{ "id": 6141881, "name": "Jonathon MILLER v. STATE of Arkansas", "name_abbreviation": "Miller v. State", "decision_date": "2007-12-05", "docket_number": "CA CR 07-501", "first_page": "391", "last_page": "394", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "100 Ark. App. 391" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "269 S.W.3d 400" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark. Ct. App.", "id": 13370, "name": "Arkansas Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "9 S.W.3d 501", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.3d", "case_ids": [ 1365238, 1365311 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "504" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/340/0307-01", "/ark/340/0302-01" ] }, { "cite": "340 Ark. 302", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1365311 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "306-07" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/340/0302-01" ] }, { "cite": "364 Ark. 26", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 3035854 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "30-32" }, { "page": "96-97" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/364/0026-01" ] }, { "cite": "352 Ark. 278", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1159669 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "288" }, { "page": "701" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/352/0278-01" ] }, { "cite": "33 S.W.3d 122", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.3d", "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "343 Ark. 159", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 226543 ], "weight": 8, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "167" }, { "page": "120" }, { "page": "170" }, { "page": "122" }, { "page": "171" }, { "page": "123" }, { "page": "170-71" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/343/0159-01" ] }, { "cite": "347 Ark. 606", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 683325 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "609" }, { "page": "607" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/347/0606-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 378, "char_count": 6107, "ocr_confidence": 0.743, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.8591662004228935e-08, "percentile": 0.3663773447795605 }, "sha256": "ad3c6bb7b0d14f3c243c4506a0b838f467e68d064322b8e784c0d5d653a9347c", "simhash": "1:6f29578cfcc3e7e1", "word_count": 1040 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:52:18.034517+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Vaught and Miller, JJ., agree." ], "parties": [ "Jonathon MILLER v. STATE of Arkansas" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "D.P. Marshall Jr., Judge.\nThis case is about a criminal defendant\u2019s right to a speedy trial. Jonathon Miller was arrested on 12 September 2005 on drug charges. His case was set for trial on three dates in the spring and summer of 2006, but was not tried on any of those dates. On 4 October 2006, one year and twenty-two days after he was arrested, Miller had his day in court. A jury convicted him of the drug charges. He now appeals that conviction, arguing that the State violated his right to a speedy trial. After our de novo review, Cherry v. State, 347 Ark. 606, 609, 66 S.W.3d 605, 607 (2002), we agree.\nBecause Miller was released on bond before trial, his arrest date started the one-year, speedy-trial clock. Ark. R. Crim. P. 28.2(a). In Miller\u2019s motion to dismiss, he showed that his case did not go to trial until more than one year after he was arrested. Miller thus presented a prima facie case of a speedy-trial violation. The burden shifted to the State to show that the delay resulted from Miller\u2019s conduct or was otherwise justified. Ferguson v. State, 343 Ark. 159, 167, 33 S.W.3d 115, 120 (2000); Ark. R. Crim. P. 28.1(b).\nThe circuit court first concluded that two periods of delay were excludable because they resulted from pretrial motions. Before Miller\u2019s case went to trial, the State moved for a speedy-trial exclusion stating that the case did not go to trial on 27 June 2006 because of a congested docket. Miller also moved to reveal the identity of a confidential informant, to sever his offenses, and for sanctions. In its order denying Miller\u2019s motion to dismiss, the circuit court excluded thirty days for the State\u2019s motion, and held that Miller\u2019s motions had also \u201ctolled speedy trial for at least thirty days.\u201d Either exclusion, if proper, would bring Miller\u2019s trial within the required one-year period.\nThe State, however, did not demonstrate that any delay resulted from any of the pretrial motions. The words of Rule 28.3(a) make clear that actual delay is the criterion. That Rule excludes:\nThe period of delay resulting from other proceedings concerning the defendant, including but not limited to an examination and hearing on the competency of the defendant and the period during which he is incompetent to stand trial, hearings on pretrial motions, interlocutory appeals, and trials of other charges against the defendant. No pretrial motion shall be held under advisement for more than thirty (30) days, and the period of time in excess of thirty (30) days during which any such motion is held under advisement shall not be considered an excluded period.\nArk. R. Crim. P. 28.3(a) (emphasis added).\nIn Ferguson, supra, our supreme court discussed the meaning of \u201chearings on pretrial motions.\u201d It stated that \u201cthe excluded period contemplated by the rule begins at the time the pretrial motion is made and includes those periods of delay attributable to the defendant until the motion is heard by the court and not more than thirty days thereafter.\u201d 343 Ark. at 170, 33 S.W.3d at 122. In Ferguson, for example, the parties filed numerous pretrial motions, and the circuit court granted at least one continuance so the parties could obtain information relevant to the pretrial motions. After various hearings, the circuit court took the motions under advisement and requested briefs from both parties before issuing its rulings. The proceedings on the motions delayed the trial. 343 Ark. at 171, 33 S.W.3d at 123.\nThis case is different. Here, no delay resulted from the pretrial motions. The State did not respond to Miller\u2019s motions, nor did the court rule on them, until the day of Miller\u2019s trial. Miller did not respond to the State\u2019s motion until two days before the trial. No pretrial hearings about the motions took place. There is nothing in the record to indicate that the circuit court granted any continuance as a result of these pretrial motions. The circuit court never took any of the motions \u201cunder advisement,\u201d and therefore the Rule\u2019s 30-day maximum exclusion for the court\u2019s consideration of motions simply does not apply.\nThe act of filing a pretrial motion does not toll the speedy-trial period. Some delay attributable to the defendant must actually result from the motion. If we were to hold otherwise, then the State could postpone a defendant\u2019s trial for more than a year any time the State or the defendant filed any motion \u2014 even if the motion caused no delay. Ferguson, 343 Ark. at 170-71, 33 S.W.3d 122-23. The circuit court\u2019s reading of Rule 28.3 would undermine the State\u2019s obligation to bring Miller to trial within twelve months of the date of his arrest absent the limited circumstances outlined in the Rule. Zangerl v. State, 352 Ark. 278, 288, 100 S.W.3d 695, 701 (2003).\nThe circuit court also concluded that a period of time was excludable because the court\u2019s trial calendar was congested. The court\u2019s decision on this issue, however, does not satisfy Rule 28.3(b)\u2019s requirements. Though the order describes the circuit court\u2019s busy schedule during part of the summer in 2006, it does not address any prejudice that might have resulted to Miller from this delay, nor does it explain why Miller was not brought to trial on any of the open days on the trial calendar. The court\u2019s ruling about docket congestion was therefore insufficient. Berry v. Henry, 364 Ark. 26, 30-32, 216 S.W.3d 93, 96-97 (2005); Ark. R. Crim. P. 28.3(b)(1)-(3).\nMiller was not required to \u201cbring himself to trial or to bang at the courthouse door.\u201d Gwin v. State, 340 Ark. 302, 306-07, 9 S.W.3d 501, 504 (2000). The State did not show that its delay in trying Miller either resulted from his conduct or was otherwise justified. The circuit court\u2019s contrary conclusion was error. We therefore reverse Miller\u2019s conviction, and dismiss this case. Ark. R. Crim. P. 28.1(c) and 30.1.\nVaught and Miller, JJ., agree.", "type": "majority", "author": "D.P. Marshall Jr., Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Gary McDonald, for appellant.", "Dustin McDaniel, Att\u2019y Gen., by: Carolyn Boies Nitta, Ass\u2019t Att\u2019y Gen., for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Jonathon MILLER v. STATE of Arkansas\nCA CR 07-501\n269 S.W.3d 400\nCourt of Appeals of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered December 5, 2007\nGary McDonald, for appellant.\nDustin McDaniel, Att\u2019y Gen., by: Carolyn Boies Nitta, Ass\u2019t Att\u2019y Gen., for appellee." }, "file_name": "0391-01", "first_page_order": 419, "last_page_order": 422 }