{
  "id": 6137925,
  "name": "James D. BREWER v. TYSON FOODS, INC. et al",
  "name_abbreviation": "Brewer v. Tyson Foods, Inc.",
  "decision_date": "1983-11-30",
  "docket_number": "CA 83-273",
  "first_page": "88",
  "last_page": "91",
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:52:08.069200+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "Cracraft and Cooper, JJ., agree."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "James D. BREWER v. TYSON FOODS, INC. et al"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Tom Glaze, Judge.\nIn this Workers\u2019 Compensation case, the Commission denied appellant\u2019s claim for benefits. We do not reach appellant\u2019s contention that the Commission\u2019s findings and decision are not supported by substantial evidence because we reverse for another reason.\nAppellee, Tyson Foods, initially accepted appellant\u2019s claim that he suffered a compensable back injury. It later denied benefits after learning appellant had suffered a back injury before working for Tyson, but had applied for employment with Tyson without disclosing his prior in-j ury. Appellant subsequently filed his claim for benefits, but the administrative law judge, relying on Shippers Transport of Georgia v. Stepp, 265 Ark. 365, 578 S.W.2d 232(1979), denied benefits, finding that appellant willfully misrepresented his physical condition, and that the misrepresentation was a substantial factor on which appellee relied in hiring appellant. The Commission reversed the judge\u2019s decision, holding it had misapplied the Shippers Transport of Georgia v. Stepp decision and remanded the case for further proceedings on the entitlement of benefits issue.\nAt the second hearing before the law judge, appellant\u2019s claim was again denied, but on this occasion the law judge considered two documents that had not previously been introduced into evidence. In fact, after the Judge conducted his final hearing in this case, he notified the parties that he intended to make the documents a part of the record and solicited their comments on the matter. In response, appellant objected, stating that the parties had agreed at the end of the last hearing that the record was complete; however, if the judge decided to admit the two documents into evidence, appellant requested a hearing to present additional evidence concerning them. The judge overruled appellant\u2019s objection, including his request for a hearing. In support of his ruling, the judge reasoned that the Commission was not bound by technical or statutory rules of evidence and procedure, and besides, the documents had been in the Commission\u2019s file for two years, readily available to both the appellant and appellee. Upon its de novo review, the Commission affirmed the law judge\u2019s findings and denied appellant benefits.\nThe documents in question are a claim form and hospital insurance form; each has an \u201cX\u201d typed into a box indicating that appellant\u2019s injury was not related to his job at Tyson Foods. In its argument, Tyson admits the documents are relevant to the work-relation issue but contends the law judge and Commission did not rely on those documents in their decisions. We simply cannot agree with that contention. Neither the judge nor the Commission indicated they did not consider the documents in denying benefits to appellant, and in fact, they indicated just the opposite. The Commission conducted a de novo review, and we must presume it considered all the evidence in the record. Also, as was the law judge\u2019s, the Commission\u2019s decision was based, at least in part, on the credibility (or lack thereof) of the appellant\u2019s testimony. The documents clearly bore on that issue of credibility since the Commission apparently disbelieved appellant\u2019s story that he suffered his back injury while employed at Tyson.\nWe agree, of course, that the compensation law provides that the Commission is not bound by technical rules of evidence or procedure, but may \u201cconduct the hearing in a manner as will best ascertain the rights of the parties.\u201d St. Paul Insurance Co. v. Touzin, 267 Ark. 539, 592 S.W.2d 447 (1980); and Davis v. C & M Tractor Co., 4 Ark. App. 34, 627 S.W.2d 561 (1982); Ark. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 81-1327 (Repl. 1976). However, the fact-finders are expected to adhere to basic rules of fair play, such as recognizing the right of cross-examination and the necessity of having all the evidence in the record. St. Paul Insurance Co. v. Touzin, supra. Here, the appellant was effectively denied a hearing concerning the documents admitted and considered by the law judge and was thereby precluded from cross-examining the individuals who completed the two exhibits. It was only after the conclusion of the final hearing before the law judge that appellant was apprised that the two documents would be considered in the judge\u2019s determination of appellant\u2019s claim for benefits. Although these two exhibits had been in the Commission\u2019s file, they had never been introduced or made a part of the record until the law judge\u2019s belated decision to admit them.\nIn Potlatch Forests v. Funk, 239 Ark. 330, 389 S.W.2d 237 (1965), the Supreme Court upheld the admission of a doctor\u2019s opinion letter, but it did so because the doctor subsequently appeared as a witness and the appellant was afforded the opportunity to cross-examine. In a later case, Browning\u2019s Restaurant v. Kuykendall, 263 Ark. 374, 565 S.W.2d 33 (1978), the Court rejected appellant\u2019s argument that the Commission erred in admitting into evidence a doctor\u2019s letter written subsequent to the findings of the administrative law judge; however, it found no merit in appellant\u2019s argument because the Commission specifically stated the doctor\u2019s letter was disregarded for the purposes of arriving at its decision.\nAs we have previously noted, appellant was denied any opportunity to cross-examine or to be heard concerning the two relevant documents. The Commission did not indicate, nor can we assume, that it did not consider these documents in reaching its decision. Therefore, we reverse and remand this cause for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.\nReversed and remanded.\nCracraft and Cooper, JJ., agree.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Tom Glaze, Judge."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Ronald, C. McCann, for appellant.",
      "Bassett Law Firm, by: Wm. Robert Still, Jr., for appellees."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "James D. BREWER v. TYSON FOODS, INC. et al\nCA 83-273\n661 S.W.2d 423\nCourt of Appeals of Arkansas Division I\nOpinion delivered November 30, 1983\nRonald, C. McCann, for appellant.\nBassett Law Firm, by: Wm. Robert Still, Jr., for appellees."
  },
  "file_name": "0088-01",
  "first_page_order": 110,
  "last_page_order": 113
}