{
  "id": 6653901,
  "name": "GUNTER BROTHERS LUMBER COMPANY v. Jimmy R. LAUNIUS, and Wife, Elizabeth LAUNIUS",
  "name_abbreviation": "Gunter Bros. Lumber Co. v. Launius",
  "decision_date": "1984-05-02",
  "docket_number": "CA 83-252",
  "first_page": "191",
  "last_page": "194",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "11 Ark. App. 191"
    },
    {
      "type": "parallel",
      "cite": "669 S.W.2d 205"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ark. Ct. App.",
    "id": 13370,
    "name": "Arkansas Court of Appeals"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 34,
    "name_long": "Arkansas",
    "name": "Ark."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "20 S.W. 409",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.W.",
      "weight": 2,
      "year": 1892,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "410"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "56 Ark. 516",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
      "year": 1892,
      "opinion_index": 0
    }
  ],
  "analysis": {
    "cardinality": 337,
    "char_count": 5495,
    "ocr_confidence": 0.856,
    "sha256": "8619c950a70e66f268a021aa42e574ff5b1a99f5281875485571a328941bd267",
    "simhash": "1:1ae2d3a967e2997c",
    "word_count": 878
  },
  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:16:17.677907+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "Mayfield, C.J., and Cloninger, J., agree."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "GUNTER BROTHERS LUMBER COMPANY v. Jimmy R. LAUNIUS, and Wife, Elizabeth LAUNIUS"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Tom Glaze, Judge.\nThis case arose from appellees\u2019 purchase of a home that Bennie Montgomery and his wife were building in the North Hills Subdivision in Ashdown, Arkansas. Appellant supplied Montgomery with building materials which were delivered to and used in the construction of appellees\u2019 home. Appellees paid the contractor, Montgomery, but Montgomery failed to pay the appellant, the supplier of the materials. As a consequence, appellant filed its lien against the appellees\u2019 property. It is undisputed that neither Montgomery nor appellant gave appellees the notice required under Ark. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 51-608.1 et seq. (Supp. 1983), that their property could be subject to a lien if persons supplying materials to improve the property were not paid in full. No such notice was required prior to \u00a7\u00a7 51-608.1 et seq., which became effective on October 1, 1979. The issue in this appeal springs from the fact that appellant supplied and delivered materials to appellees\u2019 homesite twice before October 1, 1979. Its other deliveries, a total of nineteen, came after October 1. Appellant argues that because it commenced deliveries to the worksite before the effective date of the new statutes, notice to appellees was not required. The trial court rejected this argument, finding that appellant had no valid, enforceable lien for the materials furnished after October 1, 1979; however, it found appellant entitled to a lien for $887.84, covering the two deliveries prior to that date. We believe the trial court\u2019s findings were correct.\nRelying on Kizer Lumber Co. v. Mosley, 56 Ark. 516, 20 S.W. 409 (1892), appellant contends the materials sent to appellees\u2019 homesite were supplied under a single or executory contract that existed at the time the first materials were delivered\u2014September 27, 1979. Thus, appellant concludes, if the new statutory notice provisions were construed to apply to an agreement preceding their effective date, such a construction or application would be an impairment of a contract prohibited by the Constitutions of both the United States and Arkansas. U.S. Const. art. I, \u00a7 10, cl. 1; Ark. Const. art. 2, \u00a7 17.\nFirst, we note that appellant fails to cite any case in support of its constitutional argument. However, assuming such argument has validity \u2014 which we seriously doubt \u2014 we need not reach it because the evidence supports the trial court\u2019s finding that appellant\u2019s agreement with Montgomery to supply materials was severable and terminable after each purchase rather than a single contract to supply all the necessary materials to build appellees\u2019 house. Of course, if each purchase by Montgomery was a separate contract, the notice provisions in \u00a7\u00a7 51-608.1 et seq. clearly applied to each purchase made and delivered beginning on October 1, 1979.\nAppellant\u2019s single-contract theory is based on its reading of Kizer, supra, but that case simply does not support appellant\u2019s position. The Court in Kizer was confronted with a statute of limitation issue \u2014 when the materialman, Kizer Lumber, was required to file its lien. Citing the applicable law, the Kizer court stated:\nIf the materials were furnished under one contract, he [the materialman] should file the account. . . after the last was delivered; but if the materials were furnished under separate and distinct contracts, it [the account] should be filed under each contract.... If, however, he [the materialman] began to furnish \u201cwithout any specific agreement as to the amount to be furnished,\u201d or the time within which they were to be furnished, and there was a \u201creasonable expectation that further material\u201d would \u201cbe required of him,\u201d and he was \u201cafterwards called upon from time to time to furnish the same,\u201d he should file it. . . after the last item was delivered.\nId. at 519, 20 S.W. at 410.\nIn reviewing the evidence, the Court found that when the contractor Mosely purchased his first lumber from the Kizer Lumber Company, he made no contract to buy any other, but said to them that he might need more. Under these facts, the Court held the materials were presumed to have been furnished under one contract and the amounts due under the contract should be treated as one demand.\nHere, appellant\u2019s president testified that materials for appellees\u2019 home were supplied on an open account in Montgomery\u2019s name. Appellant presented no evidence showing it was to supply all materials for appellees\u2019 home. Nor was it shown that Montgomery, either expressly or impliedly, gave appellant any \u201creasonable expectation\u201d that he would \u2014 or even might \u2014 purchase other materials with which to build appellees\u2019 house. While Montgomery did purchase other materials from appellant for that project, he could have terminated those purchases at any time. This being true, we conclude the trial court correctly found that \u00a7\u00a7 51-608 et seq. and the notice provisions contained therein applied to the deliveries of materials by appellant to the appellees\u2019 property after October 1,1979. Because there is no dispute that appellees did not receive the notice required under those statutory provisions, appellant simply is not entitled to a lien for the value of the materials delivered after October 1, 1979,\nWe affirm.\nMayfield, C.J., and Cloninger, J., agree.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Tom Glaze, Judge."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Eric W. Bishop, for appellant.",
      "Dowd, Harrelson & Moore, for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "GUNTER BROTHERS LUMBER COMPANY v. Jimmy R. LAUNIUS, and Wife, Elizabeth LAUNIUS\nCA 83-252\n669 S.W.2d 205\nCourt of Appeals of Arkansas Division II\nOpinion delivered May 2, 1984\nEric W. Bishop, for appellant.\nDowd, Harrelson & Moore, for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0191-01",
  "first_page_order": 213,
  "last_page_order": 216
}