{ "id": 6066266, "name": "Jamie HICKS and C.H. v. Cheryl BATES and D.B., Nucor Steel of Arkansas, Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Company, Death & Permanent Total Disability Trust Fund", "name_abbreviation": "Hicks v. Bates", "decision_date": "2009-02-11", "docket_number": "CA 08-501", "first_page": "348", "last_page": "354", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "104 Ark. App. 348" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "292 S.W.3d 850" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark. Ct. App.", "id": 13370, "name": "Arkansas Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "84 Ark. App. 256", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6139973 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/84/0256-01" ] }, { "cite": "335 Ark. 272", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 862797 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/335/0272-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 11-9-527", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(c)", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "103 Ark. App. 292", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6141950 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2008, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/103/0292-01" ] }, { "cite": "267 Ark. 810", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1719959 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/267/0810-01" ] }, { "cite": "93 Ark. App. 208", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6139254 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/93/0208-01" ] }, { "cite": "103 Ark. App. 178", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6139794 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2008, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/103/0178-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7\u00a7 28-65-201", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "375 Ark. 97", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 8152044 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2008, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/375/0097-01" ] }, { "cite": "374 Ark. 162", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 3689470 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2008, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/374/0162-01" ] }, { "cite": "104 Ark. App. 245", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6066059, 7301933 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2009, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/104/0245-01", "/sw3d/290/0614-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 11-9-702", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(f)(2)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 706, "char_count": 14782, "ocr_confidence": 0.776, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.087085966315723e-08, "percentile": 0.3787089517574191 }, "sha256": "004be4366d01429d47e7312f5cc29e9cb9817235d4de3273be267dc90687d3f2", "simhash": "1:a5a741715d2b4e08", "word_count": 2391 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:37:35.435157+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Gladwin and Baker, JJ., agree." ], "parties": [ "Jamie HICKS and C.H. v. Cheryl BATES and D.B., Nucor Steel of Arkansas, Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Company, Death & Permanent Total Disability Trust Fund" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Courtney Hudson Henry, Judge.\nAppellants Jamie Hicks and C.H. appeal the decision of the Arkansas Workers\u2019 Compensation Commission (Commission) awarding dependent-death benefits to D.B., the minor son of the decedent, Jerry Hicks. For reversal, appellants argue that the Commission erred in concluding that D.B.\u2019s claim of benefits was not barred by the statute of limitations found in Arkansas Code Annotated section 11-9-702 (Supp. 2007). Appellants also argue that substantial evidence does not support the Commission\u2019s finding that D.B. was wholly and actually dependent upon the decedent at the time of his death. We affirm the Commission.\nThe decedent, an employee of appellee Nucor Steel (Nu-cor), sustained a compensable injury on July 29, 2002, resulting in his death. The record reveals that he died on the premises of Nucor when the pinch point of a cold-roll welding machine crushed him. As a result, Nucor\u2019s insurer, appellee Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Company (Liberty), paid a total of $75,000 in dependency benefits to appellant Hicks, who is the decedent\u2019s widow, and their minor child, appellant C.H. Appellee Death and Permanent Total Disability Trust Fund (Fund) thereafter assumed liability and made weekly payments of $425 to appellants.\nPrior to his marriage to appellant Hicks, the decedent and appellee Cheryl Bates (Bates) were involved in a relationship, which ended when Bates was seven months\u2019 pregnant. The couple never married but had one child, D.B., who was born on September 14, 1995. Based upon the testimony of Bates and the decedent\u2019s mother, the Commission learned that the decedent saw D.B. on the date of his birth and interacted with him on a regular basis. D.B. visited the decedent at his parents\u2019 home, at Bates\u2019s restaurant, and at a local park. Photographs introduced into evidence depicted D.B. with the decedent\u2019s family, celebrating holidays together. The decedent made monthly child-support payments to Bates of an agreed-upon $150, an amount never actually ordered by a court. While the decedent\u2019s child-support payments became sporadic in 1998, he paid Bates in more frequent, smaller increments until his death in 2002.\nBates married her current husband in 1996, and they resided with D.B. in Dexter, Missouri. During that time, the decedent continued his periodic visits with his son. When Bates\u2019s husband wished to adopt D.B., the decedent would not allow it. While Bates\u2019s husband never believed himself to be D.B.\u2019s father, he and Bates nevertheless added his name as the father to D.B.\u2019s birth certificate. On July 30, 2002, Bates learned of the decedent\u2019s death, and the decedent\u2019s mother recommended to Bates that she apply for social-security survivor\u2019s benefits. Following the application, the Social Security Administration found D.B. to be the decedent\u2019s natural child, and D.B. began receiving dependency benefits.\nBates became aware of D.B.\u2019s entitlement to workers\u2019compensation benefits in February 2006. Immediately thereafter, Bates arranged for DNA testing, which concluded that the decedent was D.B.\u2019s biological father. On March 10, 2006, a Missouri circuit court appointed Bates as D.B.\u2019s legal guardian and conservator.\nOn May 17, 2006, Bates filed a claim for workers\u2019compensation dependent benefits on behalf of D.B. The administrative law judge (ALJ) conducted a hearing on December 6, 2006, and made the following findings: (1) D.B. was the son of the decedent and Bates; (2) D.B. was wholly and actually dependent upon the decedent at the time ofhis death, and as a result, D.B. was entitled to dependent benefits pursuant to Arkansas Code Annotated section 11-9-527 (Repl. 2002); and (3) the claim was not barred under the provisions of section 11-9-702.\nOn December 21, 2007, the Commission entered an opinion in agreement with the ALJ\u2019s decision that D.B. was the decedent\u2019s minor son and that he was wholly and actually dependent upon the decedent at the time ofhis death. The Commission also found that D.B.\u2019s claim was not barred by the statute of limitations. However, the Commission disagreed with the ALJ\u2019s finding that Nucor was liable for benefits, and subsequently, the Commission entered a second opinion allocating the disbursement of benefits. Appellants now bring this appeal.\nFor the first point on appeal, appellants argue that the Commission erred in interpreting section 11-9-702 and finding that D.B.\u2019s claim for dependent-death benefits was not barred by the statute of limitations. As a general rule, we recognize a two-year statute of limitations to file a workers\u2019-compensation claim following a death. Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 ll-9-702(a)(3). However, an exception to the two-year statute of limitations exists for minors:\n(2) The provisions of subsection (a) or (b) of this section shall not apply to a mental incompetent or minor so long as the person has no guardian or similar legal representative. The limitations prescribed in subsection (a) or (b) of this section shall apply to the ... minor from the date of the appointment of a guardian or similar legal representative for that person, and where no guardian or similar representative has been appointed, to a minor upon obtainment of majority.\nArk. Code Ann. \u00a7 11-9-702(f)(2). In other words, in the case of a minor, the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the minor is appointed a guardian or similar legal representative or until the minor reaches majority.\nAppellants contend that the exception provision is inapplicable to D.B. because he was under the care of his mother, a natural guardian, since his birth. Appellants dismiss that part of the exception permitting a minor to file a claim on his or her own behalf after age eighteen by arguing that this particular clause applies only to children \u201cwho do not have a living biological parent.\u201d Here, it is undisputed that the decedent\u2019s work-related death occurred on July 29, 2002; that a Missouri circuit court appointed Bates as D.B.\u2019s guardian and conservator on March 10, 2006; and that Bates filed a claim for workers\u2019-compensation dependent benefits on May 17, 2006. Thus, four years elapsed between the decedent\u2019s death and the filing of D.B.\u2019s claim. Therefore, the relevant question in this case is whether the foregoing exception for minors, found in subsection 11 \u2014 9\u2014 702(f)(2), applies to D.B., who lived with his natural parent who was not appointed his guardian until March 10, 2006.\nThis issue requires us to interpret a workers\u2019 compensation statute. We review issues of statutory construction de novo. Weisenbach v. Kirk, 104 Ark. App. 245, 290 S.W.3d 614 (2009). The basic rule of statutory construction is to give effect to the intent of the General Assembly. Id. In determining the meaning of a statute, the first rule is to construe it just as it reads, giving the words their ordinary and usually accepted meaning in common language. Arkansas Comprehensive Health Ins. Pool v. Denton, 374 Ark. 162, 286 S.W.3d 698 (2008). We construe the statute so that no word is left void, superfluous, or insignificant, and meaning and effect are given to every word in the statute if possible. Id. When the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning, there is no need to resort to rules of statutory construction. Mamo Transp., Inc. v. Williams, 375 Ark. 97, 289 S.W.3d 79 (2008). However, we will not give statutes a literal interpretation if it leads to absurd consequences that are contrary to legislative intent. Id.\nThe Commission found that section 1 l-9-702(f)(2) \u201coperates to protect all minors should they not have a legal guardian appointed and their natural guardian fails to act on [his or her] behalf. Once the minor\u2019s disability is removed and he or she reaches majority, subsection (f) permits them to file a claim on [his or her] behalf.\u201d The Commission further found that, because Bates was appointed D.B.\u2019s guardian on March 10, 2006, she filed a timely claim under section ll-9-702(f)(2).\nWe agree with the Commission\u2019s interpretation of section ll-9-702(f)(2) that Bates was not D.B.\u2019s guardian simply because she was his mother. The term \u201cguardian\u201d is not defined in our workers\u2019 compensation statutes. However, we attach great significance to the statute\u2019s use of the word \u201cappointment.\u201d The concept of appointment connotes a legal action of endowing a formal guardian with the power to protect a minor, his or her legal rights, and his or her estate. See Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7\u00a7 28-65-201 to -323 (Repl. 2004 and Supp. 2007) (authorizing the appointment, powers, and duties of court-appointed guardians). Furthermore, even if D.B.\u2019s mother had not been court-appointed as his guardian, D.B. could file a claim up to two years beyond reaching the age of majority. Despite appellants\u2019 assertions to the contrary, we glean from section ll-9-702(f)(2) that the legislature intended to protect minors, residing with a natural parent who fails to pursue a claim on their behalf, by permitting them to file a claim after age eighteen. Thus, a plain-language reading of the statute as a whole undercuts appellants\u2019 claim that D.B. had a \u201cguardian\u201d in his mother prior to her appointment by the Missouri court.\nAdditionally, we note that Arkansas Code Annotated section 11-9-801 (Repl. 2002) authorizes benefits to be paid to a minor\u2019s \u201clegally appointed guardian.\u201d This statute further demonstrates the legislative intent that a guardian is one who is sanctioned by judicial action. It also unequivocally allows Bates to act in her capacity as the appointed guardian. Our case law requires us to reconcile statutory provisions relating to the same subject to make them sensible, consistent, and harmonious. Weisenbach, supra. When we read subsection 11 -9-702(f)(2) and section 11-9-801 together, we are convinced that the legislature contemplated court action for the appointment of a guardian. For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the Commission properly allowed D.B.\u2019s claim for dependent-death benefits pursuant to subsection 11-9-702(f)(2), and we affirm the Commission\u2019s decision.\nFor the second point on appeal, appellants argue that D.B. was not \u201cwholly and actually dependent\u201d upon the decedent at the time of his death under Arkansas Code Annotated section 11 \u2014 9\u2014 527(c) (Repl. 2002). With regard to the Commission\u2019s findings of fact, this court will view the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commission\u2019s decision and affirm when that decision is supported by substantial evidence. Parson v. Arkansas Methodist Hosp., 103 Ark. App. 178, 287 S.W.3d 645 (2008). Substantial evidence is evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Doris v. Townsends of Ark., Inc., 93 Ark. App. 208, 218 S.W.3d 351 (2005). The issue is not whether the appellate court might have reached a different result from the Commission; if reasonable minds could reach the result found by the Commission, the appellate court must affirm the decision. Id. The substantial-evidence standard of review requires that we affirm if the Commission\u2019s decision displays a substantial basis for the grant of relief. Williams v. Arkansas Oak Flooring, Co., 267 Ark. 810, 590 S.W.2d 328 (Ark. App. 1979). We will not reverse the Commission\u2019s decision unless we are convinced that fair-minded persons with the same facts before them could not have reached the conclusions arrived at by the Commission. Id. Dependency is a fact question to be determined in light of the surrounding circumstances. Finley v. Farm Cat, Inc., 103 Ark. App. 292, 288 S.W.3d 685 (2008). When the Commission makes a finding of fact, that finding carries the weight of a jury conclusion. Id.\nArkansas Code Annotated section 11-9-527(c) provides in pertinent part:\nSubject to the limitations as set out in \u00a7\u00a7 11-9-501 - 11-9-506, compensation for the death of an employee shall be paid to those persons who were wholly and actually dependent upon the deceased employee ....\nArk. Code Ann. \u00a7 11-9-527(c) (emphasis added). Subsection (h) provides that \u201c[a]ll questions of dependency shall be determined as of the time of the injury.\u201d Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 ll-9-527(h).\nThe supreme court discussed the application of subsection 11-9-527(c) in Lawhon Farm Services v. Brown, 335 Ark. 272, 984 S.W.2d 1 (1998), where the court noted that, in cases where children are not living with the employee at the time of the employee\u2019s death, there must be some showing of actual dependency. \u201cActually dependent\u201d does not require total dependency but rather a showing of actual support or a reasonable expectation of support. Fordyce Concrete v. Garth, 84 Ark. App. 256, 139 S.W.3d 154 (2003).\nIn the instant case, substantial evidence supports the Commission\u2019s finding that D.B. was \u201cwholly and actually dependent\u201d upon the decedent at the time of his death. Although he was not listed as the father on D.B.\u2019s birth certificate, the decedent acknowledged D.B. as his son beginning at the time of his birth. The evidence as a whole demonstrated that the decedent saw D.B. on the day of his birth, that the decedent maintained regular visits with D.B., and that the decedent celebrated holidays with his son. Moreover, the decedent contributed, albeit sporadically at times, child-support payments to Bates for D.B.\u2019s support until his death. We also recognize that the Social Security Administration regards D.B. as the decedent\u2019s natural child and that D.B. received social-security dependency benefits. Based upon our standard of review, we conclude that, pursuant to section ll-9-527(c), substantial evidence supports the Commission\u2019s finding that D.B. was \u201cwholly and actually dependent\u201d upon the decedent at the time of his death. Accordingly, we affirm the Commission\u2019s findings.\nAffirmed.\nGladwin and Baker, JJ., agree.\nSection 11-9-801 approves the payment of a claim to the guardian of the minor\u2019s estate. This statutory provision provides in pertinent part:\n(c) If the compensation beneficiary is a mental incompetent or minor of tender years or immature judgment, the Workers\u2019 Compensation Commission, in the exercise of its discretion, may direct that payment shall be made to a legally appointed guardian of the estate of the incompetent minor.", "type": "majority", "author": "Courtney Hudson Henry, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "W. Ray Nickle; Ward & Reeves, Attorneys at Law, by: W. Edward Reeves; and William W. Carter, for appellants.", "John Barttelt, for appellee minor child.", "Rieves, Rubens & Mayton, by: David C. Jones, for appellees Nucor Steel of Arkansas and Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Co." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Jamie HICKS and C.H. v. Cheryl BATES and D.B., Nucor Steel of Arkansas, Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Company, Death & Permanent Total Disability Trust Fund\nCA 08-501\n292 S.W.3d 850\nCourt of Appeals of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered February 11, 2009\n[Rehearing denied March 18, 2009.]\nW. Ray Nickle; Ward & Reeves, Attorneys at Law, by: W. Edward Reeves; and William W. Carter, for appellants.\nJohn Barttelt, for appellee minor child.\nRieves, Rubens & Mayton, by: David C. Jones, for appellees Nucor Steel of Arkansas and Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Co." }, "file_name": "0348-01", "first_page_order": 374, "last_page_order": 380 }