{ "id": 6138190, "name": "Jack M. PITTS v. WESTERN ELECTRIC, Employer, Self-Insured Employer", "name_abbreviation": "Pitts v. Western Electric", "decision_date": "1985-05-22", "docket_number": "CA 84-443", "first_page": "85", "last_page": "88", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "15 Ark. App. 85" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "689 S.W.2d 582" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark. Ct. App.", "id": 13370, "name": "Arkansas Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "239 Ark. 439", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1730757 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1965, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/239/0439-01" ] }, { "cite": "263 Ark. 689", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1672674 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/263/0689-01" ] }, { "cite": "4 Ark. App. 11", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6135989 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/4/0011-01" ] }, { "cite": "4 Ark. App. 64", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6137284 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/4/0064-01" ] }, { "cite": "241 Ark. 498", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1724159 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1966, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/241/0498-01" ] }, { "cite": "12 Ark. App. 128", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6138945 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/12/0128-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 370, "char_count": 5137, "ocr_confidence": 0.908, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.161828885495153e-08, "percentile": 0.3828715496540532 }, "sha256": "1bed0df43fd6595837b39f755486b853363f1f51c3dd86079b9554937693069f", "simhash": "1:8796ed066d164b9b", "word_count": 836 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:08:52.139004+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Cooper and Glaze, JJ., agree." ], "parties": [ "Jack M. PITTS v. WESTERN ELECTRIC, Employer, Self-Insured Employer" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Donald L. Corbin, Judge.\nAppellant, Jack M. Pitts, was found to be \u201ccurrently totally disabled\u201d at the time of his hearing before the Administrative Law Judge and was awarded total disability benefits for the duration of his disability. Appellant\u2019s attorney was allowed \u201ca controverted attorney\u2019s fee on all permanent disability benefits in excess of 43.75 weeks.\u201d Appellant\u2019s attorney was subsequently allowed a lump sum attorney\u2019s fee upon his motion by the ALJ. The employer, Western Electric, appealed to the Full Commission which reversed the lump sum attorney\u2019s fee award on the basic premise that \u201cthe present value of all future payments under a current total disability award is undeterminable as these benefits, by definition, have no finite ending points. Therefore, a lump-sum attorney\u2019s fee cannot be awarded on a current total disability award.\u201d We affirm.\nArk. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 81-1332.1 (Supp. 1983), which contains the statutory authorization for the award of lump sum attorneys\u2019 fees, provides as follows:\nThe Workers\u2019 Compensation Commission is hereby authorized to approve lump sum attorneys fees for legal services rendered in respect of a claim before the Commission. Such lump sum attorneys fees are allowable notwithstanding that the award of compensation to the injured employee is to be paid on an installment basis. Lump sum attorneys fees, if approved by the Commission, shall be discounted at the rate provided in Ark. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 81-1319(k) as that provision may be amended from time to time.\nArk. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 81-1319(k) (Supp. 1983) provides as follows:\nWhenever the Commission determines that it is for the best interest of the parties entitled to compensation, and after due notice to all parties in interest of a hearing, the liability of the employer for compensation may be discharged by the payment of a lump sum equal to the present value of all future payments of compensation computed at seven (7) percentum discount, compounded annually. The probability of the death of the injured employee or other persons entitled to compensation before the expiration of the period during which they are entitled to compensation shall, in the absence of special circumstances making such course improper, be determined in accordance with the American Experience Table of Mortality. The probability of the happening of any other contingency affecting the amount or duration of compensation shall be disregarded, except the possibility of the remarriage of the widow which shall be determined in accordance with the Danish Annuity and Dutch Remarriage Table.\nIn Bemberg Iron Works v. Martin, 12 Ark. App. 128, 671 S.W.2d 768 (1984), we noted that McNeely v. Clem Mill & Gin, 241 Ark. 498, 409 S.W.2d 502 (1966), gave expression to a concept of applied law that remained without a label until this Court decided City of Humphrey v. Woodward, 4 Ark. App. 64, 628 S.W.2d 574 (1982), almost 16 years later. In Bemberg Iron Works, supra, we reiterated an observation in City of Humphrey, supra, that:\nnow when we speak of total disability, such benefits may be denominated further in terms of \u2018current\u2019 total, \u2018limited\u2019 total or total disability benefits \u2018until such time as total disability ceases\u2019 . . . Obviously, in making such an award, the Commission remains hopeful that the claimant\u2019s disability is not permanent and that he will eventually return to work.\nIn Aluminum Company of Amer. v. Neal, 4 Ark. App. 11, 626 S.W.2d 620 (1982), we restated the rule enumerated in U.S.F. & G. Co. v. Potter, 263 Ark. 689, 567 S.W.2d 104 (1978), that attorneys\u2019 fees can only be awarded when the statutes specifically authorize them. In the case at bar, the Commission properly concluded that a lump sum attorney\u2019s fee could not be awarded on appellant\u2019s current total disability award. We might have reached a different result had Ark. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 81-1332.1 not been amended by Act 631 of 1981 wherein the last sentence was added. This requirement in effect restricts an award of a lump sum attorney\u2019s fee to an ascertainable award to a claimant. In the instant case, the award is not ascertainable because it is not permanent. Therefore, it is impossible to calculate the award pursuant to the statutes.\nIn Littlejohn v. Earle Industries, 239 Ark. 439, 389 S.W.2d 898 (1965), the Supreme Court held that:\nThus, our legislature has entrusted to the Commission the right to determine the necessity of a claimant to secure the services of an attorney in order to preserve his benefits. We have indicated that on appeal this court will not interfere with the Commission\u2019s determination on the issue of attorneys\u2019 fees unless there is an abuse of discretion.\nWe hold that the Commission did not abuse its discretion in denying the award of a lump sum attorney\u2019s fee to appellant.\nAffirmed.\nCooper and Glaze, JJ., agree.", "type": "majority", "author": "Donald L. Corbin, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Williams, Kendall, Schrantz & Wood, P.A., by: Donald B. Kendall, for appellant.", "Friday, Eldredge & Clark, by: Donald H. Bacon, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Jack M. PITTS v. WESTERN ELECTRIC, Employer, Self-Insured Employer\nCA 84-443\n689 S.W.2d 582\nCourt of Appeals of Arkansas Division II\nOpinion delivered May 22, 1985\nWilliams, Kendall, Schrantz & Wood, P.A., by: Donald B. Kendall, for appellant.\nFriday, Eldredge & Clark, by: Donald H. Bacon, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0085-01", "first_page_order": 107, "last_page_order": 110 }