{
  "id": 6139094,
  "name": "Charles NEELY v. STATE of Arkansas",
  "name_abbreviation": "Neely v. State",
  "decision_date": "1986-06-25",
  "docket_number": "CA CR 86-6",
  "first_page": "122",
  "last_page": "124",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "18 Ark. App. 122"
    },
    {
      "type": "parallel",
      "cite": "711 S.W.2d 482"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ark. Ct. App.",
    "id": 13370,
    "name": "Arkansas Court of Appeals"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 34,
    "name_long": "Arkansas",
    "name": "Ark."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "684 S.W.2d 265",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.W.2d",
      "case_ids": [
        6135977,
        1877705,
        1877638
      ],
      "year": 1985,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ark-app/14/0001-01",
        "/ark/285/0093-01",
        "/ark/285/0094-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "14 Ark. App. 1",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark. App.",
      "case_ids": [
        6135977
      ],
      "year": 1985,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ark-app/14/0001-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "263 Ark. 350",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
      "case_ids": [
        1672746
      ],
      "weight": 2,
      "year": 1978,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ark/263/0350-01"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "analysis": {
    "cardinality": 322,
    "char_count": 4559,
    "ocr_confidence": 0.891,
    "pagerank": {
      "raw": 1.2711839582770603e-07,
      "percentile": 0.6148068864246525
    },
    "sha256": "a06280c79829efb440f6df0221568a6f42bafa876ac3b136d874fa9cebe25812",
    "simhash": "1:237de705220d9b97",
    "word_count": 782
  },
  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:17:44.845649+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "Corbin and Mayfield, JJ., agree."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "Charles NEELY v. STATE of Arkansas"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "James R. Cooper, Judge.\nThe appellant was charged with the offense of aggravated assault, under Ark. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 41-1604 (Repl. 1977), and with being a habitual offender, under Ark. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 41-1001 (Supp. 1985). After a non-jury trial, the appellant was convicted and sentenced to five years in the Arkansas Department of Correction. The appellant\u2019s sole contention on appeal is that the trial court erred in refusing to reduce the charge to assault in the first degree (Ark. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 41-1605 (Repl. 1977)). Essentially, the appellant argues that, while the evidence is sufficient to support a finding that he acted recklessly and would therefore sustain a conviction under \u00a7 41 -1605, there is insufficient evidence to support a finding that he acted purposefully. We find no merit in this contention.\nA person commits the offense of aggravated assault\nif, under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life, he purposely engages in conduct that creates a substantial danger of death or serious injury to another person.\nArk. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 41-1604 (Repl. 1977) (emphasis added). The principal difference between the crimes of aggravated assault and assault in the first degree is that the former requires the accused to have acted purposefully, while the latter merely requires reckless action. Rust v. State, 263 Ark. 350, 565 S.W.2d 19 (1978). \u201cA person acts purposefully with respect to his conduct . . . when it is his conscious object to engage in conduct of that nature. . .\u201d Ark. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 41-203(1) (Repl. 1977).\nThe facts of this case are not in dispute. On July 3,1984, the appellant and Clemmie Stewart were both in the Employment Security Division office when, after an argument with Mr. Stewart, the appellant grabbed him, held him against the wall, and put a knife up to his throat. Sergeant Bunch of the Little Rock Police Department was present and, after drawing his revolver, ordered the appellant to drop the knife. After the officer again asked him to drop the knife, the appellant complied and was arrested. The appellant testified that:\n[H]e just steady kept agitating me. . . . So I just got up and walked up to him, you know and I didn\u2019t know what I was doing. I just took my knife out and I tried to cut him . . . See, all I wanted to do was cut him. I didn\u2019t try and take his life. And see the man was known to to take his knife out and threaten some people. . . maybe there wasn\u2019t no excuse for what I did there, but I just lost my head, you know . . . And all I did was just want to scare him a little bit, you know ... I thought wasn\u2019t nothing going to happen about it, see. I just wanted to shut him up, just stop bothering me, you know. Yes, / knew what I was doing, I knew that I had shoved him up against the wall ... he didn\u2019t want to leave me alone so I just thought I would use something he could understand. [Emphasis added.]\nThe appellant contends that, because he testified that he did not want to kill Mr. Stewart, but only scare him, he could not be found to have acted purposefully. In so doing, he misapprehends what must be done purposefully. It is only necessary to show that the appellant \u201cmanifested extreme indifference to the value of human life and that he purposely engaged in conduct that created a substantial danger of death or serious injury.\u201d Vann v. State, 14 Ark. App. 1, 684 S.W.2d 265 (1985). It is the conduct that must be undertaken purposefully, not the intended result. So long as the appellant purposely engaged in the required conduct, it does not matter his intent in doing so. Here, the appellant testified that he intended to pull the knife on Mr. Stewart and that he knew what he was doing. As so aptly put by the State, \u201c[cjommon sense dictates that a person who deliberately holds a knife to another person\u2019s throat acts under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life, and that his . . . conduct creates a substantial danger of death or serious physical injury to another person.\u201d We find substantial evidence to support the appellant\u2019s conviction and, therefore, affirm the appellant\u2019s conviction.\nAffirmed.\nCorbin and Mayfield, JJ., agree.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "James R. Cooper, Judge."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "William R. Simpson, Jr., Public Defender, Donald K. Campbell, III, Deputy Public Defender, by: Thomas B. Devine, III, Deputy Public Defender, for appellant.",
      "Steve Clark, Att\u2019y Gen., by: Mary Beth Sudduth, Asst. Att\u2019y Gen., for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "Charles NEELY v. STATE of Arkansas\nCA CR 86-6\n711 S.W.2d 482\nCourt of Appeals of Arkansas Division I\nOpinion delivered June 25, 1986\nWilliam R. Simpson, Jr., Public Defender, Donald K. Campbell, III, Deputy Public Defender, by: Thomas B. Devine, III, Deputy Public Defender, for appellant.\nSteve Clark, Att\u2019y Gen., by: Mary Beth Sudduth, Asst. Att\u2019y Gen., for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0122-01",
  "first_page_order": 142,
  "last_page_order": 144
}