{ "id": 6141319, "name": "Reola DANIELS v. STATE of Arkansas", "name_abbreviation": "Daniels v. State", "decision_date": "1984-09-12", "docket_number": "CA CR 84-64", "first_page": "251", "last_page": "253", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "12 Ark. App. 251" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "674 S.W.2d 949" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark. Ct. App.", "id": 13370, "name": "Arkansas Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "372 U.S. 734", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1765418 ], "year": 1963, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/372/0734-01" ] }, { "cite": "6 Ark. App. 138", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6138776 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/6/0138-01" ] }, { "cite": "274 Ark. 109", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1754964 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/274/0109-01" ] }, { "cite": "280 Ark. 291", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1744785 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/280/0291-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 288, "char_count": 3785, "ocr_confidence": 0.847, "pagerank": { "raw": 9.05143267759258e-08, "percentile": 0.5047346389692989 }, "sha256": "eb047e5f8ea285a4071218a979c7e9ef2902640eb39aa012b05be461d9cdfdb9", "simhash": "1:5fec022f670a42f6", "word_count": 624 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:00:16.322657+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Mayfield and Corbin, JJ., agree." ], "parties": [ "Reola DANIELS v. STATE of Arkansas" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Lawson Cloninger, Judge.\nAppellant was charged with theft by deception of an amount in excess of $2,500, a class B felony, in violation of Ark. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 41-2203 (Repl. 1977). Specifically, appellant was accused by Arkansas Social Services of receiving welfare benefits in an amount in excess of $8,000 by fraud. At her trial, in which she waived a jury, a witness called by the State was asked by the prosecutor to testify to the amount of welfare benefits paid to appellant. The trial court sustained appellant\u2019s objection to the competency of the witness to testify on the matter, and following a discussion with the parties, the court granted a continuance of the case for three weeks so that the State might call the proper witness. Appellant\u2019s objection to the continuance was overruled. The trial resumed and appellant was found guilty and sentenced to twenty years in prison. Imposition of sentence was suspended conditioned upon restitution to Arkansas Social Services.\nThe sole issue on this appeal is whether the trial court erred in granting the continuance. We find no error, and we affirm.\nThe granting or denial of a continuance is within the sound discretion of the trial court \u201cand will not be reversed absent a clear abuse of that discretion amounting to a denial of justice.\u201d Walls v. State, 280 Ark. 291, 658 S.W.2d 362 (1983). The appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that the trial court erred in its' ruling on a motion for a continuance and one asserting error must show a clear abuse of discretion. Branham v. State, 274 Ark. 109, 623 S.W.2d 1 (1981). A ruling on a motion for a continuance does not constitute grounds for reversal unless prejudice to the complaining party can be proved. Christian v. State, 6 Ark. App. 138, 639 S.W.2d 78 (1982).\nThe trial judge stated that he believed that a failure in communication between the prosecutor and appellant\u2019s counsel rendered a continuance necessary. Appellant\u2019s only allegation of prejudice was that her welfare benefits had been discontinued pending her trial for welfare fraud and that she would be in dire straits financially and was \u201choping this matter would be cleared up today.\u201d The substance of appellant\u2019s allegation of prejudice appears to be that she would suffer financially if an acquittal were delayed. That possibility of prejudice was one of the factors weighed by the trial court before granting the State\u2019s motion, and the action of the trial court was a proper exercise of discretion.\nAppellant\u2019s argument that the granting of a continuance subjected her to double jeopardy is without merit. She cites as authority Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734 (1963), which held that a trial court had abused its discretion and subjected the defendant to double jeopardy in discharging one jury and impaneling a second two days later because of the absence of a prosecution witness. Downum is inapplicable to the present case. Here, the proceedings were merely continued and then resumed, not terminated and then begun anew. Ark. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 41-106 (Repl. 1977) provides, in pertinent part, that a former prosecution is a affirmative defense to a subsequent prosecution for the same offense if the former offense was terminated without the consent of the defendant. However, a continuance is not a termination, and \u00a7 41-106 would not be applicable in this instance.\nWe find no evidence of discretionary abuse or prejudice.\nAffirmed.\nMayfield and Corbin, JJ., agree.", "type": "majority", "author": "Lawson Cloninger, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "William R. Simpson, Public Defender, by: Jacquelyn C. Gregan, Deputy Public Defender, for appellant.", "Steve Clark, Atty. Gen., by: Victra L. Fezvell, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Reola DANIELS v. STATE of Arkansas\nCA CR 84-64\n674 S.W.2d 949\nCourt of Appeals of Arkansas Division II\nOpinion delivered September 12, 1984\nWilliam R. Simpson, Public Defender, by: Jacquelyn C. Gregan, Deputy Public Defender, for appellant.\nSteve Clark, Atty. Gen., by: Victra L. Fezvell, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee." }, "file_name": "0251-01", "first_page_order": 281, "last_page_order": 283 }