{
  "id": 6137034,
  "name": "Jacqueline STONE v. Raj PATEL, d/b/a Linwood Motel",
  "name_abbreviation": "Stone v. Patel",
  "decision_date": "1988-11-09",
  "docket_number": "CA 88-129",
  "first_page": "54",
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:36:57.673702+00:00",
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "Corbin, C.J., and Cracraft, J., agree."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "Jacqueline STONE v. Raj PATEL, d/b/a Linwood Motel"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Melvin Mayfield, Judge.\nThis is an appeal from a decision of the Workers\u2019 Compensation Commission. The appellant was employed by the appellee as a maid in April 1986 and worked at the motel until July 1986 when she was injured. Her claim for workers\u2019 compensation was denied by an administrative law judge who found that the appellee was not subject to the compensation act because he did not carry on an employment \u201cin which three (3) or more employees are regularly employed by the same employer in the course of business.\u201d See Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 11-9-102(3) (A) (1987). The full Commission affirmed, adopting the law judge\u2019s opinion as its own.\nRaj Patel is the owner of the Linwood Motel, which contains only 26 units. During the period in question, appellee and his wife, Val, lived and worked at the motel and the appellee had an uncle who also resided there. At the time the appellant was injured, the appellee and his wife were on a vacation trip to California and appellee\u2019s nephew was managing the motel. This appeal involves the question of whether Patel or his family members should be considered as employees in determining whether appellee had the requisite number of employees to subject him to the Arkansas Workers\u2019 Compensation Law.\nWhen reviewing a decision of the Commission, we must view the evidence and all reasonable inferences deducible therefrom in the light most favorable to the findings of the Commission and affirm that decision if it is supported by substantial evidence. Clark v. Peabody Testing Service, 265 Ark. 489, 579 S.W.2d 360 (1979).\nThere is evidence that when Mr. Patel is present, most of the work necessary to operate the motel is performed by him without help. His wife fills in when he is absent, but she does not assist in keeping the books or paying bills. She may, however, make beds or do the laundry on occasion. Although Mr. and Mrs. Patel live out of the money from the motel, there is no evidence that she was ever carried on the payroll or paid in money for her services. The Commission held she was not an employee, citing Stewart v. Cosby-Parsons Quarter Horse Ranch, 269 Ark. 866, 601 S.W.2d 590 (Ark. App. 1980), where the wife of one of the business partners performed substantial services for the business, but we upheld the finding of the Commission that the wife was not an employee, stating:\nNevertheless, the commission found that these duties were performed out of a sense of familial respo'nsibility. There is no evidence in the record that she [was] ever paid for her services or that she was working under a contract of employment.\n269 Ark. at 869.\nAppellee\u2019s uncle also resides at the motel, and the appellant testified that before the Patels went on vacation, the uncle would work in the garden and help with the flowers and cleaning. Appellant also testified that while the Patels were on vacation, the uncle did the la\u00fcndry. The appellee testified that the uncle \u201chelps with the gardening\u201d but does \u201cnothing considering the business.\u201d He denied that his uncle helped with the laundry or that he ever gave his uncle money. He did admit, however, that his uncle never paid for lodging or meals. Mr. Patel\u2019s nephew, who appellant argues was also an employee, managed the motel while the Patels went on vacation, but there is no evidence that he worked there either before or after the Patels\u2019 vacation.\nIn Wallace v. Wells, 221 Ark. 750, 255 S.W.2d 970 (1953), the Arkansas Supreme Court considered the statute which then provided that employment \u201cmeans every employment carried on in the State in which five (5) or more employees are regularly employed in the same business.\u201d The Court said:\nWe hold that Wells had five men regularly employed, although some of them worked only two days a week. The fact that five men were \u201cregularly employed in the same business\u201d is the determinative factor.\n221 Ark. at 756. In Stewart v. Cosby-Parsons Quarter Horse Ranch, supra, this court considered the present statute which provides that employment \u201cmeans every employment carried on in the state in which three (3) or more employees are regularly employed by the same employer in the course of business.\u201d During our discussion, we cited Wallace v. Wells in support of our statement that the determinative factor is whether \u201cthree persons are regularly employed in the same business,\u201d 269 Ark. at 868, and later said:\nNor can we say that the commission\u2019s determination that James Whitely was not regularly employed is unsupported by substantial evidence. . . . Even if we could find that James Whitely was, in some way, employed ... his employment would be too irregular and of insufficient duration to be considered an employee of the ranch. See Larson\u2019s, Workers\u2019 Compensation Law \u00a7 52.20 (1979).\n269 Ark. at 870. In the present case, the Commission adopted the law judge\u2019s opinion finding that the uncle and nephew were nothing more than casual employees who were \u201cnot regularly employed in the business.\u201d\nIn defining the term \u201cemployee,\u201d Ark. Code Ann. \u00a711-9-102(2) (1987), provides in part: \u201cThe term \u2018employee\u2019 shall also include a sole proprietor or a partner who devotes full time to the proprietorship or partnership and who elects to be included in the definition of \u2018employee\u2019 by filing written notice with the Workers\u2019 Compensation Commission.\u201d. This section of the compensation act determines the status of Raj Patel as a matter of law. Under the original statute, the definition of \u201cemployee\u201d did not include the above reference to a sole proprietor or partner. See Ark. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 81-1302(b) (Repl. 1976). That definition was amended by Act 119 of 1979 to include sole proprietors and partners under the conditions set out above. Section 3 of Act 119 provided:\nIt is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that under the present Workers\u2019 Compensation Law a sole proprietor or partner is not eligible to obtain worker\u2019s compensation coverage for himself; ....\nIt is clear that after 1979 sole proprietors could be considered employees, but only if they elected to be included in the definition of employees and filed their election with the Commission. Gilbert v. Gilbert Timber Co., 292 Ark. 124, 126, 728 S.W.2d 507 (1987). There is no evidence in the record, nor is it contended, that appellee ever filed such an election.\nIn workers\u2019 compensation cases, the claimant has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that his claim is compensable. Fraternal Order of Eagles v. Kirby, 6 Ark. App. 198, 639 S.W.2d 529 (1982). In determining whether the party has met the burden of proof on an issue, Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 ll-9-704(c)(4) (1987) now requires administrative law judges and the Commission to weigh the evidence impartially and without giving the benefit of the doubt to either party. Marrable v. Southern LP Gas, Inc., 25 Ark. App. 1, 751 S.W.2d 15 (1988). The determinative factor in ascertaining the requisite number of employees under the compensation act is whether three'persons are regularly employed by the same employer in the same business. Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 ll-9-102(3)(A) (1987). This presents a question of fact and the Commission\u2019s decision cannot be disturbed on appeal if it is supported by substantial evidence. Stewart v. Cosby-Parsons Quarter Horse Ranch, supra.\nUnder the evidence and the law in this case, we must affirm the Commission\u2019s finding that the appellee did not carry on an employment in which three (3) or more employees were regularly employed in the course of the business.\nAffirmed.\nCorbin, C.J., and Cracraft, J., agree.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Melvin Mayfield, Judge."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Walker, Snellgrove, Laser & Langley, by: Todd Williams, for appellant.",
      "Fulkerson & Todd, P.A., by: Jerry L. Lovelace, for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "Jacqueline STONE v. Raj PATEL, d/b/a Linwood Motel\nCA 88-129\n759 S.W.2d 579\nCourt of Appeals of Arkansas Division II\nOpinion delivered November 9, 1988\nWalker, Snellgrove, Laser & Langley, by: Todd Williams, for appellant.\nFulkerson & Todd, P.A., by: Jerry L. Lovelace, for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0054-01",
  "first_page_order": 74,
  "last_page_order": 78
}
