{ "id": 6142494, "name": "Christopher Wayne ROBERTS v. Robin Yanyan YANG", "name_abbreviation": "Roberts v. Yang", "decision_date": "2008-06-04", "docket_number": "CA 07-1112", "first_page": "384", "last_page": "388", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "102 Ark. App. 384" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "285 S.W.3d 689" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark. Ct. App.", "id": 13370, "name": "Arkansas Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "339 Ark. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 130706 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "6" }, { "page": "63" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/339/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "99 Ark. App. 159", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6139340 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "161-62", "parenthetical": "grounds" }, { "page": "406", "parenthetical": "grounds" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/99/0159-01" ] }, { "cite": "48 Ark. App. 236", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6141087 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "237", "parenthetical": "residence" }, { "page": "147", "parenthetical": "residence" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/48/0236-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 9-12-315", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "a" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "94 S.W.2d 720", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "year": 1936, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "721" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "192 Ark. 728", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1415005 ], "year": 1936, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "730-31" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/192/0728-01" ] }, { "cite": "1879 WL 1317", "category": "reporters:specialty_west", "reporter": "WL", "year": 1879, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "34 Ark. 410", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1875678 ], "year": 1879, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "419" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/34/0410-01" ] }, { "cite": "229 Ark. 842", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1702711 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1958, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "843-50" }, { "page": "794-97" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/229/0842-01" ] }, { "cite": "683 S.W.2d 611", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "612" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "284 Ark. 487", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1878667 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "489" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/284/0487-01" ] }, { "cite": "227 Ark. 624", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1705628 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1957, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "625" }, { "page": "274" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/227/0624-01" ] }, { "cite": "365 Ark. 465", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 3287014 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "470" }, { "page": "623" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/365/0465-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 9-12-307", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "weight": 5, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)(1)(B)" }, { "page": "(a)(l)(A)" }, { "page": "(b)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "90 Ark. App. 321", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6140708 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "326" }, { "page": "860-61" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/90/0321-01" ] }, { "cite": "65 Ark. App. 272", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6141106 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "276" }, { "page": "143" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/65/0272-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 583, "char_count": 9921, "ocr_confidence": 0.781, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.552296427427885e-07, "percentile": 0.674833359010506 }, "sha256": "7f872371a7cf564e44d3110e7da647db62fd60919167f150f6f693ac3f8f4cc8", "simhash": "1:03195de0046cce10", "word_count": 1659 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:30:35.503442+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Hart and Gladwin, JJ., agree." ], "parties": [ "Christopher Wayne ROBERTS v. Robin Yanyan YANG" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "D.P. Marshall Jr., Judge.\nChristopher Roberts appeals the circuit court\u2019s decree divorcing him from Robin Yanyan Yang. Roberts argues two points. He first asks us to reverse the decree because Yang failed to prove that one of the parties resided in Arkansas for the three months right before the circuit court entered the decree. He also contends that the court violated the controlling statute by ordering a private sale of the marital home. Yang did not file an opposing brief. Instead, she filed a letter stating that she \u201cdoes not contest either of the appellant\u2019s two points on appeal, and she anticipates a reversal and remand of the case to the circuit court for further proceedings.\u201d\nYang\u2019s confession of error makes the case seem straightforward. We have an independent obligation, however, to evaluate Roberts\u2019s arguments for reversal on the record presented and the governing law. \u201cThe proper administration of the law cannot be left merely to the stipulation of the parties.\u201d Burrell v. State, 65 Ark. App. 272, 276, 986 S.W.2d 141, 143 (1999). We must pass judgment on whether reversible error occurred.\nWe first hold that no error occurred on the residence issue. As Roberts contends, adequate proof of the statute\u2019s residence requirements is a necessary part of the circuit court\u2019s subject matter jurisdiction over a divorce complaint. Rogers v. Rogers, 90 Ark. App. 321, 326, 205 S.W.3d 856, 860-61 (2005). We quote the governing statute in full in the margin. The dispositive provision for this case is (a)(1)(A). Roberts argues that this provision requires corroborated proof that either he or Yang resided in Arkansas for the three months immediately preceding the decree.\nHere are the material facts distilled from the court filings, Yang\u2019s testimony, and her corroborating witness\u2019s testimony. Yang and Roberts resided in Arkansas (except for one briefperiod) as husband and wife from sometime in 1999 (or before) through November 2005. Within the next few weeks, Yang filed for divorce and served Roberts. She moved into an apartment in Little Rock soon thereafter. She continued to reside in Arkansas until November 2006, when she moved to New York. The circuit court entered the divorce decree in July 2007. All the facts about Roberts\u2019s residence are not abstracted or in the addendum. The record indicates that he was probably an Arkansas resident throughout the case. But we focus on Yang\u2019s residence because the facts about Roberts\u2019s residence are thin and because Roberts argues his appeal by focusing on Yang\u2019s residence.\nWe hold that the undisputed facts about Yang\u2019s residence, and the filing dates of her complaint and the court\u2019s decree, satisfy the statute. She resided in Arkansas for the \u201csixty (60) days next before the commencement of the action\u201d in November 2005. She had resided in Arkansas for several years before commencing her divorce case, which satisfied the second condition of (a)(1)(A): \u201cresidence in the state for three (3) full months before the final judgment granting the decree of divorce.\u201d And she remained an Arkansas resident for almost a year after filing her case. There is no contention made that the statute\u2019s thirty-day cooling-off period between commencement and decree, Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 9-12-307(a)(1)(B), was not satisfied. The record leaves no doubt that it was.\nWe reject Roberts\u2019s argument that the statute requires three-months\u2019 residence immediately before entry of the decree. The plain meaning of the provision does not establish this requirement. Farrell v. Farrell, 365 Ark. 465, 470, 231 S.W.3d 619, 623 (2006). Moreover, Roberts\u2019s authority for this proposition, Troillet v. Troillet, 227 Ark. 624, 300 S.W.2d 273 (1957), did not construe the current version of our statute.\nThe statute once stated: \u201c[t]he plaintiff, to obtain a divorce, must prove, but need not allege, in addition to a legal cause of divorce: First, a residence in the State for three (3) months next before the final judgment granting a divorce in the action and a residence for two (2) months next before the commencement of the action.\u201d Troillet, 227 Ark. at 625, 300 S.W.2d at 274 (quoting Ark. Stat. \u00a7 34-1208, the ancestor of Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 9-12-307). Act 36 of 1957 amended this provision. Among other things, the 1957 Act eliminated the word \u201cnext\u201d as the qualifying adjective describing the requirement of three months\u2019 residence before the decree. If there is an ambiguity in the current provision, this amendment dispels it. Because \u201cthe legislators specifically deleted the word]] [next], we find it impossible to believe that they really meant for that deletion to be meaningless.\u201d Frolic Footwear, Inc. v. State, 284 Ark. 487, 489, 683 S.W.2d 611, 612 (1985). The 1957 amendment undermines Roberts\u2019s reading of the current version of Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 9-12-307(a)(l)(A).\nThe statute indicates its purpose. In Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 9-12-307(b), the statute defines residence as \u201cactual presence,\u201d equates adequate proof of presence with domicile, and states that these criteria embody our state\u2019s public policy. Wheat v. Wheat, 229 Ark. 842, 843-50, 318 S.W.2d 793, 794-97 (1958). The residence requirements not only secure subject matter jurisdiction, they likewise confirm Arkansas\u2019s interest in the dispute and prevent nonresidents from litigating their divorces here. We see no warrant in this statute for requiring Arkansas residents who seek a divorce, and who have satisfied the statutory residence conditions, to either remain in Arkansas until the circuit court enters a decree or, if they have moved after filing, return for a few months before the decree is entered. The statute\u2019s words do not require that reading, and the increasingly mobile nature of society counsels against it.\n\u201cJurisdiction of the court to dissolve a marriage is in rem with the marriage being the res[.]\u201d 2 David Newbern & John J. Watkins, Arkansas Practice Series, Civil Practice and Procedure \u00a7 38:2 at 702 (4th ed. 2006). Once the circuit court acquires jurisdiction by the parties\u2019 satisfaction of all the residence conditions, the court does not then lose jurisdiction simply because the parties later happen to relocate out of state. \u201c[Wjhere a court once rightfully acquires jurisdiction of a cause, it has the right to retain and decide. ... It is quite clear that the jurisdiction of the court depends upon the state of things at the time of the action brought, and, after vesting, it can not be ousted by subsequent events.\u201d Estes v. Martin, 34 Ark. 410, 419, 1879 WL 1317 (1879); see also Wasson v. Dodge, 192 Ark. 728, 730-31, 94 S.W.2d 720, 721 (1936). Here, because of Yang\u2019s extended Arkansas residence, the circuit court\u2019s jurisdiction vested \u2014 subject to later corroborated proof of the jurisdictional facts \u2014 when she commenced the case. Yang\u2019s later relocation did not oust the court from having the power to decide her complaint.\nRoberts\u2019s second point has merit, but he waived it in the circuit court. When marital property must be sold to be divided, the controlling statute requires a public sale. Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 9-12-315 (a)(3)(B) (Repl. 2008). Here the circuit court ordered a private sale. Roberts did not object to this sale procedure when the circuit court made its bench ruling or when the court entered its decree.\nRoberts now points out the circuit court\u2019s error under the statute. His objection comes too late. This issue is not a sufficiency-of-the-evidence question, which we may address on appeal after a bench trial even if no objection was made in the circuit court. Ark. R. Civ. P. 52(b)(2). Nor is this issue like residence and grounds, statutory prerequisites for divorce which are open to challenge on appeal notwithstanding a waiver below. Araneda v. Araneda, 48 Ark. App. 236, 237, 894 S.W.2d 146, 147 (1995) (residence); Dee v. Dee, 99 Ark. App. 159, 161-62, 258 S.W.3d 405, 406 (2007) (grounds). Having not called the defect in the sale procedure to the circuit court\u2019s attention and given that court an opportunity to correct it, Roberts cannot challenge this point now. Myrick v. Myrick, 339 Ark. 1, 6, 2 S.W.3d 60, 63 (1999).\nAffirmed.\nHart and Gladwin, JJ., agree.\n(a) To obtain a divorce, the plaintiff must prove, but need not allege, in addition to a legal cause of divorce:\n(1)(A) A residence in the state by either the plaintiff or defendant for sixty (60) days next before the commencement of the action and a residence in the state for three (3) full months before the final judgment granting the decree of divorce.\n(B) No decree of divorce, however, shall be granted until at least thirty (30) days have elapsed from the date of the filing of the complaint.\n(C) When personal service cannot be had upon the defendant or when the defendant fails to enter his or her appearance in the action, no decree of divorce shall be granted the plaintiff until the plaintiff has maintained an actual residence in the State of Arkansas for a period of not less than three (3) full months;\n(2) That the cause of action and cause of divorce occurred or existed in this state or, if out of the state, that it was a legal cause of divorce in this state, the laws of this state to govern exclusively and independendy of the laws of any other state as to the cause of divorce; and\n(3) That the cause of divorce occurred or existed within five (5) years next before the commencement of the suit.\n(b) \u201cResidence\u201d as used in subsection (a) of this section is defined to mean actual presence, and upon proof of that the part alleging and offering the proof shall be considered domiciled in the state, and this is declared to be the legislative intent and public policy of the State of Arkansas.\nArk. Code Ann. \u00a7 9-12-307 (Repl. 2008).", "type": "majority", "author": "D.P. Marshall Jr., Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Tripcony Law Firm, P.A., by: James L. Tripcony, for appellant.", "No response." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Christopher Wayne ROBERTS v. Robin Yanyan YANG\nCA 07-1112\n285 S.W.3d 689\nCourt of Appeals of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered June 4, 2008\nTripcony Law Firm, P.A., by: James L. Tripcony, for appellant.\nNo response." }, "file_name": "0384-01", "first_page_order": 420, "last_page_order": 424 }