{
  "id": 6660916,
  "name": "Pauline JONES (CANADY) v. Doyle JONES",
  "name_abbreviation": "Jones v. Jones",
  "decision_date": "1987-10-14",
  "docket_number": "CA 87-38",
  "first_page": "179",
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:48:37.186670+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "Pauline JONES (CANADY) v. Doyle JONES"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Donald L. Corbin, Chief Judge.\nThis appeal comes to us from the Pulaski County Chancery Court. Appellant, Pauline Jones (Canady), appeals the chancellor\u2019s ruling which ordered that the parties\u2019 property be sold, with the proceeds to be equally divided after reduction for costs of the sale and for $ 1,500.00 back child support due to appellant for the support of their handicapped child. We affirm as modified.\nThe parties were divorced on August 25,1965, with possession of the parties\u2019 home awarded to appellant until further orders of the court. In 1985, the handicapped child moved out of the home and the appellant remarried and remained in possession of the property. On March 10,1986, appellee filed a petition seeking to have the parties\u2019 home sold and the proceeds divided. On April 10,1986, appellant filed her response and counterclaim, seeking unpaid alimony and child support; or, in the alternative, these amounts in set-off against any amounts due appellee as his interest in the home. The unpaid alimony appellant prayed for was in the amount of $900.00, the unpaid child support was $11,400.00. On September 23,1986, appellant filed an amended response to appellee\u2019s petition seeking the value of improvements and the amounts of repairs made and taxes paid on the property as a set-off against appellee\u2019s share of the sales proceeds.\nThe chancellor\u2019s order, entered on October 6,1986, held that appellant\u2019s counterclaim for alimony and child support was barred by the statute of limitations, excluding that portion of the child support which accrued in the immediately preceding five years. The court held that the parties\u2019 ownership of the property in question remained as tenants by the entirety and that appellant\u2019s counterclaim for the enhanced value of the property due to improvements made and property taxes would not be allowed under the Betterment Act. The court ruled that it would be contrary to the law to consider appellant\u2019s equitable claims based on the doctrines of unclean hands and laches. Therefore, appellant\u2019s counterclaim was denied.\nAppellant raises the following points for reversal: (1) The trial court erred when it allowed the statute of limitations to bar appellant\u2019s claim for unpaid alimony and child support asserted as a defensive set-off against appellee\u2019s claim to one-half of the sales proceeds from a judicial sale of the house as a final property settlement in the divorce; (2) the trial court erred when it disallowed appellant\u2019s counterclaim for an amount equal to the enhanced value of the property due to improvements made by appellant under the Betterment Act as a set-off against appellee\u2019s share of the sales proceeds; and (3) the trial court erred when it disallowed appellant\u2019s equitable claims, based on the doctrine of laches and the doctrine of unclean hands, in an amount equal to unpaid alimony and child support as well as the enhanced value of the property due to improvements made by appellant.\nIn her first point for reversal, appellant alleges that the trial court erred by allowing the statute of limitations to bar her claim for unpaid alimony and child support asserted as a defensive set-off against appellee\u2019s claim to one half of the sales proceeds from a judicial sale of the house. The statutory authority is Arkansas Statutes Annotated \u00a7 37-233 (Repl. 1962) which provides:\nLimitations apply to demands by way of set-off. \u2014 The provisions of this act shall be deemed and taken to apply to the case of any demand alleged by way of set-off on the part of any defendant, either by plea, notice or otherwise, provided however that any demand, right or cause of action, regardless of how same may have arisen, may be asserted by way of set-off in any action to the extent of the plaintiffs demand.\nIn Little Rock Crate & Basket Co. v. Young, 284 Ark. 295, 681 S.W.2d 388 (1984), the appellee filed a complaint in 1981 to recover $7,207.20 as the purchase price of logs he sold to the appellant in 1979. The appellant\u2019s answer denied the appellee\u2019s claim and asserted a $5,000 set-off arising from the appellant\u2019s sale of a core chipper to the appellee in 1972, a claim apparently barred by limitations. On appellee\u2019s motion for summary judgment, the trial judge disallowed the appellant\u2019s set-off. Writing for a unanimous court, Justice George Rose Smith posed this question:\nWhen a plaintiff brings suit upon a claim arising from a certain transaction, may the defendant successfully assert a setoff that arose from a different transaction and was barred by limitations when the plaintiffs cause of action accrued? The trial judge construed the controlling statute to mean that such a setoff cannot be allowed in reduction of the plaintiffs claim. We disagree.\nId. at 295, 681 S.W.2d at 388. The supreme court reversed, holding that the trial court erred in its disallowance of the $5,000 set-off by summary judgment.\nIn the case at bar, the chancellor should have allowed appellant\u2019s defensive set-off for the back alimony and child support. As set out in Arkansas Statutes Annotated \u00a7 37-233, the set-off will be limited to the extent of appellee\u2019s demand; his claim to one-half of the proceeds from the sale of the parties\u2019 home. If the set-off amount exceeds the extent of appellee\u2019s demand, the excess will be barred by the statute of limitations. We affirm as modified for the trial court to enter such orders as are necessary to implement this decree.\nSecondly, appellant argues that pursuant to the Betterment Act, she is entitled to an amount equal to the enhanced value of the property due to improvements made by appellant as a set-off against appellee\u2019s share of the proceeds. The chancellor was correct in finding that the Betterment Act did not apply. The Betterment Act, Arkansas Statutes Annotated \u00a7 34-1423 (Repl. 1962), provides that:\nRecovery for improvements and taxes paid on land of another. \u2014 If any person, believing himself to be the owner, either in law or equity, under color of title, has peaceably improved, or shall peaceably improve, any land which upon judicial investigation shall be decided to belong to another, the value of the improvement made as aforesaid and the amount of all taxes which may have been paid on said land by such person, and those under whom he claims, shall be paid by the successful party to such occupant, or the person under whom or from whom he entered and holds, before the court rendering judgment in such proceedings shall cause possession to be delivered to such successful party.\nIn the case at bar, appellant did not reasonably believe that she was the sole owner of the property. At the time of the divorce, appellant was given possession of the property \u201cuntil further orders\u201d of the court. Improvements made with the knowledge that another is claiming an interest in the property can hardly be characterized as improvements made under a bona fide belief of ownership. Lawrence v. Lawrence, 231 Ark. 324, 329 S.W.2d 416 (1959). The Arkansas Supreme Court held as follows: \u201cIt will be noted that the statute provides \u2018peaceably improved.\u2019 Even the evidence on behalf of appellant reflects that most of the improvements were made after appellant had notice that appellee was claiming half interest in the property.\u201d Id. at 330, 329 S.W.2d at 420. In the case at bar, all the improvements made by appellant were made after appellant had notice that she merely had possession of the property until further orders of the court, and that appellee had an interest in the property. Therefore, the Betterment Act does not apply in this case.\nWe need not address appellant\u2019s third argument for reversal as our disposition of the first two issues decides this case.\nAffirmed as modified.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Donald L. Corbin, Chief Judge."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Perroni, Rauls & Looney, P.A., by: Samuel A. Perroni and Rita S. Looney, and Friday, Eldredge & Clark, by: S. Randolph Looney, for appellant.",
      "Loh, Massey & Yates, Ltd., by: Howard C. Yates, for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "Pauline JONES (CANADY) v. Doyle JONES\nCA 87-38\n737 S.W.2d 654\nCourt of Appeals of Arkansas En Banc\nOpinion delivered October 14, 1987\n[Rehearing denied November 11, 1987.]\nPerroni, Rauls & Looney, P.A., by: Samuel A. Perroni and Rita S. Looney, and Friday, Eldredge & Clark, by: S. Randolph Looney, for appellant.\nLoh, Massey & Yates, Ltd., by: Howard C. Yates, for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0179-01",
  "first_page_order": 201,
  "last_page_order": 205
}