{ "id": 6142315, "name": "The ESTATE of Jerry SLAUGHTER, La'Ronda Slaughter, Executrix v. CITY of HAMPTON, Municipal League WC Trust", "name_abbreviation": "Estate of Slaughter v. City of Hampton", "decision_date": "2008-06-04", "docket_number": "CA 07-1328", "first_page": "373", "last_page": "378", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "102 Ark. App. 373" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "285 S.W.3d 669" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark. Ct. App.", "id": 13370, "name": "Arkansas Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "213 Ark. 727", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1467069 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1948, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "denying workers' compensation benefits based on a common-law marriage claim" }, { "parenthetical": "denying workers' compensation benefits based on a common-law marriage claim" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/213/0727-01" ] }, { "cite": "335 Ark. 145", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 862801 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "citing the general rule" }, { "parenthetical": "citing the general rule" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/335/0145-01" ] }, { "cite": "98 Ark.App. 409", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6142420 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2007, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/98/0409-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 11-9", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 11-9-102", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(20)", "parenthetical": "A" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "52 Ark. App. 219", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6140491 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/52/0219-01" ] }, { "cite": "363 Ark. 281", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 3557276 ], "weight": 5, "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/363/0281-01" ] }, { "cite": "93 Ark. App. 160", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6138427 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/93/0160-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 11-9-527", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 553, "char_count": 10282, "ocr_confidence": 0.774, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.728108280744093e-08, "percentile": 0.4545332565721013 }, "sha256": "78e05d6363a39278b406beb4741c5dfd2ee03e4a4062cf62d5054f917857b7df", "simhash": "1:ad2269cbf55fd458", "word_count": 1704 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:30:35.503442+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Glover and Heffley, JJ., agree." ], "parties": [ "The ESTATE of Jerry SLAUGHTER, La\u2019Ronda Slaughter, Executrix v. CITY of HAMPTON, Municipal League WC Trust" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Wendell L.Griffen, Judge.\nPreviously, the Arkansas Workers\u2019 Compensation Commission (Commission) found that Jerry Slaughter did not suffer a compensable injury in the form of a chemical exposure that led to his death. We reversed and remanded that case. On remand, the Commission awarded appropriate death benefits pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 11-9-527 (Repl. 2002), except for widow\u2019s benefits. It denied widow\u2019s benefits to La\u2019Ronda Slaughter, Mr. Slaughter\u2019s widow, because she was not married to him when he suffered the chemical exposure. Mr. Slaughter\u2019s estate again appeals, arguing that the Commission erred in denying Mrs. Slaughter widow\u2019s benefits.\nThe Commission denied widow\u2019s benefits solely because Mrs. Slaughter was not married to the decedent when the injury occurred. The Commission\u2019s analysis is fatally simplistic because \u00a7 11-9-527 does not require Mrs. Slaughter to prove that she was legally married to Mr. Slaughter when the injury occurred, although she was required to prove that she was dependent on him at that time. Additionally, the Commission failed to make any finding regarding whether Mrs. Slaughter was actually and wholly dependent on Mr. Slaughter when he died. In short, because the Commission misapplied \u00a7 11-9-527 and failed to make all of the necessary findings, we reverse and remand the case for further proceedings.\nMrs. Slaughter testified that she and Mr. Slaughter met in July 2004 and began living together \u201cpretty close after that.\u201d She said that, as early as September 2004, both she and Mr. Slaughter wore wedding rings, and that they planned to marry in February 2005.\nMr. Slaughter suffered direct chlorine-gas exposure to his face, nose, and throat on November 17, 2004, which injured his lungs and ultimately led to his death. At that time, he and Mrs. Slaughter were living together but were not married. Mrs. Slaughter offered uncontroverted testimony that Mr. Slaughter moved in with her and that she signed the lease but that they initially split rent, utilities, and the cost of food. When Mr. Slaughter moved in, Mrs. Slaughter was working, but she lost her job on November 9. Thus, by the time Mr. Slaughter was injured on November 17, he paid all of their expenses.\nMr. Slaughter was not hospitalized for his compensable injury until December 22, 2004. He and Mrs. Slaughter were married in the hospital on January 5, 2005. Mr. Slaughter died ten days later, on January 15, 2005. Mrs. Slaughter was appointed as the administratrix of her husband\u2019s estate and subsequently pursued the workers\u2019 compensation claim that gave rise to this appeal.\nWhen reviewing a decision from the Workers\u2019 Compensation Commission, we view the evidence and all reasonable inferences deducible therefrom in the light most favorable to the findings of the Commission and affirm that decision if it is supported by substantial evidence. See Fayetteville School Dist. v. Kunzelman, 93 Ark. App. 160, 217 S.W.3d 149 (2005). Substantial evidence is that which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Id. The issue is not whether the appellate court might have reached a different result from the Commission; if reasonable minds could reach the result found by the Commission, the appellate court must affirm the decision. Id.\nThe sole issue in this case is whether the Commission erred in denying Mrs. Slaughter widow\u2019s benefits. The estate argues that the mere fact that Mrs. Slaughter was married to and wholly dependent on Mr. Slaughter for her support when he died entitles her to widow\u2019s benefits. It maintains that the relevant time for determining entitlement to widow\u2019s benefits is the date of Mr. Slaughter\u2019s death, not the date of his injury, because \u00a7 11-9-527 does not apply until a death occurs.\nThe employer counters that the correct date for determining Mrs. Slaughter\u2019s entitlement to widow\u2019s benefits is the date of the injury, not the date of Mr. Slaughter\u2019s death. It asserts that adopting the estate\u2019s construction of the relevant statutes would usurp the legislative function and would be completely contrary to the manner in which the compensation act is structured.\nThe issue on appeal may be resolved by a simple matter of statutory construction. Where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, we determine legislative intent from the ordinary meaning of the language used. See Rose v. Arkansas State Plant Bd., 363 Ark. 281, 213 S.W.3d 607 (2005). In considering the meaning of a statute, we construe it just as it reads, giving the words their ordinary and usually accepted meaning in common language. Id. We construe the statute so that no word is left void, superfluous or insignificant, and we give meaning and effect to every word in the statute, if possible. Id. Thus, we seek to construe the relevant statutes in the instant case in such a manner as to give effect to them all, if possible. Id.\nWidow\u2019s benefits are one class of death benefits available under the workers\u2019 compensation scheme. Section 11-9-527 provides in relevant part:\n(c) BENEFICIARIES \u2014 AMOUNTS. Subject to the limitations as set out in \u00a7\u00a7 11- 9-501 \u2014\u25a0 11-9-506, compensation for the death of an employee shall be paid to those persons who were wholly and actually dependent upon the deceased employee in the following percentage of the average weekly wage of the employee and in the following order of preference:\n(l)(A)(i) To the widow if there is no child, thirty-five percent (35%), and the compensation shall be paid until her death or remarriage.\n(ii) However, the widow shall establish, in fact, some dependency upon the deceased employee before she will be entitled to benefits as provided in this section[.]\nAdditionally, Arkansas Code Annotated \u00a7 11-9-527(h) provides that, \u201cAll questions of dependency shall be determined as of the time of the injury.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Dependency is an issue of fact rather than a question of law, and the issue is to be resolved based upon the facts present at the time of the compensable injury. See Hoskins v. Rogers Cold Storage, 52 Ark. App. 219, 916 S.W.2d 136 (1996).\nAccordingly, a person claiming entitlement to widow\u2019s benefits pursuant to \u00a7 11-9-527 (c)(1) (A) (i), must establish two things: 1) that she is the decedent employee\u2019s \u201cwidow\u201d; and 2) that she was wholly and actually dependent on the decedent at the time of the injury. In turn, a \u201cwidow\u201d is defined as \u201cthe decedent\u2019s legal wife, living with or dependent for support upon him at the time of his death.\u201d See Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 11-9-102(20) (A) (Supp. 2007). According to the introductory clause of \u00a7 11-9-102, the definitions supplied therein apply throughout the worker\u2019s compensation code. Therefore, the definition of widow under \u00a7 11-9-102(20)(A) governs the use of that term in \u00a7 11-9-527.\nClearly, the relevant date for determining questions of dependency is the date of the injury. See Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 11-9\u2014 527(h); Hoskins, supra. However, the definition of widow does not require a person to prove that she was married to the decedent on the date of the injury. See Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 ll-9-102(20)(A). Thus, whether someone is a widow is a separate determination that is not governed by \u00a7 ll-9-527(h). Stated another way, while a dependent\u2019s status turns on the date of the injury, a widow\u2019s status does not. It follows then, that, determining a person\u2019s status as a widow does not establish whether she is a dependent, and conversely, that establishing a person\u2019s status as a dependent neither proves nor disproves whether that person is a widow.\nBecause the definition of widow applies to \u00a7 11-9\u2014 527, effect may be given to all of the relevant statutes by requiring a person claiming benefits to satisfy each discrete requirement of \u00a7\u00a7 ll-9-102(20)(A), 11-9-527(c)(1)(A)(i), and ll-9-527(h). Hence, a person claiming to be a widow must show that she was legally married to and either living with or dependent upon the decedent when he died. See Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 ll-9-102(20)(A). A person claiming entitlement to widow\u2019s benefits must show that she is a widow and was dependent on the claimant when he was injured. See Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 ll-9-527(c)(l)(A)(i) and \u00a7 11-9-527(h). On remand, the Commission should determine whether the estate met its burden of proof under these statutes.\nBecause the Commission failed to reconcile the definition of widow under \u00a7 11-9-102(20) (A) with the requirements of \u00a7 11-9-527(c) and (h), and failed to make the appropriate findings, we reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.\nReversed and remanded.\nGlover and Heffley, JJ., agree.\nSee Estate of Slaughter v. City of Hampton, 98 Ark.App. 409, 255 S.W.3d 872 (2007).\nThe employer also reminds this court that Arkansas generally does not recognize common-law marriages entered into within the State of Arkansas as legal marriages, even for workers\u2019 compensation purposes. See Ark. Const, amend. 83 (defining marriage); Rockefeller v. Rocktfeller, 335 Ark. 145, 980 S.W.2d 255 (1998) (citing the general rule); and Orsburn v. Graves, 213 Ark. 727, 210 S.W.2d 496 (1948) (denying workers\u2019 compensation benefits based on a common-law marriage claim). Nonetheless, this case does not involve a common-law marriage because Mrs. Slaughter was legally married to Mr. Slaughter when he died.\nNone of the limitations set out in these provisions are relevant in this case.\nIt is not a usurpation of the legislative function to apply different dates for the injury and for the resulting death because the Act already does so. In fact, \u00a7 11-9-527 itself reflects that the legislature recognizes that the date of death may be different from the date of injury. Section 11-9-527(b) provides: \u201cIf death does not result within one (1) year from the date of the accident or within the first three (3) years of the period for compensation payments fixed by the compensation order, a rebuttable presumption shall arise that the death did not result from the injury.\u201d", "type": "majority", "author": "Wendell L.Griffen, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Compton, Prewett, Thomas & Hickey, LLP, by: F. Mattison Thomas, III, for appellant.", "J. Chris Bradley, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "The ESTATE of Jerry SLAUGHTER, La\u2019Ronda Slaughter, Executrix v. CITY of HAMPTON, Municipal League WC Trust\nCA 07-1328\n285 S.W.3d 669\nCourt of Appeals of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered June 4, 2008\nCompton, Prewett, Thomas & Hickey, LLP, by: F. Mattison Thomas, III, for appellant.\nJ. Chris Bradley, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0373-01", "first_page_order": 409, "last_page_order": 414 }