{ "id": 6136918, "name": "Theodore JONES v. CITY OF NEWPORT", "name_abbreviation": "Jones v. City of Newport", "decision_date": "1989-09-27", "docket_number": "CA CR 89-65", "first_page": "42", "last_page": "49", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "29 Ark. App. 42" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "780 S.W.2d 338" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark. Ct. App.", "id": 13370, "name": "Arkansas Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "284 Ark. 519", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1878648 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/284/0519-01" ] }, { "cite": "711 S.W.2d 836", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 6138405, 1875406 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/18/0097-01", "/ark/289/0616-01" ] }, { "cite": "18 Ark. App. 97", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6138405 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/18/0097-01" ] }, { "cite": "264 Ark. 213", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1668980 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/264/0213-01" ] }, { "cite": "10 Ark. App. 265", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6140972 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/10/0265-01" ] }, { "cite": "25 Ark. App. 234", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6140516 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/25/0234-01" ] }, { "cite": "458 U.S. 867", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "265 Ark. 822", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1664816 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/265/0822-01" ] }, { "cite": "486 U.S. 153", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6212318 ], "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/486/0153-01" ] }, { "cite": "25 Ark. App. 157", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6139162 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/25/0157-01" ] }, { "cite": "289 Ark. 450", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1875367 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/289/0450-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 27-14-601", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 27-16-602", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "weight": 2, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 596, "char_count": 10713, "ocr_confidence": 0.88, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.0482681451391714e-07, "percentile": 0.5529343602657916 }, "sha256": "48ea02b481f8ecd6f2c778f6311bac009bed99b4cee41a55c20399b984dc0425", "simhash": "1:0b2c8486504493f0", "word_count": 1841 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:00:46.162740+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Cracraft and Rogers, JJ., agree." ], "parties": [ "Theodore JONES v. CITY OF NEWPORT" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "James R. Cooper, Judge.\nThe appellant in this criminal case was issued citations charging him with driving without a valid driver\u2019s license in violation of Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 27-16-602(a) (1987), and with failure to pay vehicle registration and license fees in violation of Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 27-14-601 (1987). After a jury trial, the appellant was convicted of those offenses and fined. From that decision, comes this appeal.\nThe appellant proceeded pro se both at trial and on appeal. He advances several points for reversal, many of which are similar to those presented in the recently-decided case of Theodore Jones v. State of Arkansas, CACR 89-28 (op. del. August 30, 1989) (not designated for publication). We affirm.\nThere was evidence at trial to show that the appellant did not have a valid driver\u2019s license, and that he was apprehended while driving a vehicle on which the registration and license fees had not been paid. The appellant does not dispute this evidence, but instead advances several arguments challenging the validity and applicability of the licensing statutes.\nThe appellant first contends that, by virtue of his status as \u201can individual freeman at common law,\u201d he possesses a natural right to travel the highway and is therefore expressly exempt from the licensing requirements of Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 27-16-602 (1987). We do not agree. Arkansas Statutes Annotated \u00a7 27-16-603 lists several classes of persons exempt from licensing, but contains no exemption for \u201cindividual freemen at common law.\u201d Moreover, it has been generally held that the operation of a motor vehicle on the public highway is not a matter of right, but is instead a mere license or privilege. 7A Am. Jur. 2d Automobiles and Highway Traffic \u00a7 100 (1980). The Arkansas Supreme Court, in accord with the weight of authority, has held that driving a motor vehicle on a public highway is not a matter of natural right, but is instead a privilege which may be regulated by licensing requirements. Satterlee v. State, 289 Ark. 450, 711 S.W.2d 827 (1986). Satterlee is controlling, and the trial court did not err in denying the appellant\u2019s motion to dismiss on this basis.\nThe appellant next contends that the trial court erred in converting the exercise of his right to drive on the public highway into a crime. Because this argument is premised on the contention that driving is a right rather than a privilege, and because we have. rejected that contention, we need not address this argument. For the same reason, we need not address the appellant\u2019s contention that his conviction abrogated his right to travel on a state highway as an individual.\nNext, the appellant contends that he was denied due process of law by the trial court\u2019s refusal to hold an omnibus hearing under Ark. R. Crim. P. 20.2 and 20.3. The plain language of Ark. R. Crim. P. 20.1,20.2, and 20.3 clearly indicates that an omnibus hearing is not mandatory in every case. Nevertheless, we need not address the merits of this issue because the record clearly shows that the appellant was not prejudiced by the trial court\u2019s refusal to hold an omnibus hearing. Despite the appellant\u2019s assertion that his motions were not read by the trial judge, the record shows that the trial judge stated that he had reviewed the appellant\u2019s motions, noted the similarity of these motions to motions presented by the appellant in a previous case, and ruled on them prior to trial. We do not reverse in the absence of prejudicial error, Hardcastle v. State, 25 Ark. App. 157, 755 S.W.2d 228 (1988), and we find no prejudice in the trial court\u2019s refusal to hold an omnibus hearing in this case.\nThe appellant also argues that he was denied assistance of counsel at trial. The record reflects that the following exchange took place after the parties approached the bench for trial:\nTHE COURT: We\u2019ll try your case now. You ready to go?\nTHE COURT: Who is this man right here?\nMR. JONES: That is my assistance of counsel.\nTHE COURT: You go out there on the front row out there. You go sit down on the front row out there. There is no assis\u2014\nMR. JONES: Am I being denied. . .\nTHE COURT: You are. There is no assistance of counsel going to come up here in a tee shirt with double swingers on it.\nNow, what you need to do is get through those rails real quick and get on that front row or you\u2019re fixing to go to the jailhouse real quick. You hear me?\nMR. JONES: Is this, a record being made of this?\nTHE COURT: You betcha.\nMR. JONES: Then let the record reflect that I\u2019ve been denied my assistance of counsel.\nThe appellant argues that the trial court erred in refusing to allow his unnamed \u201cnext friend\u201d to take part in the proceedings, and asserts that neither the Arkansas constitution nor the federal constitution require that an accused\u2019s counsel must be approved by the Bar or by the court.\nThe appellant does not assert that his \u201cnext friend\u201d was a licensed attorney, and we find no error. The United States Supreme Court has noted that:\nThe Sixth Amendment right to choose one\u2019s own counsel is circumscribed in several important respects. Regardless of his persuasive powers, an advocate who is not a member of the bar may not represent clients (other than himself) in court.\nWheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153 (1988). Likewise, Arkansas courts have held that the right to choose counsel cannot be manipulated or subverted to obstruct the orderly procedures of court, or to interfere with the administration of justice. See e.g., Tyler v. State, 265 Ark. 822, 581 S.W.2d 328 (1979). Here, the record shows that the appellant had represented himself in all pre-trial proceedings, and that the trial court was surprised at the appearance of the appellant\u2019s inappropriately-attired \u201cnext friend\u201d on the day of trial. The appellant does not assert that his \u201cnext friend\u201d was a licensed attorney. We find no error on this point.\nThe appellant next contends that the trial court erred in refusing to allow him to call the prosecuting attorney as a witness. The record shows that the appellant attempted to call Mr. Montgomery, who was prosecuting the case for the State, as an expert witness. The trial court denied the request on the ground that it would be a breach of ethics for Mr. Montgomery to testify in a case he was prosecuting, and that there was no indication that only Mr. Montgomery could provide the expert testimony the appellant desired.\nAn appellant must show that a witness\u2019s testimony would have been both material and favorable to his defense in order to establish a violation of his right to compulsory process. United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 867 (1982). The appellant has failed to make such a showing in the case at bar. No mention is made in the appellant\u2019s brief regarding his purpose for calling Mr. Montgomery, and no proffer of testimony was made at trial. On this record, we cannot say that the trial court erred in refusing to allow Mr; Montgomery to be called as a witness.\nNext, the appellant contends that the trial court erred in proceeding criminally in a civil case. He notes that Ark. R. Crim. P. 1.5 requires that criminal prosecutions be brought in the name of the State of Arkansas, and concludes that the case at bar is a civil case because it was prosecuted in the name of the City of Newport. This argument was addressed and rejected in Graham v. State, 25 Ark. App. 234, 756 S.W.2d 921 (1988), which held that a court is not deprived of criminal jurisdiction when the style of a misdemeanor case lists a municipality as plaintiff.\nThe appellant next argues that the trial court erred in refusing to allow him to voir dire each prospective juror individually. We do not agree. Arkansas Code Annotated \u00a716-33-101 (1987) requires the court to examine prospective jurors regarding disqualifications, and permits further questions to be asked \u201cby the court, or the attorneys in the case, in the discretion of the court.\u201d The record shows that the trial judge complied with Ark. R. Crim. P. 32.2 by identifying the parties and counsel, by revealing the names of the witnesses made known to the court, and by outlining the nature of the offense. It is well-settled that the trial judge has wide discretion to regulate the scope and extent of voir dire, and that his restriction of that examination will not be reversed on appeal unless his discretion is clearly abused. Izzard v. State, 10 Ark. App. 265, 663 S.W.2d 192 (1984). Here, the trial judge permitted the appellant to ask questions to individual jurors but limited voir dire by requiring the appellant to address his questions to the panel as a whole after noting that the appellant was asking each juror the same questions. We cannot say that the trial court clearly abused his discretion in so limiting voir dire.\nThe appellant also argues that the traffic tickets he received were defective in that they bore the caption \u201csummons\u201d rather than \u201ccitation.\u201d Although the appellant asserts that he was denied due process by the defective caption, he does not indicate the manner in which he was prejudiced by being charged by a ticket captioned as a summons. The record shows that the tickets comported with the form prescribed for citations in Ark. R. Crim. P. 5.3 in that they apprised the appellant of the charges against him, the name of the issuing officer, the date of issuance, the location of the violation, and the place and time where he could appear to have a court date set. The appellant was thus informed of the nature of the offense charged and afforded an opportunity to be heard on that charge, see Thompson v. City of Little Rock, 264 Ark. 213, 570 S.W.2d 262 (1978), and we hold that the traffic tickets, despite their defective captions, were not so defective as to prejudice the appellant in this case. See Gullett v. State, 18 Ark. App. 97, 711 S.W.2d 836 (1986).\nFinally, the appellant argues that the trial court erred in denying his proposed jury instructions. The record shows that the appellant submitted nineteen jury instructions based on his theory that he travelled the highway as a matter of natural right, and supporting the proposition that such rights cannot be denied by state government. We have reviewed these instructions and find them to be either incorrect or irrelevant. We hold that the trial court did not err in refusing the proffered instructions. See Rayford v. State, 284 Ark. 519, 683 S.W.2d 911 (1985).\nAffirmed.\nCracraft and Rogers, JJ., agree.", "type": "majority", "author": "James R. Cooper, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Appellant, pro se.", "Steve Clark, Att\u2019y Gen., by: Tim Humphries, Asst. Att\u2019y Gen., for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Theodore JONES v. CITY OF NEWPORT\nCA CR 89-65\n780 S.W.2d 338\nCourt of Appeals of Arkansas Division I\nOpinion delivered September 27, 1989\n[Rehearing denied October 25, 1989.]\nAppellant, pro se.\nSteve Clark, Att\u2019y Gen., by: Tim Humphries, Asst. Att\u2019y Gen., for appellee." }, "file_name": "0042-01", "first_page_order": 64, "last_page_order": 71 }