{
  "id": 6140356,
  "name": "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. Charles Darwin DAVIDSON",
  "name_abbreviation": "United States v. Davidson",
  "decision_date": "1985-03-27",
  "docket_number": "CA 84-298",
  "first_page": "194",
  "last_page": "197",
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      "cite": "686 S.W.2d 455"
    }
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  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ark. Ct. App.",
    "id": 13370,
    "name": "Arkansas Court of Appeals"
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    "name_long": "Arkansas",
    "name": "Ark."
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    {
      "cite": "278 Ark. 91",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
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        1748423
      ],
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      "year": 1982,
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:14:39.423771+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "Cracraft, C.J., and Corbin, J., agree."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. Charles Darwin DAVIDSON"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Tom Glaze, Judge.\nThis appeal arises from a foreclosure proceeding initiated by Mutual Life Insurance against Clarence E. Hopmann, the United States [Farmer\u2019s Home Administration (FHA), Department of Agriculture and Internal Revenue Service (IRS)], Charles Darwin Davidson and others. Mr. Hopmann owned the real and personal property involved in this cause and appellant, appellee and Mutual Life claimed certain interests in Hopmann\u2019s property. On October 6, 1983, the trial court entered a decree granting judgment to Mutual Life and determining it was secured by a first and prior lien. The court provided for a commissioner\u2019s sale and for the net sale proceeds to be applied first to the payment of Mutual Life\u2019s judgment. The balance of such proceeds were ordered placed in escrow for distribution to the other parties with their interests to be determined at a later date. On July 11, 1984, the trial court found that the balance of the proceeds was $49,950.00 and that from these proceeds, the IRS was entitled to the amount of its September 22, 1980, tax lien. The court, considering FHA\u2019s and appellee\u2019s respective claims and interests, ordered that appellee should receive the balance of the $49,950.00, which was $23,165.09.\nAppellant raises one point for reversal: The trial court erred in setting priorities because appellant\u2019s security interest (based upon its security agreement with Hopmann) was perfected in May, 1981, and was prior to appellee\u2019s judgment liens. Appellee argues, among other things, that appellant\u2019s abstract is deficient and the trial court\u2019s judgment should be affirmed. See Rule 9(e) of the Arkansas Rules of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals. Appellee\u2019s specific complaint is the appellant failed to abstract the testimony given in the hearing prior to the entry of the foreclosure decree on October 6, 1983, and that it also omitted from the abstract the security agreement upon which FHA based its priority-of-lien claim. Appellant responds by stating that the October, 1983, testimony was not relevant to the July, 1984, proceeding wherein the trial court determined the priority of the parties\u2019 respective lien interests. Furthermore, appellant suggests that abstracting the security agreement would be a duplication because the testimony of Mr. Howard Forrest, an FHA representative, was abstracted, and that testimony established that the security agreement was executed on May 12, 1981. Since it also did not abstract a financing statement, we assume \u2014 though it is not argued \u2014 that appellant further relies on Forrest\u2019s testimony to show that its security interest was perfected by its filing a financing statement on May 6, 1981.\nFinally, appellant mentions almost in passing that no execution had issued on appellee\u2019s judgments and thus, appellee had no lien on the balance of the proceeds placed in escrow. We have a problem in accepting appellant\u2019s argument that the abstract is sufficient. It is settled that the burden is on the appellant to bring up a record to show that the trial court was wrong. King v. Younts, 278 Ark. 91, 643 S.W.2d 542 (1982); Ark. R. App. P. 6. In addition, an appellate court must presume that the missing testimony in a record on appeal supports the finding of the lower court. King v. Younts at 92, 643 S.W.2d at 543. Here the trial court determined that appellee\u2019s lien interest was paramount to appellant\u2019s. In so finding, the court\u2019s July, 1984, order referred to and in part was based upon the October, 1983, proceeding (which was not abstracted) and the decree of foreclosure (which was only partially abstracted). Appellant now contends the trial court erred because its security interest was perfected prior to appellee\u2019s judgment liens, but we find nothing in the abstract setting out appellant\u2019s judgments or when those judgments were filed. From our limited examination of the transcript (which we are not required to do), we cannot locate any of appellee\u2019s judgments \u2014 which, leads us to conclude that either they had been introduced at the October, 1983, hearing and were not made a part of this record on appeal or they were introduced in the July, 1984, hearing but not designated as a part of the record. Either way, we are left to guess at which proceeding appellee\u2019s judgments were introduced. Without having these pertinent documents before us we can only speculate why the trial court held as it did. For example, did the court reject appellant\u2019s priority interest arguments because its documents failed to comply with the formal requisites under the law which are necessary to perfect its secured interest? Perhaps, on the other hand, appellee\u2019s judgments had been entered prior to the appellant\u2019s having perfected its secured interest. Or, maybe the trial court clearly erred as appellant asserts in this appeal. Without a proper abstract, we are unable to determine how the trial court disposed of appellant\u2019s argument that appellee\u2019s judgments posed no liens on the proceeds in escrow or, for that matter, whether such an argument was presented the trial judge. Other possibilities can be posed, but the point we make is that the record simply fails to demonstrate the trial court\u2019s error that the appellant now argues in this appeal.\nOf course, we need not (nor can we) speculate on matters either omitted from the abstract or from the transcript. We are required to affirm this appeal for two reasons: (1) Appellant\u2019s abstract fails to reflect the documents which support its claims; and (2) the appellee\u2019s judgments which appellant argues are subordinate to its interest are neither abstracted nor made a part of the record in this appeal.\nAffirmed.\nCracraft, C.J., and Corbin, J., agree.\nThe Forrest testimony reflects nothing concerning FHA\u2019s filing the security agreement as a financing statement. Nonetheless, appellant could perfect its security interest by filing a financing statement prior to execution of the security agreement if it complies with Ark. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 85-9-402 (Supp. 1983).\nAppellant specifically named those matters it designated on appeal rather than designating the entire record.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Tom Glaze, Judge."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "George W. Proctor, United States Att\u2019y, by: Fletcher Jackson, Asst. U.S. Att\u2019y, for appellant.",
      "Davidson Law Firm, Ltd., by: Charles Darwin Davidson, for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. Charles Darwin DAVIDSON\nCA 84-298\n686 S.W.2d 455\nCourt of Appeals of Arkansas Division II\nOpinion delivered March 27, 1985\n[Rehearing denied April 24, 1985.]\nGeorge W. Proctor, United States Att\u2019y, by: Fletcher Jackson, Asst. U.S. Att\u2019y, for appellant.\nDavidson Law Firm, Ltd., by: Charles Darwin Davidson, for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0194-01",
  "first_page_order": 222,
  "last_page_order": 225
}