{ "id": 6138390, "name": "Charles A. VAUGHN v. Ronnie A. MORRIS and Linda L. MORRIS, Husband and Wife", "name_abbreviation": "Vaughn v. Morris", "decision_date": "1984-06-27", "docket_number": "CA 83-329", "first_page": "106", "last_page": "110", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "12 Ark. App. 106" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "671 S.W.2d 195" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark. Ct. App.", "id": 13370, "name": "Arkansas Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "411 F.2d 879", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 2191463 ], "year": 1969, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/411/0879-01" ] }, { "cite": "243 Ark. 635", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 8722777 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1967, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/243/0635-01" ] }, { "cite": "23 Ark. 653", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1866025 ], "year": 1861, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/23/0653-01" ] }, { "cite": "6 Ark. App. 308", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6142124 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/6/0308-01" ] }, { "cite": "54 S. W.2d 66", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "year": 1932, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "186 Ark. 435", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 8722482 ], "year": 1932, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/186/0435-01" ] }, { "cite": "411 S.W.2d 666", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "year": 1967, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "242 Ark. 6", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 8717265 ], "year": 1967, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/242/0006-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 426, "char_count": 6960, "ocr_confidence": 0.868, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.298132930532853e-08, "percentile": 0.3338011212236698 }, "sha256": "39c98c5d0482a5d526071dc6fefb1132c82f3d2cdcac16d758522e9d0f5904e6", "simhash": "1:3726b50b1e88931b", "word_count": 1158 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:00:16.322657+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Cracraft and Cooper, JJ., agree." ], "parties": [ "Charles A. VAUGHN v. Ronnie A. MORRIS and Linda L. MORRIS, Husband and Wife" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Lawson Cloninger, Judge.\nThis is a case in which appellees, Ronnie A. and Linda L. Morris, sought specific performance of a sales contract for the sale of land and damages in the amount of $5,000 against the appellant, Charles A. Vaughn, and Virginia Vaughn, his wife. Appellant alleged that he was uncertain regarding the possession of appellees of the property described and asked that the complaint be dismissed. Appellant further alleged that appellees were put on actual notice of an adverse claim of possession to the lands which were the subject of the sales contract. After trial on April 28, 1983, the chancellor dismissed appellees\u2019 cause of action against Mrs. Vaughn and ordered the appellant, Charles A. Vaughn, to specifically perform the contract between the parties.\nAppellant\u2019s first point for reversal is that the chancellor erred in granting specific performance. Specifically, h\u00e9 argues that appellees acquired their interest by virtue of a tax deed which was void and that the property was pasture land under fence and in actual possessio\u00f1 of Leon Wilcox, who claimed titled adversely.\nAt trial, Mr. Vaughn testified that he entered into this contract with the intention of either selling the property to his neighbor, Mr. Wilcox, or trading it to him for other property more desirable. When he approached Mr. Wilcox with the proposal, Mr. Wilcox indicated that he was not interested in purchasing the property because it already belonged to him. Appellant\u2019s attorney subsequently rendered a title opinion, to the effect that the tax deed was void and did not constitute color of title. The attorney further stated that the order of quiet title of June 11,1979, would not be binding on the record owners since there was no actual or constructive notice given to them. He concluded that the title was \u201cnot only incomplete, but also not even insurable.\u201d Subsequently, appellees hired an attorney in order to make the title marketable. Addititional quitclaim deeds and an affidavit were recorded. Appellant\u2019s attorney then rendered a supplemental title opinion, stating that all requirements of his original title opinion had been met.\nThe chancellor found that appellees had provided marketable title within a reasonable time as provided by the contract. He further held that although he could not guarantee that Mr. Wilcox would not bring an action for adverse possession, he found that Mr. and Mrs. Wilcox recognized title of the property in the Morrises when they were parties in a lawsuit in July of 1980. Since Mr. Wilcox acknowledged that the Morrises owned the property, he cannot now claim title by adverse possession.\nA party seeking specific performance of a contract must show that he has at all times been ready, able, and willing to perform his part of the contract, and that he has complied with the terms of the contract by performing, or offering to perform the acts which form consideration of undertaking on the part of the other party. Lawson v. Taylor Hotels, Inc., 242 Ark. 6, 411 S.W.2d 666 (1967).\nIn Holt v. Manuel, 186 Ark. 435, 54 S. W.2d 66 (1932), the Arkansas Supreme Court stated that it will never compel a purchaser to take a title where \u201cthe point on which it depends is too doubtful to be settled without litigation, or where the purchase would expose him to the hazard of such proceedings; or, as it is usually expressed, it will not compel him to buy a lawsuit.\u201d\nThe court further stated:\nIt is not sufficient to create a reasonable doubt that the owner might be exposed merely to idle litigation, but it must be a reasonable apprehension that the purchaser taking the title might be subjected to litigation of a substantial nature from which his title might be placed in jeopardy. In determining whether or not reasonable doubt exists, it appears to be the general rule that the opinion of an attorney that the title to property is bad is not sufficient to raise such a doubt, although, as in the instant case, the attorney may be one of admitted standing and ability. Such opinion that the title is invalid, if erroneous, will not justify the purchaser in receding from his contract, [cases omitted]. If it should appear to the court, upon generally familiar principles of law, that the title is valid, then the doubt as to the title would be unfounded, and there could be no basis for any reasonable apprehension that the purchaser would be subjected to substantial litigation.\nIn Holt, supra, the attorney, in his title opinion, based his opinion that the title was bad on the fact that minor heirs of a trust which was terminated were not properly served with process in the termination of the trust. The chancellor found that actual service was had on the minors and further a guardian ad litem was appointed in the cause for the minors. See also Baugh v. Johnson, 6 Ark. App. 308, 641 S.W.2d 730 (1982).\nWe find that the chancellor\u2019s decision is not clearly against a preponderance of the evidence. As was stated in Holt, supra, an opinion by an attorney that the title is not marketable, if erroneous, will not justify the purchaser in rescinding the contract. In this case, appellant\u2019s attorney initially found that the title was unmarketable, but later rendered a supplemental title opinion, stating that all requirements which he had set out in his initial opinion had been met. Further, the chancellor found that Mr. Wicox had recognized appellees\u2019 title to the property in a previous lawsuit and, therefore, any claim of adverse possession would be \u201cidle litigation.\u201d We uphold the chancellor\u2019s decision to grant appellees specific performance on the contract of purchase.\nAppellant argues secondly that the chancellor erred in granting specific performance because the appellees sued appellant for a private roadway or access to the tract \u00bfcross other property owned by the appellant. He argues that this was inconsistent with one seeking specific performance, and cites Walworth v. Miles, 23 Ark. 653 (1861). A review of the pleadings and the transcript indicates that this argument was never raised in the trial court and cannot be considered on appeal. Gregory v. Gordon, 243 Ark. 635, 420 S.W.2d 825 (1967).\nAppellees argue on cross appeal that they are entitled to pre-judgment interest. Although appellees-cross appellants asked for interest in their pleadings, we do not find in the record that they presented the issue to the chancellor. The chancellor specifically awarded interest from the date of judgment and no objection was raised. Cross appellants cannot now raise the issue on appeal. Arkla Exploration Company v. Boren, 411 F.2d 879 (8th Cir. 1969).\nAffirmed.\nCracraft and Cooper, JJ., agree.", "type": "majority", "author": "Lawson Cloninger, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Ball & Lindsay, by: Wayne B. Ball, for appellant.", "George M. Hunt, Sr., and Esther M. White, for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Charles A. VAUGHN v. Ronnie A. MORRIS and Linda L. MORRIS, Husband and Wife\nCA 83-329\n671 S.W.2d 195\nCourt of Appeals of Arkansas Division II\nOpinion delivered June 27, 1984\nBall & Lindsay, by: Wayne B. Ball, for appellant.\nGeorge M. Hunt, Sr., and Esther M. White, for appellees." }, "file_name": "0106-01", "first_page_order": 134, "last_page_order": 138 }