{
  "id": 6138899,
  "name": "B. J. McADAMS, INC. v. DOGGETT LEASING COMPANY, INC. and Junior DOGGETT",
  "name_abbreviation": "B. J. McAdams, Inc. v. Doggett Leasing Co.",
  "decision_date": "1984-12-19",
  "docket_number": "CA 84-102",
  "first_page": "162",
  "last_page": "164",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "13 Ark. App. 162"
    },
    {
      "type": "parallel",
      "cite": "681 S.W.2d 406"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ark. Ct. App.",
    "id": 13370,
    "name": "Arkansas Court of Appeals"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 34,
    "name_long": "Arkansas",
    "name": "Ark."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "271 Ark. 469",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
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        1756127
      ],
      "weight": 2,
      "year": 1980,
      "opinion_index": 0,
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        "/ark/271/0469-01"
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:52:11.493423+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "Cracraft, C.J., and Cloninger, J., agree."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "B. J. McADAMS, INC. v. DOGGETT LEASING COMPANY, INC. and Junior DOGGETT"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Donald L. Corbin, Judge.\nAppellant, B.J. McAdams, Inc., is a motor carrier of property in interstate commerce, and enters into vehicle lease agreements with owners of tractors and trailers to maintain a fleet of vehicular equipment to provide transportation services. Appellees, Doggett Leasing Company, Inc., and Junior Doggett, executed five such agreements with appellant, and were to receive a specified percentage of the net revenue from each load transported by appellees\u2019 vehicles. Net revenue was defined in the agreements \u201cas gross revenue less amounts paid to other persons.\u201d Also, appellees were to reimburse appellant for any claims for cargo damage caused directly or indirectly by appellees or their employees.\nOn June 23, 1982, appellees filed suit alleging that appellant had breached the terms of the agreements by (1) deducting fees from the compensation owed to appellees, from October, 1977, through January, 1982, and paying the fees to two wholly-owned subsidiaries of appellant, and (2) deducting a late delivery claim and a cargo damage claim from appellees\u2019 compensation, which were not caused by appellees or their employees.\nAppellant filed a counterclaim for breach of the agreements alleging that it had paid certain cargo damage claims caused by appellees or their employees, for which it had not been reimbursed by appellees.\nOn October 31, 1983, in a trial by jury, a verdict was rendered in favor of appellees on their complaint and against appellant on its counterclaim. Appellant filed a motion for new trial which was denied by the trial court, and appellant prosecutes this appeal.\nAppellant raises two issues on appeal: (1) The trial court erred in failing to find, as a matter of law, that the contract phrase, \u201camounts paid to other persons,\u201d was unambiguous, and the interpretation of the phrase by the jury was not supported by substantial evidence. (2) The jury verdict against appellant on the complaint and counterclaim involving cargo damage claims was not supported by substantial evidence.\nWe need not reach either of these arguments because appellant may not now question the sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict because appellant failed to renew its motion for a directed verdict at the conclusion of all the evidence, nor did appellant file a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. In McFall Chevrolet Co. v. Collins, 271 Ark. 469, 609 S. W.2d 118 (Ark. App. 1980), this Court stated:\n[I]n order for an appellant to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence in a jury trial, he must either move fora directed verdict at the conclusion of all the evidence, move for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or move for a new trial because of insufficiency of the evidence. The failure to do one of these three requirements precludes raising the issue on appeal.\nThe rule has since been changed by a May, 1983, amendment to delete the mention of a motion for a new trial as being a means to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence of a jury verdict. ARCP Rule 50(e) now states:\n(e) Failure to Question Sufficiency of the Evidence. When there has been a trial by jury, the failure of a party to file a motion for directed verdict at the conclusion of all the evidence, or a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, because of insufficiency of the evidence will constitute a waiver of any question pertaining to the sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury verdict. [Amended by Per Curiam, May 16, 1983.]\nThe trial of this case was on October 31, 1983, and was clearly subject to the rule change.\nAffirmed.\nCracraft, C.J., and Cloninger, J., agree.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Donald L. Corbin, Judge."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "James W. Woods, for appellant.",
      "Henry & Duckett, for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "B. J. McADAMS, INC. v. DOGGETT LEASING COMPANY, INC. and Junior DOGGETT\nCA 84-102\n681 S.W.2d 406\nCourt of Appeals of Arkansas Division I\nOpinion delivered December 19, 1984\n[Rehearing denied January 16, 1985.]\nJames W. Woods, for appellant.\nHenry & Duckett, for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0162-01",
  "first_page_order": 182,
  "last_page_order": 184
}