{ "id": 6065951, "name": "Marvin Earl GOODSELL v. STATE of Arkansas", "name_abbreviation": "Goodsell v. State", "decision_date": "2008-12-17", "docket_number": "CA CR 08-115", "first_page": "183", "last_page": "187", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "104 Ark. App. 183" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "289 S.W.3d 534" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark. Ct. App.", "id": 13370, "name": "Arkansas Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 16-89-111", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(d)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "838 F.2d 932", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 1310613 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "939" }, { "page": "940" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/838/0932-01" ] }, { "cite": "298 Ark. 617", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1889881 ], "weight": 8, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "620-21" }, { "page": "130" }, { "page": "620-22" }, { "page": "130-31" }, { "page": "620-21" }, { "page": "130" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/298/0617-01" ] }, { "cite": "53 Ark. App. 256", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6141494 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "260" }, { "page": "728" }, { "page": "260, 264" }, { "page": "728, 730" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/53/0256-01" ] }, { "cite": "325 Ark. 455", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 369297 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "460" }, { "page": "701" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/325/0455-01" ] }, { "cite": "346 Ark. 91", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1111344 ], "weight": 6, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "98" }, { "page": "276" }, { "page": "98" }, { "page": "276" }, { "page": "98" }, { "page": "276" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/346/0091-01" ] }, { "cite": "84 S.W. 494", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.", "year": 1904, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "495" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "73 Ark. 407", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1504013 ], "year": 1904, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "411" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/73/0407-01" ] }, { "cite": "350 Ark. 22", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1404472 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "30" }, { "page": "877-78" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/350/0022-01" ] }, { "cite": "357 Ark. 105", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 5405490 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "112" }, { "page": "818" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/357/0105-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 502, "char_count": 7754, "ocr_confidence": 0.783, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.17296182132626264 }, "sha256": "a1a5ebc655dfa5bb88b1698f89f89611d4c7545daf2904a6275b822f6e7c34c3", "simhash": "1:4fe0f59627cca392", "word_count": 1220 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:37:35.435157+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Robbins and Vaught, JJ., agree." ], "parties": [ "Marvin Earl GOODSELL v. STATE of Arkansas" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "D.P. Marshall Jr., Judge.\nA Faulkner County jury convicted Marvin Goodsell of four counts of second-degree sexual assault. The victims were Goodsell\u2019s two stepdaughters. Fie appeals, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions and an evidentiary ruling. We address Goodsell\u2019s sufficiency challenge first. Standridge v. State, 357 Ark. 105, 112, 161 S.W.3d 815, 818 (2004). He argues that the State failed to satisfy the corpus-delicti requirement with other proof that the assaults occurred. Viewing the evidence in the fight most favorable to the State, we agree. Davis v. State, 350 Ark. 22, 30, 86 S.W.3d 872, 877-78 (2002). We therefore reverse and dismiss Goodsell\u2019s convictions. This disposition moots the alleged evidentiary error.\nGoodsell confessed to police officers that he sexually assaulted both of his stepdaughters. He then testified at trial that he did not commit the crimes. Under Arkansas'Code Annotated \u00a7 16 \u2014 89\u2014 111(d) (Repl. 2005), \u201c[a] confession of a defendant, unless made in open court, will not warrant a conviction unless accompanied with other proof that the offense was committed.\u201d This other proof need not have been sufficient to convict Goodsell. Misenheimer v. State, 73 Ark. 407, 411, 84 S.W. 494, 495 (1904). The requirement does not mandate that the State establish any further connection between Goodsell and the crimes. Barnes v. State, 346 Ark. 91, 98, 55 S.W.3d 271, 276 (2001). Independent of the confession, the State had to prove only (1) the existence of an injury or harm constituting the crime and (2) that the injury was caused by someone\u2019s criminal activity. Ferrell v. State, 325 Ark. 455, 460, 929 S.W.2d 697, 701 (1996). We must therefore determine whether, setting aside Goodsell\u2019s out-of-court confession, the evidence demonstrates that someone sexually assaulted his two stepdaughters. Barnes, 346 Ark. at 98, 55 S.W.3d at 276.\nAs the other proof, the State points to testimony from the two victims, a police lieutenant, and the girls\u2019 mother. First, the stepdaughters. Both girls gave statements to police accusing Goodsell of sexually assaulting them. But each girl recanted the accusations before trial. Goodsell moved to exclude the girls\u2019 prior inconsistent statements. The circuit court ruled unequivocally that the girls\u2019 out-of-court statements about the assaults would be permitted only as rebuttal evidence on their credibility if they testified at trial contrary to their statements. At trial, both girls denied any abuse, and the circuit court then admitted their prior statements to impeach their testimony. But, as the circuit court instructed the jury, those statements were to be considered \u201cfor the purpose of judging the credibility of the witness, but may not be considered ... as evidence of the truth of the matter set forth in that statement.\u201d The girls\u2019 accusations to police, therefore, are not other proof of the assaults.\nNext, Lieutenant Matt Rice. He took Goodsell\u2019s recorded confession. At trial, the prosecutor asked Rice if Goodsell made any hand gestures during the police interview. Rice answered, \u201cYes. At the time he told me that he put his fingers in her vagina, he held up, I believe, his right hand, \u2014 his right hand and his index finger and middle finger when he was telling me about putting his fingers in their vagina.\u201d Rice\u2019s statement comes straight from Goodsell\u2019s confession, which may not weigh in the corpus-delicti analysis. Barnes, 346 Ark. at 98, 55 S.W.3d at 276 (2001). And Goodsell\u2019s hand gesture, adrift from the accompanying confession, is not evidence that a crime occurred.\nWe are left with testimony from Leslie Goodsell, the victims\u2019 mother. At trial, she twice mentioned the details of the girls\u2019 accusations. First, Mrs. Goodsell testified that the girls\u2019 youth counselors came to her with \u201cconcerns . . . that my husband had been sexually molesting my oldest daughter.\u201d The youth counselors did not testify at trial. And Mrs. Goodsell did not testify that the counselors actually observed the assaults or knew for certain that they had occurred. A concern by someone who did not testify at trial is simply insufficient other proof that someone sexually assaulted the girls. Second, Mrs. Goodsell acknowledged that she was aware that her older daughter had told the State Police \u201cthat [Mr. Goodsell] had been fondling her.\u201d But again, the daughter\u2019s prior statement was hearsay that the jury could not consider as substantive evidence.\nArguing for affirmance, the State cites Hinzman v. State, 53 Ark. App. 256, 922 S.W.2d 725 (1996) for the proposition that hearsay statements, when admitted, are sufficient to corroborate a confession. Hinzman rests on Johnson v. State, 298 Ark. 617, 770 S.W.2d 128 (1989). The foundational case \u2014Johnson \u2014 is distinguishable. There, the victim\u2019s prior statement was admitted pursuant to a hearsay exception, Ark. R. Evid. 803(25), and was evidence of the truth of the matter asserted. 298 Ark. at 620-21, 770 S.W.2d at 130. Thus the victim\u2019s out-of-court accusation provided sufficient other proof to corroborate Johnson\u2019s extrajudicial confession. Johnson, 298 Ark. at 620-22, 770 S.W.2d at 130-31.\nAt first blush, Hinzman supports the State\u2019s contention that the hearsay testimony from the witnesses here \u2014 especially the victims\u2019 mother \u2014 corroborated Goodsell\u2019s confession. For two reasons, however, we are persuaded that Hinzman does not control this case. First, Hinzman cites and applies Johnson, while not purporting to extend the supreme court\u2019s precedent. And Johnson presented different circumstances: the hearsay statement there was admitted into evidence for its truth under an exception to the hearsay rule. 298 Ark. at 620-21, 770 S.W.2d at 130. Second, Hinzman focuses on another issue \u2014 how the State impeached the victim with her prior statement. 53 Ark. App. at 260, 922 S.W.2d at 728. That was the \u201cprimary thrust of [the] appeal,\u201d and the basis for reversal. 53 Ark. App. at 260, 264, 922 S.W.2d at 728, 730. Hinzman does not discuss or address the deeper point presented here: the victims\u2019 recanted statements, which the circuit court excluded, infected the related testimony of the other witnesses; and the challenged testimony about the victims\u2019 statements was not admitted for its truth, but rather was subject to the court\u2019s proper limiting instruction about the evidentiary value of the victims\u2019 statements.\nIn sum, the State failed to carry its burden of offering other proof that Goodsell committed these crimes. We must therefore reverse and dismiss Goodsell\u2019s convictions. Though precedent binds us to follow the corpus-delicti rule, we question the necessity of this stringent corroboration requirement. We recognize the reason behind the rule \u2014 to prevent convictions based solely on coerced confessions. But \u201cthe rule is a vestige of a time when brutal methods were commonly used to extract confessions, sometimes to crimes that had not been committed.\u201d U.S. v. Kerley, 838 F.2d 932, 939 (7th Cir.1988) (quotation omitted). Some jurisdictions, including the federal system, have done away with the rule, requiring instead that there \u201cbe substantial independent evidence which would tend to establish the trustworthiness of the statement.\u201d 838 F.2d at 940. If change is to come to Arkansas law on this issue, however, then either the General Assembly must amend Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 16-89-111(d) or our supreme court must reinterpret the other-proof requirement.\nRobbins and Vaught, JJ., agree.", "type": "majority", "author": "D.P. Marshall Jr., Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Lynn Frank Plemmons, for appellant.", "Dustin McDaniel, Att\u2019y Gen., by: Farhan Khan, Ass\u2019t Att\u2019y Gen., for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Marvin Earl GOODSELL v. STATE of Arkansas\nCA CR 08-115\n289 S.W.3d 534\nCourt of Appeals of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered December 17, 2008\nLynn Frank Plemmons, for appellant.\nDustin McDaniel, Att\u2019y Gen., by: Farhan Khan, Ass\u2019t Att\u2019y Gen., for appellee." }, "file_name": "0183-01", "first_page_order": 209, "last_page_order": 213 }