{
  "id": 6645840,
  "name": "Wanda GUTHRIE v. TYSON FOODS, INC.",
  "name_abbreviation": "Guthrie v. Tyson Foods, Inc.",
  "decision_date": "1987-02-18",
  "docket_number": "CA 86-238",
  "first_page": "69",
  "last_page": "72",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "20 Ark. App. 69"
    },
    {
      "type": "parallel",
      "cite": "724 S.W.2d 187"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ark. Ct. App.",
    "id": 13370,
    "name": "Arkansas Court of Appeals"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 34,
    "name_long": "Arkansas",
    "name": "Ark."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "226 Ark. 388",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
      "case_ids": [
        8720557
      ],
      "weight": 2,
      "year": 1956,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ark/226/0388-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "268 Ark. 961",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
      "case_ids": [
        1715310
      ],
      "weight": 2,
      "year": 1980,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ark/268/0961-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "246 Ark. 327",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
      "case_ids": [
        1604082
      ],
      "weight": 2,
      "year": 1969,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ark/246/0327-01"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "analysis": {
    "cardinality": 279,
    "char_count": 4215,
    "ocr_confidence": 0.909,
    "pagerank": {
      "raw": 8.95887501656537e-08,
      "percentile": 0.5017670914404663
    },
    "sha256": "fce7c3d5dfaf5c34a61dd827e114842b0e6324f43669df35b19ebde600a1abc3",
    "simhash": "1:81083895b29c0691",
    "word_count": 704
  },
  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:16:54.687302+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "Cracraft and Mayfield, JJ., agree."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "Wanda GUTHRIE v. TYSON FOODS, INC."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "James R. Cooper, Judge.\nThe appellant in this Workers\u2019 Compensation case, Wanda Guthrie, was injured at her workplace on July 7, 1982. More than two years later, on August 6, 1984, the appellant filed a tort action against her employer, which was dismissed on the grounds that the appellant\u2019s exclusive remedy was under the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act. On March 25,1985, the appellant filed her notice of a Workers\u2019 Compensation claim against the employer. The administrative law judge ruled that the appellant\u2019s claim was barred by the two-year statute of limitations set out in Ark. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 81-1318(a)(l) (Supp. 1985). The Workers\u2019 Compensation Commission essentially adopted the decision of the administrative law judge in an opinion dated April 15,1986, and therefore dismissed her claim. From that decision, comes this appeal.\nFor reversal, the appellant argues that Ark. Stat. Ann. \u00a781-1318(e) (Repl. 1976), controls and prevents her claim from being barred by the two-year limitation period prescribed in \u00a7 81-1318(a)(1). Because we find this argument to be persuasive, we do not address the appellant\u2019s argument that Tyson was estopped to rely on the limitations defense.\nArkansas Statutes Annotated \u00a7 81-1318(a)(1) (Supp. 1985) provides that:\nA claim for compensation for disability on account of an injury (other than an occupational disease and occupational infection) shall be barred unless filed with the Commission within two (2) years from the date of the injury.\nAlthough the appellant did not file her claim within two years from the date of her injury, she contends that her claim was nevertheless timely filed under Ark. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 81-1318(e) (Repl. 1976), which states that:\nWhenever recovery in an action at law to recover damages for injury to or death of an employee is denied to any person on the ground that the employee and his employer were subject to the provisions of this Act [\u00a7\u00a7 81-1301 \u2014 81-1349], the limitations prescribed in subsections (a) and (b) shall begin to run from the date of the termination of such action.\n(Emphasis supplied). The question, then, is whether the action at law for damages referred to in \u00a7 81-1318(e) must itself be filed within the two-year limitation period for filing compensation claims set out in \u00a7 81-1318(a)(1) in order to give effect to the tolling provision in \u00a7 81-1318(e).\nAs a prerequisite for the tolling of the statute of limitations, paragraph (e) requires (1) an action at law for damages; (2) denial of recovery; and (3) that recovery be denied on the ground that the employer and employee were subject to the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act. Bryan v. Ford, Bacon & Davis, 246 Ark. 327, 438 S.W.2d 472 (1969). That the action for damages must be filed within the two-year period prescribed by \u00a7 81-1318(a)(1) cannot be inferred from the language of paragraph (e). Instead, that paragraph clearly states that whenever an action at law for damages is terminated on the ground that the parties were subject to the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act, the two-year period in paragraph (a)(1) begins to run only upon termination of that action. Because the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act is highly remedial, it is entitled to a liberal construction. Hart\u2019s Exxon Service Station v. Prater, 268 Ark. 961, 597 S.W.2d 130 (Ark. App. 1980). Moreover, in keeping with the policy of resolving doubtful cases in favor of the claimant, where there is substantial doubt concerning which statute of limitations is applicable in Workers\u2019 Compensation cases, the rule is that the longer statute of limitations is to be preferred and adopted. Reynolds Metal Co. v. Brumley, 226 Ark. 388, 290 S.W.2d 211 (1956). We therefore hold that an action at law for damages need not be filed within the period prescribed by Ark. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 81-1318(a)(1) in order to give effect to the tolling provision in Ark. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 81-1318(e).\nWe reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.\nCracraft and Mayfield, JJ., agree.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "James R. Cooper, Judge."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "William A. Storey, for appellant.",
      "Bassett Law Firm, by: William Robert Still, Jr., for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "Wanda GUTHRIE v. TYSON FOODS, INC.\nCA 86-238\n724 S.W.2d 187\nCourt of Appeals of Arkansas Division I\nOpinion delivered February 18, 1987\nWilliam A. Storey, for appellant.\nBassett Law Firm, by: William Robert Still, Jr., for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0069-01",
  "first_page_order": 91,
  "last_page_order": 94
}