{
  "id": 6649390,
  "name": "James Charles WILLIAMS v. STATE of Arkansas",
  "name_abbreviation": "Williams v. State",
  "decision_date": "1986-02-05",
  "docket_number": "CA CR 85-128",
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:52:03.800747+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "Cooper and Glaze, JJ., dissent."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "James Charles WILLIAMS v. STATE of Arkansas"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Donald L. Corbin, Judge.\nAppellant, James Charles Williams, was charged with the first degree murder of his brother and convicted of second degree murder by a Pulaski County Circuit Court jury. He was sentenced to thirty years imprisonment in the Arkansas Department of Correction. The only issue raised by this appeal is whether the trial court committed reversible error in refusing to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of manslaughter. We reverse and remand.\nTestimony adduced at trial established that appellant, Fred Williams, Elbert Townsend and Johnny Griffin played cards on October 14,1984, at Townsend\u2019s apartment. Griffin testified that appellant and his brother, Fred Williams, argued about appellant cheating. He observed appellant walk over by Fred Williams and pull out a knife. Fred Williams then grabbed a chair to try to protect himself. Griffin also stated that Fred Williams was backing up and that he \u201cwasn\u2019t serious with the chair.\u201d He further stated that he saw appellant stab his brother three to five times.\nTownsend testified that an argument broke out between appellant and his brother. Fred Williams stated to appellant, \u201cShut your mouth before I put my foot in it.\u201d Townsend stated appellant then told his brother that he would kill him first. Townsend testified that appellant had a knife in his hand and tried to swing at his brother. Townsend observed Fred Williams trying to block his brother\u2019s advances with a chair.\nAppellant took the stand and testified that he and his brother got into an argument and Fred Williams scooted from the table quickly. Appellant did not know what was going on and he stood up. His brother grabbed the chair and scooted back and appellant went into his pocket to get his knife out. Before he was able to get it out of his pocket, appellant stated his brother struck appellant with the chair on his left shoulder. Appellant testified he started swinging with the knife and upon observing blood coming from his brother, got scared and ran. He also stated that when he left the scene he observed that his brother had the chair and was on his feet. Appellant testified that he did not mean to kill his brother and that everything happened real fast.\nRoy Jackson testified that on the night of October 14,1984, appellant came to his home and asked to talk to him. He observed some blood on appellant\u2019s shirt and asked him about it. Appellant told him that he and his brother had gotten into a fight and that he had cut his brother. Appellant also told Jackson that his brother had picked up a chair and was going to hit him with it.\nFrank Randolph testified that on October 14, 1984, appellant called him and wanted Randolph to pick him up. Appellant told Randolph that he had gotten into a fight with his brother and that he thought he had hurt him real bad. Randolph was subsequently stopped by the police on his way to pick appellant up.\nDr. Lee Beamer, the Associate Medical Examiner, testified that he performed an autopsy on Fred Williams. He stated that Fred Williams sustained five stab wounds to his person which were the cause of death. Toxicology tests performed established that Fred Williams had been drinking alcohol.\nThe record in the case at bar reflects that appellant requested and proffered an instruction on manslaughter which the trial court refused. The basis of its refusal was that an instruction on manslaughter was not justified under the evidence of the trial. Manslaughter is committed by one who recklessly causes the death of another person. Ark. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 41-1504(l)(c) (Repl. 1977). \u201cRecklessly\u201d is defined as follows:\n\u201cRecklessly.\u201d A person acts recklessly with respect to attendant circumstances or a result of his conduct when he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or the result will occur. The risk must be of a nature and degree that disregard thereof constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the actor\u2019s situation.\nOn the other hand, second degree murder is committed by a person if he knowingly causes the death of another person under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life or with the purpose of causing serious physical injury to another person, he causes the death of any person. Ark. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 41-1503(l)(b) and (c) (Repl. 1977). The jury in the instant case was instructed on this basis.\nAs noted by the Arkansas Supreme Court in Robinson v. State, 269 Ark. 90, 598 S.W.2d 421 (1980), no right has been more zealously protected than the right of an accused to have the jury instructed on lesser included offenses. \u201cThis is so, no matter how strongly the trial judge feels that the evidence weighs in favor of a finding of guilty on the most serious charge.\u201d Id. at 93, 598 S.W.2d at 423, 424. It is reversible error to refuse to give a correct instruction on a lesser included offense and its punishment when there is testimony furnishing a reasonable basis on which the accused may be found guilty of the lesser offense. Glover v. State, 273 Ark. 376, 619 S.W.2d 629 (1981). Where there is no evidence tending to disprove one of the elements of the larger offense the court is not required to instruct on the lesser one because absent such evidence there is no reasonable basis for finding an accused guilty of the lesser offense. In this type of case the jury must find the defendant guilty either of the offense charged or nothing. Fisk v. State, 5 Ark. App. 5, 631 S.W.2d 626 (1982). Where, however, there is the slightest evidence tending to disprove one of the elements of the larger offense, it is error to refuse to give an instruction on the lesser included one. Brewer v. State, 271 Ark. 254, 608 S.W.2d 363 (1980).\nIn this case there was evidence presented on which the jury might have found that appellant recklessly caused the death of his brother. While it appears most unlikely, the jury could have believed appellant\u2019s testimony and found that the criminal intent required for conviction of the larger offense was lacking. It is the jury\u2019s sole prerogative to evaluate the conflicting evidence and to draw its own inferences.\nIn Savannah v. State, 1 Ark. App. 161, 645 S.W.2d 694 (1983), this Court reversed the appellant\u2019s conviction and remanded for a new trial upon the trial court\u2019s refusal to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of robbery. There, the appellant participated in a liquor store robbery and testified at trial that he did not know his riding companion had a weapon until after the robbery or that his companion intended to rob the store. Upon abandoning the car, appellant stated that they went in separate directions but met later at appellant\u2019s parents\u2019 home. The appellant claimed his companion later left the pistol at the house. The pistol was recovered at that address by the police. We noted in Savannah that it was the jury\u2019s sole prerogative to evaluate the evidence and draw its own inferences as to whether the appellant knew his companion had a pistol when the robbery was committed and why the pistol was recovered at appellant\u2019s residence after the robbery. Finally, we stated there that if the jury believed the appellant\u2019s version of the robbery, it could have found him guilty of robbery, not aggravated robbery.\nIn Bongfeldt v. State, 6 Ark. App. 102, 639 S.W.2d 70 (1982), we held that the trial court had committed prejudicial error in failing to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of criminal trespass. Appellant had testified at trial that he entered the building intending to borrow some gasoline and pay the owner for it the next morning. This testimony provided evidence on which the jury might have found the appellant\u2019s entry was without the criminal intent required for conviction of the larger offense of burglary. We stated there that it was not impossible for the jury to have found the appellant guilty only of criminal trespass and reversed and remanded for a new trial.\nWe conclude that it was prejudicial error of the court in the case at bar to fail to give the proffered instruction on manslaughter and we therefore reverse and remand for a new trial.\nReversed and remanded.\nCooper and Glaze, JJ., dissent.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Donald L. Corbin, Judge."
      },
      {
        "text": "James R. Cooper, Judge,\ndissenting. I agree with the majority opinion when it states that it is reversible error to refuse to give a correct instruction on a lesser included offense when there is evidence furnishing a reasonable basis on which the accused could be found guilty of the lesser included offense. In the case at bar, however, I find no reasonable basis for giving an instruction on manslaughter. Manslaughter requires a lesser degree of intent than does first or second degree murder, requiring only that the defendant acted \u201crecklessly\u201d (The proffered instruction referred only to subparagraph (c) of Ark. Stat. Ann. Section 41-1504 (Supp. 1985).).\nIn the case at bar, the appellant and the victim had been arguing over a card game, and the appellant, in response to the victim\u2019s threat to put his foot down the appellant\u2019s throat, told the victim that he would kill him first. Shortly thereafter, following a scuffle, the appellant stabbed the victim Jive times. According to the medical examiner, either of two of the stab wounds were fatal wounds.\nI simply cannot agree that, where the appellant threatened to kill the victim and then stabbed him five times, a reasonable basis existed for a jury to find that the appellant \u201crecklessly\u201d caused his brother\u2019s death. I would affirm.",
        "type": "dissent",
        "author": "James R. Cooper, Judge,"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "William R. Simpson, Jr., Public Defender, Donald K. Campbell, III, Deputy Public Defender, by: Carolyn P. Baker, Deputy Public Defender.",
      "Steve Clark, Att\u2019y Gen., by: Connie Griffin, Asst. Att\u2019y Gen., for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "James Charles WILLIAMS v. STATE of Arkansas\nCA CR 85-128\n702 S.W.2d 825\nCourt of Appeals of Arkansas En Banc\nOpinion delivered February 5, 1986\nWilliam R. Simpson, Jr., Public Defender, Donald K. Campbell, III, Deputy Public Defender, by: Carolyn P. Baker, Deputy Public Defender.\nSteve Clark, Att\u2019y Gen., by: Connie Griffin, Asst. Att\u2019y Gen., for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0053-01",
  "first_page_order": 83,
  "last_page_order": 88
}