{
  "id": 6139720,
  "name": "Claudia PROWS v. ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT of HEALTH and HUMAN SERVICES",
  "name_abbreviation": "Prows v. Arkansas Department of Health & Human Services",
  "decision_date": "2008-04-30",
  "docket_number": "CA 07-1219",
  "first_page": "205",
  "last_page": "210",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "102 Ark. App. 205"
    },
    {
      "type": "parallel",
      "cite": "283 S.W.3d 637"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ark. Ct. App.",
    "id": 13370,
    "name": "Arkansas Court of Appeals"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 34,
    "name_long": "Arkansas",
    "name": "Ark."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "360 Ark. 340",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
      "case_ids": [
        5459787
      ],
      "weight": 2,
      "year": 2005,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "355"
        },
        {
          "page": "401"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ark/360/0340-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "372 Ark. 32",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
      "case_ids": [
        3507822
      ],
      "weight": 2,
      "year": 2007,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "36"
        },
        {
          "page": "800"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ark/372/0032-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "98 Ark. App. 57",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark. App.",
      "case_ids": [
        6137162
      ],
      "weight": 2,
      "year": 2007,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "67"
        },
        {
          "page": "285"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ark-app/98/0057-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 9-27-341",
      "category": "laws:leg_statute",
      "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.",
      "weight": 6,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "parenthetical": "b"
        },
        {
          "page": "(b)(3)(B)(i)"
        },
        {
          "parenthetical": "a"
        },
        {
          "page": "(a)(4)(A)"
        },
        {
          "page": "(b)(3)(B)(i)"
        },
        {
          "page": "(a)(3)"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0
    }
  ],
  "analysis": {
    "cardinality": 476,
    "char_count": 7683,
    "ocr_confidence": 0.758,
    "pagerank": {
      "raw": 3.3372352789826064e-07,
      "percentile": 0.8739515315371669
    },
    "sha256": "b8f7b6f985d4e4e61e3a55ddfdaa357c3471d9e8a8d17cdcb25647a9893a3648",
    "simhash": "1:edde7b16ba8656d5",
    "word_count": 1253
  },
  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:30:35.503442+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "Pittman, C.J., and Robbins, J., agree."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "Claudia PROWS v. ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT of HEALTH and HUMAN SERVICES"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "D.P. Marshall Jr., Judge.\nClaudia Prows has a long history of mental disease and has been diagnosed with bipolar disorder and paranoid schizophrenia. She appeals the termination of her parental rights to her young son, Z.C. Claudia raises several points on appeal, including that the circuit court erred as a matter of law by ruling that it could not consider her recent mental stability. We agree. Because we reverse and remand on this point, we do not address her other arguments.\nClaudia\u2019s mental instability has greatly affected her ability to care for her son since he was born in April 2005. DHS removed Z.C. from his parents\u2019 custody about five months after his birth because Claudia\u2019s \u201cstate of mind and her concerns that someone might be coming to get her child\u201d made it unsafe for Z.C. to stay in his parents\u2019 home. Claudia and her husband stipulated that Z.C. was dependent-neglected, and the circuit court so held in an October 2005 order. After that adjudication, Dr. Lloyd Spencer diagnosed Claudia with bipolar disorder. Dr. Spencer tried but failed to stabilize Claudia\u2019s condition with medication. For the next year and a half, Claudia missed doctor\u2019s appointments and did not take her medication consistently. Dr. Spencer concluded that the adverse effects from her medications caused her to stop taking them. During that time, Claudia had some excellent visits with her son, while others were failures. For example, DHS placed Z.C. in Claudia\u2019s care for a thirty-day trial placement. But after a week, Claudia gave Z.C. back to DHS because she was unable to care for him. Shortly thereafter, the circuit court entered a permanency-planning order changing the goal of the case to termination and adoption.\nIn February 2007 \u2014\u25a0 about four months after DHS filed its termination petition \u2014 Claudia told Dr. Spencer that she needed his help to prevent losing Z.C. permanently. She began following his recommendations and seeing him frequently. He corrected her medications and began regular therapy. During the next six months, Claudia\u2019s mental state improved.\nAt the termination hearing in late August 2007, Dr. Spencer testified that, although Claudia was not ready to be a single parent that day, he has seen \u201ca great deal\u201d of improvement in her since February 2007. He concluded that she was capable of supervised visits with Z.C. immediately, and would probably be ready for unsupervised visits in three to six months. He could not give a date certain when Claudia could manage sole custody. Nor did he testify that she would never be capable of being Z.C.\u2019s parent. Claudia did not argue that her mental problems were a disability that would implicate the Americans with Disabilities Act and allow for \u201creasonable accommodations\u201d by .DHS. Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 9-27-341 (b)(3)(B)(vii){b) (Repl. 2008).\nThe circuit court ruled from the bench that \u201cthis is probably one of the hardest cases I\u2019ve had to decide ... so I went back and started reading the Code .. . once I read the law it\u2019s actually crystal clear ... if [Z.C.] is not able to go home today, then I have to terminate . . ..\u201d It then terminated Claudia\u2019s parental rights on the grounds that Z.C. had been out of her custody for twelve months and, despite a meaningful effort to rehabilitate her and correct the conditions that caused Z.C.\u2019s removal from the home, those conditions had not been remedied. Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 9-27-341(b)(3)(B)(i).\nIn its termination order, the court also stated that \u201c[t]he fact that Mother has had some recent stability cannot play a role according to ACA 9-27-341(b)(3)(B)(vii).\u201d After our de novo review, Ivers v. Dep\u2019t of Human Servs., 98 Ark. App. 57, 67, 250 S.W.3d 279, 285 (2007), we conclude that the court made an error of law requiring reversal. The cited statute contains no such evidentiary bar. Arkansas Code Annotated section 9-27-341(b) (3) (B)(vii)(ij) allows termination on the following ground: We give this unambiguous statute its plain meaning. Rylwell, L.L.C. v. Arkansas Development Finance Authority, 372 Ark. 32, 36, 269 S.W.3d 797, 800 (2007). And this statute does not prohibit the circuit court\u2019s consideration of Claudia\u2019s recent mental stability.\nThat other factors or issues arose subsequent to the filing of the original petition for dependency-neglect that demonstrate that return of the juvenile to the custody of the parent is contrary to the juvenile\u2019s health, safety, or welfare and that, despite the offer of appropriate family services, the parent has manifested the incapacity or indifference to remedy the subsequent issues or factors or rehabilitate the parent\u2019s circumstances that prevent return of the juvenile to the custody of the parent.\nThe circuit court terminated Claudia\u2019s parental rights under subsection (i), not subsection (vii). That subsection likewise contains no prohibition on considering Claudia\u2019s recent improvements. The termination statute, moreover, required that the court consider Claudia\u2019s compliance during the entire dependency-neglect case and the evidence presented at the termination hearing in deciding whether termination was in Z.C.\u2019s best interest. Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 9-27-341 (a)(4)(B). Here the circuit court did not consider everything required by the statute.\nWe recognize that evidence of parental improvement as termination becomes imminent will not outweigh other evidence demonstrating a failure to remedy the situation that caused the child to be removed in the first place. Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 9-27-341(a)(4)(A); Camarillo-Cox v. Ark. Dep\u2019t of Human Servs., 360 Ark. 340, 355, 201 S.W.3d 391, 401 (2005). But the circuit court should have considered and weighed the evidence about Claudia\u2019s recent improvements. Its failure to do so was error. We therefore reverse and remand for consideration of Claudia\u2019s recent mental stability.\nThis legal error was not, as the attorney ad litem contends, harmless in light of the evidence supporting termination under Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 9-27-341(b)(3)(B)(i). The circuit court terminated Claudia\u2019s parental rights because of her mental instability and failure to remedy that condition. And the court\u2019s consideration of her recent stability may affect its conclusion. The circuit judge\u2019s statement from the bench that she had to terminate Claudia\u2019s parental rights if Z.C. was not able to go home with her immediately after the hearing was also incorrect. The statute does not impose this standard. The statute seeks stability for the child, while allowing a parent a reasonable time (all material things considered) to correct problems. Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 9-27-341(a)(3). According to the Department of Children and Family Services supervisor in this case, Z.C. has been in at least two foster homes and \u201ca couple of respites\u201d since DHS removed him from Claudia\u2019s care. Given the lack of stability thus far in Z.C.\u2019s life, and the court\u2019s incorrect statement of the law from the bench that it had to terminate if Z.C. could not go home on the day of the hearing, Claudia\u2019s recent mental stability may well affect the court\u2019s ultimate decision. We are therefore convinced that the court\u2019s failure to consider her improvements was not a harmless error.\nReversed and remanded.\nPittman, C.J., and Robbins, J., agree.\nThe circuit court also terminated Z.C.\u2019s father\u2019s parental rights. But the father did not appeal the termination.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "D.P. Marshall Jr., Judge."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Heather L. Schmiegelow, for appellant.",
      "Gray Allen Turner, Office of Chief Counsel, for appellee.",
      "Chrestman Group, PLLC, by: Keith L. Chrestman, attorney ad litem for the minor child."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "Claudia PROWS v. ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT of HEALTH and HUMAN SERVICES\nCA 07-1219\n283 S.W.3d 637\nCourt of Appeals of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered April 30, 2008\nHeather L. Schmiegelow, for appellant.\nGray Allen Turner, Office of Chief Counsel, for appellee.\nChrestman Group, PLLC, by: Keith L. Chrestman, attorney ad litem for the minor child."
  },
  "file_name": "0205-01",
  "first_page_order": 241,
  "last_page_order": 246
}
