{ "id": 6136483, "name": "Barbara JENKINS v. Timothy Wayne JENKINS", "name_abbreviation": "Jenkins v. Jenkins", "decision_date": "2008-06-18", "docket_number": "CA 07-850", "first_page": "21", "last_page": "24", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "103 Ark. App. 21" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "285 S.W.3d 704" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark. Ct. App.", "id": 13370, "name": "Arkansas Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "83 Ark. App. 145", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6138513 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "holding person not bound by agreement read into record without expressing assent in open court" }, { "parenthetical": "holding person not bound by agreement read into record without expressing assent in open court" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/83/0145-01" ] }, { "cite": "8 Ark. App. 177", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6139835 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/8/0177-01" ] }, { "cite": "25 Ark. App. 221", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6140326 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/25/0221-01" ] }, { "cite": "60 Ark. App. 164", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6138681 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/60/0164-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 354, "char_count": 5567, "ocr_confidence": 0.79, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.89950402824256e-08, "percentile": 0.30838554680214947 }, "sha256": "ee25a5f5b6fd7d10349f289ae43749ceebc44390be42420c7d187b1f0e40e49c", "simhash": "1:1f2dd3326d6c79df", "word_count": 876 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:49:33.837419+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Robbins and Griffen, JJ., agree." ], "parties": [ "Barbara JENKINS v. Timothy Wayne JENKINS" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Larry D. Vaught, Judge.\nThis appeal is taken from the divorce decree ending the fifteen-year marriage of appellant Barbara Jenkins and appellee Timothy Jenkins. The decree incorporated a property-settlement agreement that was recited to a court reporter prior to trial. For reversal, appellant takes issue with the trial court\u2019s ruling that the settlement agreement was binding and enforceable. She argues that the agreement should be construed under contract law; that there was no meeting of the minds; and that the Statute of Frauds required the agreement to be in writing. We reverse and remand.\nThe facts of this case are simple. Appellant filed an action for divorce on February 22, 2005. Appellee filed his answer and counterclaim on March 10, 2005. The parties, and their respective attorneys, appeared on August 25, 2005, for a scheduled deposition of appellee at the offices of appellant\u2019s attorney, Harold King. However, instead of taking depositions, the parties began to negotiate a settlement of the divorce action. Appellant\u2019s attorney proposed a settlement to the divorce. The same day, Mr. King recited the terms of the parties\u2019 agreement to a certified court reporter.\nThe parties\u2019 agreement was subsequently reduced to a writing prepared by Mr. King. The writing, dated September 20, 2005, purported to be the \u201c1st \u2018rough\u2019 draft\u201d of the agreement. And, indeed, there were several hand-written modifications to the \u201cdraft,\u201d presumably (but not clearly) made by appellee. Further, the writing contained several additional terms of the settlement that were not recorded in the August 25 agreement. These additional terms included the parties\u2019 proposed visitation for their minor children, the disposition of an investment account, and the decision to quit-claim deed several jointly owned properties. There was a final, written property-settlement agreement submitted to the trial court. However, this document was not signed by appellant.\nOn September 22, 2006, appellee filed a motion to enforce the parties\u2019 property-settlement agreement (which he identified as the statements made on the record in the proceeding before the court reporter on August 25, 2005). Appellant responded to the motion alleging that the agreement was not enforceable because there was no mutual agreement; and no \u201csigned writing establishing an agreement.\u201d She further argued that because the agreement involved the transfer of real property the Statute of Frauds required that the settlement be in writing. The trial court rejected appellant\u2019s position and concluded that the parties were bound by the oral agreement they had entered into on August 25, 2005. The court also recognized that the written recitation of the agreement varied in both terms and scope from the original oral agreement but concluded that such modifications \u201cin no way invalidate [d]\u201d the parties\u2019 prior agreement. The court then entered a final divorce decree, incorporating the terms of the written document purporting to be a recitation of the prior oral agreement.\nAppellant filed a notice of appeal, arguing that the trial court erred in its conclusion that the parties had previously entered into an enforceable settlement agreement because there was no signed writing and no meeting of the minds. We review these allegations of error using a de novo standard, and begin our legal analysis by examining the statutory rules relating to the enforcement of separation agreements. Arkansas Code Annotated section 9-12-313 (Repl. 2008) provides:\nCourts of equity may enforce the performance of written agreements between husband and wife made and entered into in contemplation of either separation or divorce and decrees or orders for alimony and maintenance by sequestration of the property of either party, or that of his or her sureties, or by such other lawful ways and means, including equitable garnishments or contempt proceedings, as are in conformity with rules and practices of courts of equity.\n(Emphasis added.) However, oral stipulations dictated in open court have the force and effect of a binding agreement. Bishop v. Bishop, 60 Ark. App. 164, 961 S.W.2d 770 (1998); Kunz v. Jarnigan, 25 Ark. App. 221, 756 S.W.2d 913 (1988); Linehan v. Linehan, 8 Ark. App. 177, 649 S.W.2d 837 (1983). But, in order to be bound by the oral stipulations, the parties affected by the stipulations must express their assent to the terms of the agreement in open court. See Baker v. Daves, 83 Ark. App. 145, 119 S.W.3d 53 (2003) (holding person not bound by agreement read into record without expressing assent in open court).\nHere, the parties had no written agreement under which the trial court could order performance. The parties initial recitation of their agreement was unilateral and was not conducted in open court \u2014 appellant\u2019s attorney outlined the general terms of the agreement to a court reporter, prior to the court hearing. Appellant never assented to the \u201coral stipulations\u201d of the agreement in open court, and vigorously refuted the existence of an agreement at the hearing before the circuit judge. Therefore, the trial court erred in its conclusion that appellant was a party to a binding agreement.\nReversed and remanded.\nRobbins and Griffen, JJ., agree.", "type": "majority", "author": "Larry D. Vaught, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Brown & McKissic, LLP, by: Gene E. McKissic, for appellant.", "Virginia \u201cGinger\u201d Atkinson and William F. Sherman, for appel-lee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Barbara JENKINS v. Timothy Wayne JENKINS\nCA 07-850\n285 S.W.3d 704\nCourt of Appeals of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered June 18, 2008\n[Rehearing denied August 20, 2008.]\nBrown & McKissic, LLP, by: Gene E. McKissic, for appellant.\nVirginia \u201cGinger\u201d Atkinson and William F. Sherman, for appel-lee.\nHEFFLEY,J., would grant rehearing." }, "file_name": "0021-01", "first_page_order": 49, "last_page_order": 52 }