{ "id": 6143330, "name": "INTERNATIONAL PAPER COMPANY v. Ezekiel McBRIDE", "name_abbreviation": "International Paper Co. v. McBride", "decision_date": "1984-10-31", "docket_number": "CA 84-188", "first_page": "400", "last_page": "404", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "12 Ark. App. 400" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "678 S.W.2d 375" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark. Ct. App.", "id": 13370, "name": "Arkansas Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "2 Ark. App. 343", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6142596 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/2/0343-01" ] }, { "cite": "6 Ark. App. 333", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6142303 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/6/0333-01" ] }, { "cite": "4 Ark. App. 11", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6135989 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/4/0011-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 375, "char_count": 5731, "ocr_confidence": 0.865, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.626888350810993e-07, "percentile": 0.6882397390735908 }, "sha256": "f5c6fef2c4c849679f336b3a69cbb124e10dc821f8d3b498f5c076c366212bca", "simhash": "1:86988aa3621f5a13", "word_count": 921 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:00:16.322657+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Cooper, J., agrees.", "Mayfield, J., concurs." ], "parties": [ "INTERNATIONAL PAPER COMPANY v. Ezekiel McBRIDE" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Donald L. Corbin, Judge.\nAppellee, Ezekiel McBride, was adjudicated permanently and totally disabled as a result of an injury to his lower back while employed by the appellant, International Paper Company. Now the matter is back before us because appellant is controverting the lump sum award of attorney\u2019s fees to appellee\u2019s attorney.\nAppellant\u2019s first argument that we must address concerns the question raised by his counsel as to whether Ark. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 81-1332.1 (Supp. 1983) of the Arkansas Workers\u2019 Compensation Act, providing for lump sum award of attorneys\u2019 fees is inconsistent with Ark. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 81-1332 (Supp. 1983), and therefore void.\nThe emergency clause found in Act 215 of 1979, codified at Ark. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 81-1332.1, makes it clear that the legislature was aware of the provisions of \u00a7 81-1332 in regard to attorneys\u2019 fees. With this knowledge the legislature passed Act 215 to address what it saw as a gap left by \u00a7 81-1332. Section 5 of Act 215 reads in pertinent part:\n[T]hat the scope of the Commission\u2019s authority to award attorney\u2019s fees on a lump sum basis is unclear and must be immediately clarified. Therefore an emergency is hereby declared to exist. . . .\nObviously, the legislature intended the two sections, \u00a7 81-1332 and \u00a7 81-1332.1, to be read in conjunction with one another and saw no conflict between the two statutes. The legislature felt strongly that the Commission should be able to award lump sum attorneys\u2019 fees. Had the legislature perceived any conflict between the statute they enacted to accomplish this and the old statute, they would have undoubtedly repealed \u00a7 81-1332.\nWe have spoken to this issue previously in Aluminum Company of America v. Neal, 4 Ark. App. 11, 626 S.W.2d 620 (1982). Judge Tom Glaze writing for a majority of the Court stated:\nPrior to the enactment of Act 215, many instances existed where the claimant\u2019s attorney received his or her compensation installments on the same schedule benefits were paid the claimant. Since an individual claimant or beneficiary might die or remarry prior to the projected time set forth in the tables, attorneys in these instances would fail to receive full payment for their services. The language in the emergency clause of Act 215, i.e., Section 3 supra, clearly reflects that the Arkansas General Assembly enacted Act 215 to remedy this problem.\nAppellant argues that \u00a7 81-1332.1 is unconstitutional in that it violates the equal protection and due process clauses of the Fourteenth and Fifth Amendments to the United States Constitution.\nThe equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment has been interpreted to mean that similar individuals in similar circumstances will be dealt with in a similar manner. There is nothing in the language of \u00a7 81-1332.1 to indicate that any individual or group of individuals is to be singled out for different treatment under similar circumstances. Section 81-1332.1 is a facially neutral statute and in no way violates the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Appellants present several hypothetical situations in which they allege \u00a7 81-1332.1 could be discriminatorily applied; however, the record is totally devoid of any evidence to support an argument that the statute has been applied discrimina-torily. Absent such evidence, we cannot address this issue.\nAppellant argues that \u00a7 81-1332.1 violates the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment because the Commission\u2019s discretion in awarding lump sum attorneys\u2019 fees can never be challenged due to the statute\u2019s lack of guidelines. We believe appellant misunderstands the nature of the protection provided by the Fifth Amendment.\nThe due process clause of the Fifth Amendment, applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment, provides in part that no one shall be deprived of property without due process of law. Appellants below were afforded a hearing before the Commission to determine whether a lump sum attorney\u2019s fee would be awarded. This hearing provided appellant due process of law in regard to the award of a lump sum attorney\u2019s fee.\nAppellants argue that the statute fails to set forth guidelines for awarding lump sum attorney\u2019s fees. We must disagree. The plain language of the statute authorizes the Commission to award lump sum attorney\u2019s fees. No limitations are set forth because none were apparently intended. We must assume that the legislature intended to authorize the Commission to award such fees in any or all cases. Thus the statute\u2019s guidelines are discernible; lump sum attorneys\u2019 fees can be awarded in any or all cases. Any complaint that the Commission has exercised their authority to award lump sum attorneys\u2019 fees discrimina-torily must be raised under the equal protection clause and supported by the record.\nThe Workers\u2019 Compensation Commission declined to rule on the constitutionality of \u00a7 81-1332.1 when the issue was raised before them. As we have said before in Hamilton v. Jeffrey Stone Co., 6 Ark. App. 333, 641 S.W.2d 723 (1982), and in Swafford v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 2 Ark. App. 343, 621 S.W.2d 862 (1981), the constitutionality of a statute must be raised at the Commission level; however, the ultimate decision upon a statute\u2019s constitutionality can only be decided by a court of law. Arkansas Constitution, Article VII, \u00a7 1. The constitutionality of the statute was properly raised below and we find the statute to be constitutional.\nAffirmed.\nCooper, J., agrees.\nMayfield, J., concurs.", "type": "majority", "author": "Donald L. Corbin, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Bridges, Young, Matthews, Holmes ir Drake, for appellant.", "Baim, Gunti, Mouser, Bryant \u00bfr DeSimone, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "INTERNATIONAL PAPER COMPANY v. Ezekiel McBRIDE\nCA 84-188\n678 S.W.2d 375\nCourt of Appeals of Arkansas Division I\nOpinion delivered October 31, 1984\nBridges, Young, Matthews, Holmes ir Drake, for appellant.\nBaim, Gunti, Mouser, Bryant \u00bfr DeSimone, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0400-01", "first_page_order": 438, "last_page_order": 442 }