoline, owned his own equipment, and that Silvicraft did not tell him how to cut trees but only marked the ones which were to be cut.\nSilvicraft\u2019s manager testified that less experienced workers than the appellee would be more closely supervised; that Silvicraft did not direct the appellee to hire helpers; and that Silvicraft did not exercise control over the manner of cutting and hauling pulpwood. Further, Silvicraft purchases the timber from the landowners, designates the boundaries of the tracts to be cut, and marks the trees to be cut. In order to conduct its business of selling pulpwood to processors, Silvicraft has a business relationship with some thirty other persons who work similarly to the appellee. Also, Silvicraft did not withhold income or social security taxes from the appellee\u2019s checks.\nIn reaching his decision that the appellee was an employee of the appellant, the administrative law judge considered a number of factors approved by this court in Franklin v. Arkansas Kraft, Inc., 5 Ark. App. 264, 635 S.W.2d 286 (1982). The administrative law judge found that the appellant exercised a great deal of control over the appellee\u2019s performance of his work; that the appellant could have terminated the appellee, had co-signed a note on the appellee\u2019s truck and would have called this demand note if the appellee had gone to work for another pulpwood broker; and that the appellee was engaged solely in the business of cutting pulpwood for the appellant. Also, the administrative law judge found the appellant\u2019s sole business was that of purchasing pulpwood from private owners and that the appellant could not have performed its work without the services of the appellee and other similarly situated persons. Finally, the administrative law judge found that the appel-lee had been employed by the appellant for a substantial period of time and that he would have continued in the employ of the appellant had he not sustained his injury. The Commission adopted the findings of the administrative law judge. In finding that the appellee was the employee rather than an independent contractor, the administrative law judge relied heavily on the relative nature of the work test, as espoused by Professor Larson. See, Larson, Workmen\u2019s Compensation Law \u00a7\u00a7 43.42 et seq.\nThe appellants argue that, in determining whether an individual is an employee or an independent contractor, the most important test to apply is the control test. They cite Franklin in support of that argument. Franklin does not so state. Our opinion in Franklin does point out that, in applying the relative nature of the work test, the right to control may be sufficient to decide the employer/employee relationship question without consideration of other factors. The relative nature of the work is a combination of factors to be considered, all of which are utilized so as to give a clearer picture of the parties\u2019 relationship than is possible when only control is considered. Control of the manner of performing the work is significant, but, if considered determinative or controlling, may lead to clearly wrong results. In Sandy v. Salter, 260 Ark. 486, 541 S.W.2d 929 (1976) the Arkansas Supreme Court upheld the Commission\u2019s denial of benefits to Sandy, who was injured while remodeling a residence for the Salters, who were engaged in the trucking business. The Court stated:\nThe case at hand confirms the soundness of Larson\u2019s approach to the problem. If the power to control is alone to be taken into account, the Salters might be found to have had that power, owing to their authority to dismiss the workmen at will. Yet there was certainly no actual power to control the men in the details of their work, for the Salters knew nothing about how to go about remodeling a home.\nThis Court approved the use of Professor Larson\u2019s relative nature of the work test in Franklin, supra, another case involving timber haulers. The use of this test is consistent with the basic premise behind workers\u2019 compensation laws. As stated by Professor Larson,\nThe theory of compensation legislation is that the cost of all industrial accidents should be borne by the consumer as a part of the cost of the product. It follows that any worker whose services form a regular and continuing part of the cost of that product, and whose method of operation is not such an independent business that it forms in itself a separate route through which his own costs of industrial accident can be channelled, is within the presumptive area of intended protection.\nLarson, Workmen\u2019s Compensation Law, \u00a7 4S.51.\nThe right to control includes several items such as the right to determine the manner of completing the work; right to terminate; right to hire or control the hiring of helpers; the method of payment; and the furnishing of, or the obligation to furnish, tools or equipment necessary to perform the work. In determining the relative nature of the work to the alleged employer\u2019s business, some factors to be considered include whether the worker is engaged in a separate and distinct occupation or business, whether the work to be performed is an integral part of the employer\u2019s regular business, and the duration of the employment.\nAll of these factors are intertwined in the case at bar, and, based on an analysis of both control and the relationship between Silvicraft\u2019s business and the work being performed by the appellee, the administrative law j udge and the Commission found the appellee to be an employee of Silvicraft. The determination of whether, at the time of injury, a person was an employee or an independent contractor, is a factual one and the Commission is required to follow a liberal approach, resolving doubts in favor of employment status for the worker. Franklin, supra; Liggett Construction Co. v. Griffin, 4 Ark. App. 247, 629 S.W.2d 316 (1982); Purdy v. Livingston, 262 Ark. 575, 559 S.W.2d 24 (1977); Feazell v. Summers, 218 Ark. 136, 234 S.W.2d 765 (1950).\nThis Court\u2019s standard of review requires that we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commission\u2019s decision, and affirm if it is supported by substantial evidence. In order to reverse a decision of the Commission, we must be convinced that fair-minded persons, with the same facts before them, could not have arrived at the conclusion reached by the Commission. Office of Emergency Services v. Home Ins. Co., 2 Ark. App. 185, 618 S.W.2d 573 (1981); Bunny Bread v. Shipman, 267 Ark. 926, 591 S.W.2d 692 (Ark. App. 1980).\nOn the facts of the case at bar, we find substantial evidence to support the Commission\u2019s decision regarding the appellee\u2019s status as an employee rather than an independent contractor.\nThe Commission also affirmed the administrative law judge\u2019s finding that the appellants were estopped from denying workers\u2019 compensation coverage to the appellee because of the method used to calculate workers\u2019 compensation insurance premiums. Because of our decision on the appellee\u2019s status, we do not reach this question. The appellant also argues that the Commission\u2019s decision that a vendor endorsement in the appellant\u2019s insurance policy is void as against public policy has no basis in fact or law. Because of our affirmance on the employment issue, we need not decide this question.\nAffirmed.\nCracraft and Glaze, JJ., agree.\nFranklin was remanded so that the Commission could consider matters in addition to control in deciding the employer/employee question.", "type": "majority", "author": "James R. Cooper, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Barber, McCaskill, Amsler, Jones if Hale, by: Michael L. A lexander, for appellants.", "Williamson, Ball if Bird, by: Samuel N. Bird, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "SILVICRAFT, INC. and GEORGIA CASUALTY AND SURETY, INC. v. J. A. LAMBERT\nCA 83-232\n661 S.W.2d 403\nCourt of Appeals of Arkansas Division I\nOpinion delivered November 23, 1983\nBarber, McCaskill, Amsler, Jones if Hale, by: Michael L. A lexander, for appellants.\nWilliamson, Ball if Bird, by: Samuel N. Bird, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0028-01", "first_page_order": 50, "last_page_order": 56 }