{
  "id": 6138970,
  "name": "EUREKA LOG HOMES and United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Corbit MANTONYA",
  "name_abbreviation": "Eureka Log Homes v. Mantonya",
  "decision_date": "1989-06-21",
  "docket_number": "CA 88-430",
  "first_page": "180",
  "last_page": "186",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "28 Ark. App. 180"
    },
    {
      "type": "parallel",
      "cite": "772 S.W.2d 365"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ark. Ct. App.",
    "id": 13370,
    "name": "Arkansas Court of Appeals"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 34,
    "name_long": "Arkansas",
    "name": "Ark."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "224 Ark. 387",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
      "case_ids": [
        1646568
      ],
      "weight": 2,
      "year": 1954,
      "opinion_index": 0,
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    {
      "cite": "226 Ark. 388",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
      "case_ids": [
        8720557
      ],
      "weight": 2,
      "year": 1956,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ark/226/0388-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "240 Ark. 571",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
      "case_ids": [
        1727712
      ],
      "weight": 4,
      "year": 1966,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "576"
        },
        {
          "page": "19"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ark/240/0571-01"
      ]
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  "analysis": {
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    "char_count": 12530,
    "ocr_confidence": 0.887,
    "pagerank": {
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    "simhash": "1:8510faadfcb2cb84",
    "word_count": 1959
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:10:20.618919+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "Mayfield and Rogers, JJ., agree"
    ],
    "parties": [
      "EUREKA LOG HOMES and United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Corbit MANTONYA"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Donald L. Corbin, Chief Judge.\nStated explicitly, the issue in this case is whether the Arkansas Workers\u2019 Compensation Commission was correct in awarding appellee, Corbit Mantonya, interest on medical bills which accrued pending a final determination by this court as to which of three employers was liable for injuries sustained by appellee in October of 1983. We affirm the Commission\u2019s finding that the appellee is entitled to 10% interest on his medical benefits from August 17, 1984, until paid by appellants, Eureka Log Homes and United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company.\nAppellee\u2019s chronological survey of the lengthy history of this case is helpful:\n10/29/83: Appellee suffered a compensable work-related injury while in the employ of Don Cox Lumber Company, an uninsured subcontractor of appellant Eureka Log Homes. Thereafter, appellee filed a claim for workers\u2019 compensation benefits against both Don Cox Lumber Company and appellant Eureka Log Homes (designated respectively as Respondent No. 1 and Respondent No. 2 below).\n4/25/84: The original hearing was conducted in this matter before Administrative Law Judge Tolley in order to determine appellee\u2019s entitlement to workers\u2019 compensation benefits. At this hearing, both Don Cox Lumber Company and appellant Eureka Log Homes took the position that Don Cox Lumber Company was an independent contractor for purposes of appellee\u2019s workers\u2019 compensation claim.\n8/17/84: The original opinion was filed in this case, wherein the administrative law judge ruled that Don Cox Lumber Company was the subcontractor of appellant Eureka Log Homes, so that both were liable to appellee for the work-related injury he sustained. In particular, appellant Eureka Log Homes was directed to pay permanent partial disability benefits, reasonable and necessary medical expenses, attorney\u2019s fees, and costs of the proceedings. The administrative law judge specifically ruled that the award would \u201cbear interest at the rate of ten (10%) percent from date until paid.\u201d The issue of claimant\u2019s entitlement to permanent partial disability benefits, having been reserved, was not ruled upon by the administrative law judge.\n9/4/84: Appellant Eureka Log Homes filed its notice of appeal from the 8/17/84 administrative law judge\u2019s decision, stating as the grounds for said appeal.that appellant Eureka Log Homes was not liable to appellee on his workers\u2019 compensation claim.\n10/2/85: The full Commission rendered its initial decision in this case, wherein the Commission found that Don Cox Lumber Company was an \u201cindependent contractor,\u201d so that appellant Eureka Log Homes was not liable to appellee for payment of the workers\u2019 compensation benefits in question.\n10/23/85: Appellee filed his notice of appeal with the Arkansas Court of Appeals appealing from the above-referenced Commission ruling, stating as the grounds for said appeal the Commission\u2019s error in not finding appellant Eureka Log Homes to be a statutory prime contractor under Arkansas Statutes Annotated Section 81-1306 (1976) now codified at Arkansas Code Annotated Section 11-9-402 (Supp. 1987).\n7/2/86: The Arkansas Court of Appeals in an unpublished opinion found appellant Eureka Log Homes to be a prime contractor within the meaning of Arkansas Statutes Annotated Section 81-1306, thereby reversing the full Commission\u2019s decision of 10/2/85. No mention was made of the prior interest award.\n11/7/87: A hearing was held in this case before Administrative Law Judge Emerson to take up the issue of appellee\u2019s entitlement to permanent partial disability benefits (which issue had been preserved at the original 8/17/ 84 hearing), and to determine the end date of appellee\u2019s \u201chealing period.\u201d At this hearing, appellee also requested that the administrative law judge enforce the original ten (10%) percent interest award granted herein.\n12/4/87: The administrative law judge\u2019s opinion was filed, wherein it was determined that claimant\u2019s \u201chealing period,\u201d ended on January 17, 1985, and that claimant was entitled to permanent partial disability benefits in the amount of five (5 %) percent to the body as a whole. The administrative law judge, however, refused to enforce the ten (10 %) percent interest award for his stated reason that the 7/2/86 Court of Appeals decision had not specifically ordered the same.\n1/8/88: Appellee filed his notice of appeal to the full Commission from the 12/4/87 administrative law judge\u2019s decision, on the grounds that he erred in finding that appellee was not entitled to interest on medical benefits as initially awarded by the original administrative law judge.\n10/12/88: The full Commission filed its opinion in this case, wherein the 12/4/87 administrative law judge\u2019s opinion was reversed and appellee was determined entitled to receive ten (10%) percent interest on the stipulated $27,789.31 of medical expenses.\n11/7/88: Appellants filed their notice of appeal from the 10/12/88 full Commission opinion with the Arkansas Court of Appeals alleging that the Commission erred in finding that appellee is entitled to the ten (10%) percent interest award. It is this appeal, which is now pending before the Court of Appeals.\nThe Commission noted that the appellate history of this case has always dealt with the status of the employment relationship (independent contractor/uninsured subcontractor/prime contractor as statutory employer). The finding of compensability, with its resulting expenses (benefits/fee/interest), was never challenged. The Commission further observed that the controversy has always revolved around who has to pay, not what they will pay.\nThe majority of the Commission in its decision of October 10, 1988, opined that since the appellants did not challenge the award of interest in the first appeal to this court, the doctrine of res judicata applied; thus, barring the appellants from now contesting the 10% interest award.\nThis court in its unpublished opinion in this matter dated July 2,1986, finally determined who had to pay. We placed the liability on the appellants herein. Although we did not say specifically that appellants would be liable for the original award of interest on the medical bills granted by Administrative Law Judge Tolley, it was at least implicit that appellants would be totally liable for any benefits accruing and due appellee/claim-ant. We did state that appellant herein was \u201calso liable for the [claimant\u2019s] claims for compensation benefits and medical expenses.\u201d We believe this language is broad enough to include an award of interest within the meaning of \u201ccompensation benefits.\u201d In effect, we reinstated Administrative Law Judge Tolley\u2019s decision of August 17,1984. As we have noted earlier, there never has been a direct challenge as to what was to be paid until the appeal now before us.\nOnce we reversed the Commission as to the designation of who was liable, the case had to go back to the Commission for it to determine the appropriate dollar amount due the claimant. This would necessarily require a recalculation of interest because there would have to be a calculation of benefits in order to arrive at a total award. Every decision we make in workers\u2019 compensation cases necessarily requires that the case go back to the Commission for the entry of an order that is in keeping with our decision. On remand, the Commission referred the case to an administrative law judge for a hearing on issues that had been reserved at the original August 17, 1984, hearing to determine the end of appellee\u2019s healing period and his entitlement to permanent partial disability benefits.\nIn Clemons v. Bearden Lumber Company, 240 Ark. 571, 401 S.W.2d 16 (1966) our supreme court in construing Arkansas Statutes Annotated Section 81-1319(g) (1976) noted the task of filling certain omissions in the statute such as \u201cWhen, for example, would interest begin to run if the claim were allowed by the referee, denied by the Commission, and allowed by the courts?\u201d The supreme court held that interest upon accrued and unpaid installments of compensation is to be computed from the dates when they should have been paid, beginning, however, not earlier than the date on which a referee or full Commission first enters an award allowing or denying a claim. The court explained:\nThis rule has the merit of simplicity, fixing the rights of all concerned with certainty. It has the far more important merit of fairness, providing the claimant with some measure of redress for the fact that the payment of his just claim has been delayed, through no fault of his, for months or even, as in the case at bar, for years. Morever, [sic] this construction of the statute treats delinquent payments with the same justice that applies to advance payments, which must be discounted to their present value. \u00a7 81-1319(k).\nId. at 576, 401 S.W.2d at 19. See also, Reynolds Metal Co. v. Brumley, 226 Ark. 388, 290 S.W.2d 211 (1956).\nArkansas Code Annotated Section 11-9-809 (1987) provides that \u201ccompensation shall bear interest at the legal rate from the day an award is made by either an administrative law judge or the full Workers\u2019 Compensation Commission on all accrued and unpaid compensation.\u201d In turn, Arkansas Code Annotated Section 11-9-102(9) (1987) expressly states that \u201c \u2018compensation\u2019 means the money allowance payable to the employee or to his dependents and includes the allowances provided for in \u00a7 11-9-509 .. .\nArkansas Code Annotated Section 11-9-509 (1987) is titled \u201cMedical services and supplies \u2014 Amounts and time periods\u201d and specifically addresses itself to the amounts payable and time periods allowable \u201cfor authorized medical, hospital, and other services and treatment furnished under \u00a7\u00a7 11-9-508 \u2014 11-9-516,\u201d which code provisions deal exclusively with medical services and supplies of the type involved in the case at bar.\nBecause Section 11-9-102(9) expressly and unequivocally includes those types of \u201callowances provided for in \u00a7 11-9-509,\u201d we agree with appellee that it cannot be seriously maintained that the interest award granted earlier by the administrative law judge did not encompass and directly apply to the stipulated $27,789.31 medical expense amount involved here.\nAppellants\u2019 second issue involves the allegation that the Commission erred in finding that appellee is entitled to interest on medical expenses paid directly to medical care providers by appellants. We fail to see any merit in appellants\u2019 argument that since the providers were paid directly, an award of interest to the appellee on this sum would allow claimant to recover a \u201cwindfall.\u201d We addressed this issue, at least obliquely, in our discussion of the Clemmons case. Appellants\u2019 argument in this regard is not persuasive. We have to agree with appellee\u2019s assessment that most medical benefits are paid directly to the medical providers. A review of many cases while not specifically stating that medicals were paid directly, brings us to the conclusion that interest is due on direct medical payments. In Ragon v. Great American Indemnity Company, 224 Ark. 387, 273 S.W.2d 524 (1954) an attorney sought to base his fee on the amount expended on medical services after successfully reversing the Commission\u2019s denial of benefits to his client. The court in referring to the complaint noted that the insurance company has paid out great sums for medical and hospital services and supplies which were within the peculiar knowledge and information of the carrier and unknown to plaintiff. Ragon turned on the legal ground that the attorney had not exhausted his administrative remedies by first applying to the Commission for redress. Very few seriously, injured employees have the resources to pay for expensive medical care. We see the allowance of interest as being part and parcel of the benefits due an injured employee. It also should serve as a deterrent to frivolous appeals.\nWe find substantial evidence to support the Commission\u2019s determination that appellants owe appellee interest on the stipulated medical expenses of $27,789.31 beginning August 17,1984, the date it should have been paid and the earliest date that an administrative law judge first entered the award.\nAffirmed.\nMayfield and Rogers, JJ., agree",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Donald L. Corbin, Chief Judge."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Davis, Cox & Wright, by: Kelly Carithers, for appellant.",
      "M\u00e1shburn & Taylor, by: W.H.Taylor; and Jennifer Morris Horan, for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "EUREKA LOG HOMES and United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Corbit MANTONYA\nCA 88-430\n772 S.W.2d 365\nCourt of Appeals of Arkansas Division I\nOpinion delivered June 21, 1989\nDavis, Cox & Wright, by: Kelly Carithers, for appellant.\nM\u00e1shburn & Taylor, by: W.H.Taylor; and Jennifer Morris Horan, for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0180-01",
  "first_page_order": 204,
  "last_page_order": 210
}