{
  "id": 6141739,
  "name": "The ESTATE Of Dave KNOTT, by Charlie KNOTT, Administrator v. John Harris JONES and CERTAIN LANDS",
  "name_abbreviation": "Estate of Knott ex rel. Knott v. Jones",
  "decision_date": "1985-04-10",
  "docket_number": "CA 84-262",
  "first_page": "271",
  "last_page": "274",
  "citations": [
    {
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      "cite": "14 Ark. App. 271"
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    {
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      "cite": "687 S.W.2d 529"
    }
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  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ark. Ct. App.",
    "id": 13370,
    "name": "Arkansas Court of Appeals"
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      "cite": "179 S.W.2d 441",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.W.2d",
      "year": 1944,
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      "year": 1981,
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    {
      "cite": "272 S.W. 846",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.W.",
      "year": 1925,
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "169 Ark. 60",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
      "case_ids": [
        1373942
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      "year": 1925,
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        "/ark/169/0060-01"
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    {
      "cite": "225 Ark. 153",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
      "case_ids": [
        1642733
      ],
      "weight": 2,
      "year": 1955,
      "opinion_index": 0,
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        "/ark/225/0153-01"
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:14:39.423771+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "Cooper and Mayfield, JJ., agree."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "The ESTATE Of Dave KNOTT, by Charlie KNOTT, Administrator v. John Harris JONES and CERTAIN LANDS"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Lawson Cloninger, Judge.\nAppellant\u2019s statement of the issue can perhaps best be reduced to a single contention: the chancellor erred in granting summary judgment on the basis of res judicata. We do not agree, and we affirm the lower court\u2019s holding.\nIn his capacity as administrator of the Estate of Dave Knott, appellant filed an action in Jefferson County Chancery Court to quiet title to 14.6 acres of land. Jefferson County Circuit Court, in a previous ejectment action, had held that appellee was the owner and entitled to the possession of the land in question. The chancellor dismissed appellant\u2019s action, stating that it was barred by res judicata because of the circuit court\u2019s prior summary judgment in appellee\u2019s favor in a suit involving the same land. The chancellor found that appellant had claimed in the circuit court case that he personally owned the land and was therefore estopped from bringing an action in his fiduciary capacity. \u201cThe issues are the same,\u201d said the chancellor, \u201cand only the capacity of the parties differs.\u201d Appellant as administrator of the estate was held to be merely a nominal plaintiff. \u201cThe real party in interest,\u201d the chancellor concluded, \u201cis Charlie Knott, individually.\u201d\nArk. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 62-2401 (Repl. 1971) provides that realty becomes an asset in the hands of the administrator of an estate \u201cwhen so directed by the will (if any), or when the court finds that such property should be sold, mortgaged, leased or exchanged for any purpose enumerated in [\u00a7 62-2704].\u201d The latter statute lists the following contingencies:\n(1) For the payment of claims,\n(2) For the payment of a legacy given by the will of the decedent,\n(3) For the preservation or protection of assets of the estate,\n(4) For making distribution of the estate or any part thereof, or\n(5) For any other purpose in the best interest of the estate.\nSince 1956, when appellant was appointed administrator, no claim has been filed against the estate, and no other \u201cpurpose enumerated\u201d has been found by the probate court. In Cranna, Administrator v. Long, 225 Ark. 153, 279 S.W.2d 828 (1955), the Arkansas Supreme Court ruled that legal title of an intestate\u2019s lands, upon his death, descends and vests in his heirs at law, subject to a widow\u2019s dower and the payment of debts through his administrator. Thus, the property cannot be said ever to have been an asset in appellant\u2019s hands; only when real property has become an asset in an administrator\u2019s hands may he, in the language of \u00a7 62-2401, \u201cmaintain or defend an action for the possession thereof, or to determine or protect the title thereto.\u201d See Miller v. Watkins, 169 Ark. 60, 272 S.W. 846 (1925).\nBy 1982, appellant, through inheritance and conveyance from his brothers, had acquired all the interest in the lands comprising the estate. It was in his capacity as an individual landowner that he appeared as a party to the action in circuit court in 1983 that resulted in the recognition of appellee as owner of the 14.6 acres. Apart from the fact that appellant lacked legal capacity to maintain the action in chancery as administrator of the estate, his effort to circumvent the effect of res judicata by claiming to be a different party in the chancery suit (i.e., the estate by the administrator) is only an exercise in semantics. Generally speaking, the principle of res judicata applies when a final adjudication occurs on the merits of an issue, without fraud or collusion, by a court of competent jurisdiction, on matters that were (or might have been) litigated. Precisely identical parties are not required; a substantial identity is sufficient. The rule will not be defeated by minor differences. Wells v. Ark. Public Svc. Comm\u2019n, 272 Ark. 481, 616 S.W.2d 718 (1981); Rose v. Jacobs, 231 Ark. 286, 329 S.W.2d 170 (1959). See also 50 C.J.S. Judgments, \u00a7 765. Here, the differences were not merely minor; they were found to be altogeth\u00e9r fictional, and that finding is supported by the evidence. We endorse the ruling of the chancellor that when a party to one action in his individual capacity and to a second in his representative capacity is, in both cases, asserting or protecting his individual rights, the doctrine of res judicata binds him. See Vaughn\u2019s Adm\u2019r v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 179 S.W.2d 441 (Ky., 1944).\nAffirmed.\nCooper and Mayfield, JJ., agree.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Lawson Cloninger, Judge."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Robert F. Morehead, for appellant.",
      "Jones \u00bfr Petty, for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "The ESTATE Of Dave KNOTT, by Charlie KNOTT, Administrator v. John Harris JONES and CERTAIN LANDS\nCA 84-262\n687 S.W.2d 529\nCourt of Appeals of Arkansas Division I\nOpinion delivered April 10, 1985\n[Rehearing denied May 15, 1985.]\nRobert F. Morehead, for appellant.\nJones \u00bfr Petty, for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0271-01",
  "first_page_order": 299,
  "last_page_order": 302
}