{
  "id": 6139105,
  "name": "INSURED LLOYDS INS. CO. v. ARKANSAS TRUCK PARTS, INC.",
  "name_abbreviation": "Insured Lloyds Ins. v. Arkansas Truck Parts, Inc.",
  "decision_date": "1984-12-19",
  "docket_number": "CA 84-29",
  "first_page": "165",
  "last_page": "170",
  "citations": [
    {
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      "cite": "13 Ark. App. 165"
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      "cite": "681 S.W.2d 403"
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    "name_abbreviation": "Ark. Ct. App.",
    "id": 13370,
    "name": "Arkansas Court of Appeals"
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      "cite": "280 Ark. 435",
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      "year": 1983,
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      "cite": "241 Ark. 250",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
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        1724114
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      "year": 1966,
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      "case_paths": [
        "/ark/241/0250-01"
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    {
      "cite": "268 Ark. 746",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
      "case_ids": [
        1715248
      ],
      "weight": 2,
      "year": 1980,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ark/268/0746-01"
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    },
    {
      "cite": "336 P.2d 869",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "P.2d",
      "year": 1959,
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "53 Wash.2d 707",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Wash. 2d",
      "case_ids": [
        1011192
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      "year": 1959,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/wash-2d/53/0707-01"
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:52:11.493423+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "Cooper and Corbin, JJ., agree."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "INSURED LLOYDS INS. CO. v. ARKANSAS TRUCK PARTS, INC."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Melvin Mayfield, Judge.\nInsured Lloyds Insurance Company appeals the trial judge\u2019s decision granting appellee judgment on a garage liability policy. The appellee is engaged in the repair and sale of used cars and in the sale of used automotive parts. The policy was purchased from a local insurance agency and obtained by it from Lloyds\u2019 general agent, Arkansas All Risks, Inc. The policy provided. \u201cAutomobile Hazard 1\u201d coverage as follows:\n(1) the ownership, maintenance or use (including loading or unloading) of any automobile for the purpose of garage operations, and (2) the occasional use for other business purposes and the use for non-business purposes of any automobile owned by or in charge of the named insured and used principally in garage operations, and (3) the ownership, maintenance or use of any automobile owned by the named insured while furnished for the use of any person.\nThe garage liability master endorsement, expressly made a part of the policy, provides space for the listing of \u201cfurnished automobiles\u201d and \u201cservice vehicles.\u201d No vehicle is listed in the space allotted to either category and at the top of each space the words \u201cno coverage is provided\u201d have been typed. It is undisputed that appellee had no \u201cservice vehicles\u201d at the time the policy was issued. The evidence does not establish whether appellee did or did not have any \u201cfurnished automobiles\u201d at the time; apparently, this is because the parties were not concerned with the insurance coverage of \u201cfurnished automobiles.\u201d\nAppellee subsequently acquired a 1979 GMC wrecker and, during the period covered by the policy, the wrecker was involved in an accident when appellee\u2019s driver was delivering some parts and turned in front of another truck. Lloyds denied that its policy afforded liability coverage for the damages to the other truck. Appellee paid that claim and brought this suit against Lloyds. The judge, sitting without a jury, found the policy ambiguous, resolved the ambiguity against Lloyds, and gave appellee judgment for the amount it paid to settle the claim, plus 12% penalty, and attorneys\u2019 fees. It is Lloyds\u2019 contention that the policy is unambiguous and that it did not afford liability coverage for the wrecker.\nWe start with appellee\u2019s assertion that a garage liability policy is unique. The case of Morrison v. Anchor Casualty Co., 53 Wash.2d 707, 336 P.2d 869 (1959), is cited. The opinion in that case states:\nAn insurance company lawyer, writing in the Insurance Law Journal (October, 1954), p. 668, commences an article . . . with the following statement:\n\u201cThe Automobile Garage Liability Policy is one of the most complex, and perhaps least understood, liability forms in use today. Its complexity is largely attributable to the breadth of coverage, that is, it embraces a multiplicity of hazards which otherwise are written under separate policies.\u201d\nThe court\u2019s opinion in Morrison also points out that a \u201cvery important distinction\u201d between the automobile garage liability policy and standard automobile liability insurance is that the garage policy does not insure a particular automobile. The appellee says this distinction is very important in the instant case.\nTurning to the master endorsement, to which we have referred, the appellee points to the fact that the space provided for the listing of \u201cservice vehicles\u201d does not provide a column for the listing of the premium charge for such vehicles whereas the space for the listing of \u201cfurnished automobiles\u201d does provide a column for the listing of the premium charge for those vehicles. Appellee then asks: \u201cIf a category is provided under furnished automobiles for a premium charge on the appellant\u2019s form, why is there not a category under the service vehicle portion for a premium charge?\u201d The appellee answers its own question as follows: \u201cThe answer is that a premium has already been charged for service vehicles under the advance premium provision of hazard 1 coverage which used a payroll basis to determine the extent of the exposure for which the appellant must charge.\u201d\nWe have to agree with appellee\u2019s answer. The Hazard 1 provision says it covers \u201c(1) the ownership, maintenance or use (including loading or unloading) of any automobile for the purpose of garage operations. ...\u201d It is undisputed that the wrecker involved in this case was owned by the appellee and was being used in appellee\u2019s garage operations at the time it collided with the other vehicle. It is undisputed that an advance premium had already been charged and collected for the policy\u2019s Hazard 1 liability coverage. It is undisputed that this advance premium was based on appellee\u2019s payroll and that the payroll could be audited.\nThe appellee next points to the space on the master endorsement where service vehicles could be listed and calls our attention to the fact that printed under that space is the following: \u201cCoverage is automatically extended to newly acquired Service Vehicles during the policy period so long as the Named Insured notifies the Company within 30 days of such acquisition and proper premium is charged therefor.\u201d Since the evidence shows that the wrecker was acquired by appellee during the policy period and that appellee\u2019s insurance agent promptly notified Lloyds\u2019 general agent of that fact, the next question is whether the \u201cproper premium\u201d has been charged.\nAppellee has the same answer to that question. The proper premium was charged when the advance premium based on the appellee\u2019s payroll was charged. Appellee\u2019s insurance agent testified to the same effect. On the other hand, a witness from Lloyd\u2019s general agent, Arkansas All Risks, Inc., testified to the contrary. He would not say that a party who has Hazard 1 coverage and adds a service vehicle must, in every case, pay an additional premium, but he did say that Lloyds would charge an additional premium in that situation. The next question is: Did Lloyds have the right under its contract to charge this additional premium as a condition for coverage?\nLloyds places great emphasis on the following evidence. After the appellee acquired the wrecker, the local agent wrote Lloyds\u2019 general agents stating:\nPlease add the following.vehicle to this policy:\n1979 GMC Wrecker . . .\nWe want liability coverages & Fire, Theft, CAC & Collision - 250 deductible will be sufficient. Let me know if you need other information. I would appreciate a quote.\nLloyds\u2019 general agent replied to that letter, according to appellee\u2019s agent, with a quote of $1100.00. Appellee\u2019s local ag\u00e9nt testified that he told Lloyds\u2019 general agent that the Hazard 1 coverage already afforded appellee liability insurance and that he was able to get the collision coverage with another company at a cheaper rate. Appellee\u2019s agent admitted that he ultimately received a letter from Lloyds\u2019 general agent stating that in order to provide liability coverage for the wrecker the appellee would have to buy a commercial automobile policy or add it to his garage policy and pay a premium of $820.00. It is also admitted that this quote was not accepted and that the premium quoted was not paid.\nHowever, as we have said, the question is whether Lloyds had the right to charge this additional premium as a condition for liability coverage of the wrecker while used in the appellee\u2019s garage operation. We have to agree with the appellee that the insurance policy is, at least, ambiguous in that regard. We have held that an ambiguity must be construed against the insurance company preparing the contract, and that the policy will be construed so as to provide coverage unless it is patently unreasonable to do so. MFA Mut. Ins. Co. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 268 Ark. 746, 595 S.W.2d 706 (Ark. App. 1980). Applying that rule, the trial judge found for the appellee. We do not set aside the trial judge\u2019s findings of fact unless clearly against the preponderance of the evidence. ARCP 52(a). We think his decision in this case must be affirmed.\nAppellant argues, in the alternative, that if liability coverage is found to exist the amount recoverable should be reduced by the $250.00 deductible referred to on the master endorsement. While it is not clear, that this deductible applies to the coverage involved in this case, the short answer is that the issue was not raised in the trial court and cannot be raised here for the first time. Old American Life Ins. Co. v. Williams, 241 Ark. 250, 407 S.W.2d 110 (1966); Tompos v. City of Fayetteville, 280 Ark. 435, 658 S.W.2d 404 (1983).\nAffirmed.\nCooper and Corbin, JJ., agree.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Melvin Mayfield, Judge."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Laser, Sharp ir Huckabay, P.A., for appellant.",
      "Hoof man & Bingham, P.A., for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "INSURED LLOYDS INS. CO. v. ARKANSAS TRUCK PARTS, INC.\nCA 84-29\n681 S.W.2d 403\nCourt of Appeals of Arkansas Division I\nOpinion delivered December 19, 1984\nLaser, Sharp ir Huckabay, P.A., for appellant.\nHoof man & Bingham, P.A., for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0165-01",
  "first_page_order": 185,
  "last_page_order": 190
}