{ "id": 6066301, "name": "DEATH & PERMANENT TOTAL DISABILITY TRUST FUND, Buster Roberts Logging, American Interstate Insurance Company v. Francisca Guevara RODRIGUEZ, Lavona Kay Haury, Estate of Modesto Sustaita Herrera", "name_abbreviation": "Death & Permanent Total Disability Trust Fund v. Rodriguez", "decision_date": "2009-02-11", "docket_number": "CA 08-842", "first_page": "375", "last_page": "382", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "104 Ark. App. 375" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "292 S.W.3d 827" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark. Ct. App.", "id": 13370, "name": "Arkansas Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "204 S.W.3d 541", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.3d", "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "stating that a notice of cross-appeal is required when an appellee seeks affirmative relief not granted below" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "361 Ark. 73", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 5682993 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "stating that a notice of cross-appeal is required when an appellee seeks affirmative relief not granted below" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/361/0073-01" ] }, { "cite": "201 S.W.3d 900", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.3d", "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "360 Ark. 388", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 5459474 ], "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/360/0388-01" ] }, { "cite": "102 Ark. App. 373", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6142315 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2008, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/102/0373-01" ] }, { "cite": "92 Ark. App. 40", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6136527 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/92/0040-01" ] }, { "cite": "78 Ark. App. 79", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6136953 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/78/0079-01" ] }, { "cite": "365 Ark. 133", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 3286883 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2006, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/365/0133-01" ] }, { "cite": "610 S.W.2d 586", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "citing Roach Manufacturing, but holding that it was distinguishable because the minor child had always received support from another person and at no time received support from the decedent" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "271 Ark. 727", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1756292 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "citing Roach Manufacturing, but holding that it was distinguishable because the minor child had always received support from another person and at no time received support from the decedent" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/271/0727-01" ] }, { "cite": "335 Ark. 272", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 862797 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "affirming an award of dependency benefits despite the children not receiving formal child support" }, { "parenthetical": "affirming an award of dependency benefits despite the children not receiving formal child support" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/335/0272-01" ] }, { "cite": "244 Ark. 119", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 8718209 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1968, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/244/0119-01" ] }, { "cite": "265 Ark. 908", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1664706 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "912-13" }, { "page": "270-71" }, { "page": "271" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/265/0908-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 11-9-527", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(h)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "7 Ark. App. 185", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6139886 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/7/0185-01" ] }, { "cite": "52 Ark. App. 219", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6140491 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/52/0219-01" ] }, { "cite": "84 Ark. App. 256", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6139973 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/84/0256-01" ] }, { "cite": "337 Ark. 94", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1240990 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/337/0094-01" ] }, { "cite": "336 Ark. 510", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 51273 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/336/0510-01" ] }, { "cite": "84 Ark. App. 430", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6142661 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2004, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/84/0430-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 11", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 11-9-111", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "a" }, { "parenthetical": "a" } ], "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 735, "char_count": 13954, "ocr_confidence": 0.786, "pagerank": { "raw": 8.724443257361318e-08, "percentile": 0.4941000421260081 }, "sha256": "f3ebd3e4f8a30a88e785d55203aa3a42672f56ba3d4b62e3667f1f636206d66e", "simhash": "1:104b4c324ffc5542", "word_count": 2272 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:37:35.435157+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Pittman and Hart, JJ., agree." ], "parties": [ "DEATH & PERMANENT TOTAL DISABILITY TRUST FUND, Buster Roberts Logging, American Interstate Insurance Company v. Francisca Guevara RODRIGUEZ, Lavona Kay Haury, Estate of Modesto Sustaita Herrera" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Waymond M. Brown, Judge.\nModesto Sustaita Flerrera was involved in a fatal workplace accident on December 9, 2004. Fie was survived by two \u201cwives\u201d and four children, three of whom were minors at the time of his death. By opinion dated April 22, 2008, the Workers\u2019 Compensation Commission found that the minor children, all alien nonresidents, were entitled to survivor benefits. The Death and Permanent Total Disability Trust Fund (\u201cTrust Fund\u201d) appeals from that finding, contending that the children were not dependent on the decedent and that they were barred from receiving benefits under Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 11-9-111 (a) (Repl. 2002). We affirm.\nFactual and Procedural History\nEvidence presented at a hearing before an administrative law judge (ALJ) shows that the decedent, a Mexican citizen, married Francisca Guevara Rodriguez in Mexico in 1986. The couple had four children, three of whom (Eber Sustaita Guevara, Marlen Sustaita Guevara, and Erendria Magaly Sustaita Guevara) were minors at the time of the decedent\u2019s death. The decedent entered the United States illegally in June 1996 to work and provide for his family. The decedent sent the family $100 per month, but the payments slowed and eventually stopped in July or August 2003. Rodriguez explained that she last saw him in 1996, but that she could not divorce him because Mexican law had no process to get a divorce when a husband abandons a wife. She had little hope that the decedent would return to her. The decedent married Lavona Kay Haury under the name \u201cFrancisco Javier Sustaita\u201d in June 2000. He later obtained employment from Buster Roberts Logging under the name \u201cCresentiano Lerma Pina\u201d a little over a year before suffering a fatal workplace accident in December 2004. Haury received death benefits for five weeks, but payments ceased when the dispute arose over the decedent\u2019s identity.\nAfter concluding that the decedent was indeed Modesto Sustaita Herrera, the ALJ found that Rodriguez was the decedent\u2019s legal wife, but that she was not entitled to survivor benefits because she was not actually dependent upon the decedent. However, the ALJ awarded benefits to the minor children, finding that the children \u201cby virtue of their age were entitled to an expectation of support sufficient to establish that they were wholly and actually dependent on their father at the time of his accident.\u201d The Commission affirmed and adopted the opinion of the ALJ. Furthermore, it considered the provisions of Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 11 \u2014 9\u2014 111 (a) and found that the statute did not bar the minor children from receiving survivor benefits. An appeal to this court followed.\nAnalysis\nThe sole issue here is whether the decedent\u2019s minor children were entitled to survivor benefits. In reviewing decisions from the Workers\u2019 Compensation Commission, we view the evidence and all reasonable inferences deducible therefrom in the light most favorable to the Commission\u2019s decision and affirm if that decision is supported by substantial evidence. Smith v. City of Ft. Smith, 84 Ark. App. 430, 143 S.W.3d 593 (2004). Substantial evidence is evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Williams v. Prostaff Temps., 336 Ark. 510, 988 S.W.2d 1 (1999). The issue is not whether the reviewing court might have reached a different result from the Commission; if reasonable minds could reach the result found by the Commission, we must affirm the decision. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. v. Baker, 337 Ark. 94, 989 S.W.2d 151 (1999).\nArkansas Code Annotated section 11-9-527 (c) (Repl. 2002) outlines the benefits to be paid to the family of a worker who dies in the course and scope of his employment. The statute mandates that compensation \u201cbe paid to those persons who were wholly and actually dependent upon the deceased employee.\u201d Dependency is a fact question to be determined in light of the surrounding circumstances. Fordyce Concrete v. Garth, 84 Ark. App. 256, 139 S.W.3d 154 (2003). \u201cActual dependency\u201d does not require a finding of total dependency; it may be established by showing either actual dependency or a reasonable expectancy of future support, even if no actual support has been provided. Hoskins v. Rogers Cold Storage, 52 Ark. App. 219, 916 S.W.2d 136 (1996); Pinecrest Mem. Park v. Miller, 7 Ark. App. 185, 646 S.W.2d 33 (1983). The question of dependency is determined as of the time of the decedent\u2019s injury. Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 11-9-527(h); Hoskins, supra.\nIn finding that the minor children were entitled to benefits, the ALJ relied upon Roach Manufacturing Co. v. Cole, 265 Ark. 908, 582 S.W.2d 268 (1979). There, the decedent married his wife in 1965, and the couple had a child together the following year. In 1975, the decedent left the family and moved to Memphis, where he married another woman without divorcing his first wife. The first wife did what she could to support the couple\u2019s daughter without seeking support from the decedent, who died in a workplace accident in May 1976. The supreme court affirmed the Commission\u2019s decision that the first wife was not entitled to benefits, based upon the wife\u2019s failure to establish dependency. However, it also affirmed the award of benefits to the decedent\u2019s daughter. In doing so, it quoted from Professor Larson\u2019s famous treatise: \u201cProof of bare legal obligation to support, unaccompanied by either actual support or reasonable expectation of support, is ordinarily not enough to satisfy the requirement of actual dependency.\u201d Id. at 912-13, 582 S.W.2d at 270-71 (quoting Larson, Workmen\u2019s Compensation Law, \u00a7 63 (1976)). However, in affirming the award of benefits to the daughter, the court wrote:\nOn the other hand, the Commission could also find, with respect to a 10-year-old child who was being supported by her mother, that the same lapse of 11 months without legal action on the mother\u2019s part did not demonstrate, in Larson\u2019s language, that there was no longer any \u201creasonable expectation of support\u201d on the part of the father. The child was not able to act for herself. Her necessary expenses would naturally increase as she grew older, with the concurrent possibility that her mother would not be able to maintain the child in \u201cher accustomed mode of living,\u201d as we expressed it in Smith v. Farm Service Cooperative, [244 Ark. 119, 424 S.W.2d 147 (1968)]. Thus a reasonable expectation of future support could be found.\nId. at 913, 582 S.W.2d at 271; see also Lawhon Farm Servs. v. Brown, 335 Ark. 272, 984 S.W.2d 1 (1998) (affirming an award of dependency benefits despite the children not receiving formal child support).\nThe Trust Fund asserts that Roach Manufacturing is inapplicable to this case for three reasons. First, it argues that Roach Manufacturing predates Act 793 of 1993, which substantially altered portions of the workers\u2019 compensation code. The Trust Fund correctly states that the law now requires the Commission and reviewing courts to construe the provisions of the workers\u2019 compensation code strictly. See Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 ll-9-704(c)(3) (Repl. 2002). However, our supreme court has expressly held that prior case law dealing with dependency benefits was not in conflict with the Act and, therefore, was still controlling. See Lawhon Farm Servs., supra.\nSecond, the Trust Fund states that, when Roach Manufacturing was decided, claimants were given the benefit of the doubt in workers\u2019 compensation cases. They correctly state that the law today requires the Commission to weigh the evidence without giving the benefit of the doubt to any party. See Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 ll-9-704(c)(4). However, nothing in the Roach Manufacturing decision required the Commission to be partial to either party.\nFinally, the Trust Fund contends that Roach Manufacturing does not support the conclusion that the natural children of deceased employees are always automatically entitled to benefits as a matter of law. The Trust Fund is correct in this regard, as there must always be proof of actual dependency before a person is entitled to dependency benefits. See Bankston v. Prime West Corp., 271 Ark. 727, 610 S.W.2d 586 (Ark. App. 1981) (citing Roach Manufacturing, but holding that it was distinguishable because the minor child had always received support from another person and at no time received support from the decedent). However, the record contains ample evidence that there was a reasonable expectation of support, despite the mother\u2019s testimony that she never expected to see the decedent again. Similar to Roach Manufacturing, the decedent here provided for his family until 2003, when he abandoned them for his new \u201cwife,\u201d and the children, by virtue of their ages, could not have been expected to pursue support on their own. The record supports the Commission\u2019s finding that the decedent\u2019s minor children were wholly and actually dependent upon decedent.\nThe Trust Fund also argues that the minor children were barred from receiving benefits under the provisions of Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 11-9-111 (a). That statute provides:\nCompensation to alien nonresidents of the United States or Canada shall be the same in amount as provided for residents, except that alien nonresident dependents in any foreign country shall be limited to the surviving wife or children or, if there is no surviving wife or children, to the surviving father or mother whom the employee has supported, either wholly or in part, for the period of one (1) year prior to the date of the injury.\nThe Trust Fund argues that the statute limits the class of beneficiaries of alien nonresidents to the surviving wife, his children, and his parents, and that the statute bars them from receiving benefits unless the decedent supported them for the one-year period prior to his death.\nTo address the Trust Fund\u2019s argument, we must construe the meaning of the statute. We review issues of statutory construction de novo, as it is for this court to decide what a statute means. Johnson v. Bonds Fertilizer, Inc., 365 Ark. 133, 226 S.W.3d 753 (2006). As mentioned previously, the provisions of the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act are to be construed strictly. See Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 ll-9-704(c)(3). Strict construction requires that nothing be taken as intended that is not clearly expressed, and its doctrine is to use the plain meaning of the language employed. American Standard Travelers Indem. Co. v. Post, 78 Ark. App. 79, 77 S.W.3d 554 (2002). The basic rule of statutory construction, to which all other interpretive guides must yield, is to give effect to the intent of the legislature. Teasley v. Hermann Cos., 92 Ark. App. 40, 211 S.W.3d 40 (2005). Statutes are to be construed such that no word is left void, superfluous, or insignificant. Estate of Slaughter v. City of Hampton, 102 Ark. App. 373, 285 S.W.3d 669 (2008). When the meaning is not clear, we look to the language of the statute, the subject matter, the object to be accomplished, the purpose to be served, the remedy provided, the legislative history, and other appropriate means that shed light on the subject. Baker Refrigeration Systems, Inc. v. Weiss, 360 Ark. 388, 201 S.W.3d 900 (2005).\nThe Trust Fund argues that the General Assembly intended to create two separate and distinct burdens of proof for resident and nonresident alien beneficiaries when it enacted \u00a7\u00a7 11-9-111 and 11-9-527. It further contends that the phrase \u201csupported, either wholly or in part, for the period of one (1) year prior to the date of the injury\u201d must necessarily apply to the surviving wife or children. Otherwise, it claims, a surviving wife or child would have to present no proof of dependency at all, which would be an absurd result. We disagree.\nSection 11-9-111 (a) ensures that residents and nonresidents receive equal compensation and limits the class of alien nonresident dependents. Nothing in \u00a7 11-9-527 excludes alien nonresidents from receiving benefits, and nothing in \u00a7 11-9-111 renders the provisions of \u00a7 11-9-527 inapplicable except to the extent that certain beneficiaries are excluded. Alien nonresident dependents must still meet the requirements set forth in \u00a7 11 \u2014 9\u2014 527 to receive dependency benefits.\nWe also reject the Trust Fund\u2019s interpretation that the phrase \u201csupported . . . for the period of one (1) year prior to the date of the injury\u201d applies to the surviving wife or children. It is apparent from the statute that it is written disjunctively. Dependents include the surviving wife and children, or, if that class of persons does not exist, then to the surviving mother or father \u201cwhom the employee has supported.\u201d The Trust Fund\u2019s interpretation would also bar from benefits those alien nonresident spouses who were married for less than one year and alien nonresident children who were less than one year old. We doubt that the General Assembly intended such a result. The interpretation that makes more sense is that the one-year clause only applies to the surviving father and mother.\nThe Commission did not err in finding that the minor children had a reasonable expectation of support from the decedent or that the minor children were not barred by \u00a7 11-9-111 from receiving benefits. Therefore, we affirm.\nAffirmed.\nPittman and Hart, JJ., agree.\nCounsel for the minor children challenges the constitutionality of Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 11-9-111. However, no cross-appeal was filed on this issue. Accordingly, the constitutionality of the statute is not properly before us. See Hoffman v. Gregory, 361 Ark. 73, 204 S.W.3d 541 (2005) (stating that a notice of cross-appeal is required when an appellee seeks affirmative relief not granted below).", "type": "majority", "author": "Waymond M. Brown, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "David L. Pake, for appellant Total Disability Trust Fund.", "Guy Davis, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "DEATH & PERMANENT TOTAL DISABILITY TRUST FUND, Buster Roberts Logging, American Interstate Insurance Company v. Francisca Guevara RODRIGUEZ, Lavona Kay Haury, Estate of Modesto Sustaita Herrera\nCA 08-842\n292 S.W.3d 827\nCourt of Appeals of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered February 11, 2009\nDavid L. Pake, for appellant Total Disability Trust Fund.\nGuy Davis, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0375-01", "first_page_order": 401, "last_page_order": 408 }