{ "id": 6141368, "name": "Joel Mark ROWNAK v. Lisa Monette ROWNAK", "name_abbreviation": "Rownak v. Rownak", "decision_date": "2008-10-08", "docket_number": "CA 08-193", "first_page": "258", "last_page": "263", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "103 Ark. App. 258" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "288 S.W.3d 672" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark. Ct. App.", "id": 13370, "name": "Arkansas Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "79 Ark. App. 413", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6142430 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "reciting that a trial court has inherent power to correct a decree to accurately reflect the court's original ruling or to interpret its prior decision and that, when its decree is ambiguous, the court has jurisdiction to make changes clarifying what the court originally intended" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/79/0413-01" ] }, { "cite": "11 S.W.2d 475", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "year": 1928, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "recognizing the long-held right allowing parties to make their own contract and to fix its terms and conditions, which will be upheld unless illegal or in violation of public policy" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "178 Ark. 566", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1396927 ], "year": 1928, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "recognizing the long-held right allowing parties to make their own contract and to fix its terms and conditions, which will be upheld unless illegal or in violation of public policy" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/178/0566-01" ] }, { "cite": "320 Ark. 115", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1451133 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "recognizing that Rule 60 may not be used to breathe life into an otherwise defunct Rule 59 motion for new trial" }, { "parenthetical": "recognizing that Rule 60 may not be used to breathe life into an otherwise defunct Rule 59 motion for new trial" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/320/0115-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 469, "char_count": 9132, "ocr_confidence": 0.778, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.846212159434013e-08, "percentile": 0.4585724882029802 }, "sha256": "cbe710b98343745272e5bd43d6315e34fe4679550f4344914eada50f89951001", "simhash": "1:e39d4f3edf06b9ad", "word_count": 1493 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:49:33.837419+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Gladwin and Robbins, JJ., agree." ], "parties": [ "Joel Mark ROWNAK v. Lisa Monette ROWNAK" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Sam Bird, Judge.\nThis case concerns a finding of contempt against appellant Joel Mark Rownak for failing to follow his express agreement with appellee Lisa Monette Rownak, his ex-wife, about the religious upbringing of their two sons. The parties\u2019 agreement was approved by the circuit court and set forth in its 2005 divorce decree, which awarded custody of the children to appellant and awarded visitation rights to appellee. The following paragraph of the divorce decree reflects the agreement and the court\u2019s approval of it:\nBased upon the express agreement of the parties that the minor children be raised in the Protestant faith, the Court orders that each party hereto is enjoined from promoting another religious belief system/faith to the minor children unless both parties should consent.\nIn November 2006 appellee filed a petition for change of custody or, alternatively, for modification of visitation, and in March 2007 she filed a petition for contempt, alleging that appellant had violated the paragraph of the decree at issue. Both parties presented testimony and evidence in a hearing on the petitions. The court found appellant to be in contempt and, in its written order entered on May 18, 2007, addressed the issue as follows:\n[T]he matter is one of contract interpretation if the objective is valid and not void as to public policy or a crime in the state of Arkansas. It is the finding of this Court that parents can agree how to raise their children as to their religious beliefs and training, in this instance, and that such a provision is not void as against public policy in the state of Arkansas and that is does not cause a crime.\nGiven that finding, the defendant candidly acknowledged that he has promoted the LDS faith to his sons. The plaintiff has not consented to the promotion of that faith to her sons and has objected to its promotion by the defendant.\nThe court found that appellant had violated the 2005 order \u201cby promoting another religious belief system/faith\u201d to his sons without appellee\u2019s consent, and appellant was ordered to \u201ccease all such contemptuous conduct immediately.\u201d\nAppellant did not file a notice of appeal from the May 18, 2007 order. Instead, on August 2, 2007, he filed a motion for clarification of the term \u201ccontemptuous conduct\u201d as used in the May 18 order, or in the alternative, a motion pursuant to Ark. R. Civ. P. 60(a), for modification of the May 18 order to prevent a miscarriage of justice. The alleged miscarriage of justice was the portion of the order enjoining appellant from promoting his religious faith to his children. The court denied both motions in an order of August 6, 2007. Appellant raises two points on appeal from the order denying his motions. We affirm the trial court\u2019s order.\nMiscarriage of Justice\nAppellant\u2019s first point on appeal involves Rule 60(a) of the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure, which allows a circuit court to prevent the miscarriage of justice by modifying or vacating an order within ninety days after the date it is filed. Appellant contends that the portion of the contempt order that enjoined him from promoting his faith to the parties\u2019 children without appellee\u2019s consent permitted the miscarriage of justice because it interfered with his First Amendment rights, violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, and violated correlating provisions of the Arkansas Constitution.\nAppellee asserts that appellant used Rule 60 to circumvent the thirty-day deadline of Rule 4 of the Arkansas Rules of Appellate Procedure \u2014 Civil for appealing the circuit court\u2019s order of contempt, entered on May 18, 2007. We find nothing in Rule 60 that would prevent appellant\u2019s filing his motion for modification on August 2, 2007, and we do not view this situation as one in which a litigant employed Rule 60 as a ruse to avoid the time constraints of Rule 4. Cf. United S. Assurance Co. v. Beard, 320 Ark. 115, 894 S.W.2d 948 (1995) (recognizing that Rule 60 may not be used to breathe life into an otherwise defunct Rule 59 motion for new trial).\nWe agree, however, with appellee\u2019s argument that the injunction about which appellant complains has for its basis a valid contract between the parties and does not violate appellant\u2019s constitutional rights. The circuit court\u2019s order merely effectuated the parties\u2019 agreement, which was made a part of the divorce decree with the court\u2019s approval, regarding the religious upbringing of their children. In its order of contempt, the court found it to be undisputed that appellant had requested that this provision be included in the divorce decree and that appellee had acquiesced in his request. Based upon testimony by appellant\u2019s wife, a statement by the president of LDS that was publicized on the church\u2019s website, and testimony by appellant, the court found the LDS church not to be a Protestant faith and found that appellant had promoted the LDS faith to his sons. The court noted that appellee had not consented to appellant\u2019s promotion of the faith to them and, indeed, had objected to his promoting it.\nA miscarriage of justice is a \u201cgrossly unfair outcome in a judicial proceeding.\u201d Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 1019 (8th ed. 2004). The circuit court correctly found that parents can agree as a contractual matter about children\u2019s religious upbringing and that the parties\u2019 agreement enjoining each from promoting a non-Protestant religion to their children unless the other party consented was neither criminal nor void as against public policy. See Am. Ins. Co. v. Austin, 178 Ark. 566, 11 S.W.2d 475 (1928) (recognizing the long-held right allowing parties to make their own contract and to fix its terms and conditions, which will be upheld unless illegal or in violation of public policy). In light of the parties\u2019 agreement, instigated by appellant, he has failed to demonstrate that the court\u2019s order enjoining him from promoting the LDS faith to these children without appellee\u2019s consent resulted in an outcome that was grossly unfair. The circuit court did not err in denying appellant\u2019s motion to modify its judgment in order to prevent a miscarriage of justice.\nClarification of Contempt Order\nAs his second point on appeal, appellant contends that the circuit court\u2019s refusal to clarify \u201ccontemptuous conduct\u201d relating to the promotion of his religious faith violated his constitutional right to due process of law. His motion to clarify the court\u2019s May 18 order of contempt asked the court to state the specific activities it would consider contemptuous by ordering that he \u201ccease all such contemptuous conduct immediately.\u201d A memorandum attached to appellant\u2019s motion asked whether he would be allowed to do specific things such as display church-related items in his home, read to his sons scriptures from the Book of Mormon, or speak to others about his faith in his children\u2019s presence.\nOn appeal appellant asserts that the record contains no examples of his own specific admissions of promoting the LDS faith to his children. He complains that he had not anticipated that his conduct would be considered contemptuous, and he asserts that he was left to interpret the vagueness of the court\u2019s order. He concludes that the court\u2019s refusal to clarify conduct that it would consider contemptuous in the future was an abuse of discretion.\nThe circuit court found appellant in contempt of the parties\u2019 agreed order after hearing testimony that, without appellee\u2019s consent and despite her objections, appellant and his wife promoted the LDS faith to appellant and appellee\u2019s sons through scripture reading and daily prayer, appellant involved one of the boys in Boy Scout activities at the LDS church, and one of them had been baptized in the church. Again, it was at appellant\u2019s instigation that the decree of divorce included a provision enjoining him from promoting a different faith to his sons without appellee\u2019s consent. The circuit court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to clarify specific and future acts that this provision of the parties\u2019 contract sought to prevent.\nAffirmed.\nGladwin and Robbins, JJ., agree.\nCustody was changed to appellee based upon the court\u2019s finding of a material change in circumstances, including the factor of appellant\u2019s changing his church membership from Southern Baptist to LDS. Appellant does not challenge this finding on appeal.\nThe motion to clarify, filed on August 2, 2007, was permitted under the circuit court\u2019s inherent power to correct its decree. See Abbott v. Abbott, 79 Ark. App. 413,90 S.W.3d 10 (2002) (reciting that a trial court has inherent power to correct a decree to accurately reflect the court\u2019s original ruling or to interpret its prior decision and that, when its decree is ambiguous, the court has jurisdiction to make changes clarifying what the court originally intended).", "type": "majority", "author": "Sam Bird, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Davis & Associates, P.A., by: Charles E. Davis, for appellant.", "Matthews, Campbell, Rhoads, McClure, Thompson & Fryauf, P.A., by: Larry J. Thompson and Jesse J. Reyes, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Joel Mark ROWNAK v. Lisa Monette ROWNAK\nCA 08-193\n288 S.W.3d 672\nCourt of Appeals of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered October 8, 2008\nDavis & Associates, P.A., by: Charles E. Davis, for appellant.\nMatthews, Campbell, Rhoads, McClure, Thompson & Fryauf, P.A., by: Larry J. Thompson and Jesse J. Reyes, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0258-01", "first_page_order": 288, "last_page_order": 293 }