{
  "id": 6715214,
  "name": "Shari Sue FINNEY v. STATE of Arkansas",
  "name_abbreviation": "Finney v. State",
  "decision_date": "1981-11-18",
  "docket_number": "CA CR 81-92",
  "first_page": "180",
  "last_page": "182",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "3 Ark. App. 180"
    },
    {
      "type": "parallel",
      "cite": "623 S.W.2d 847"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ark. Ct. App.",
    "id": 13370,
    "name": "Arkansas Court of Appeals"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 34,
    "name_long": "Arkansas",
    "name": "Ark."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "267 Ark. 61",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
      "case_ids": [
        1719807
      ],
      "weight": 2,
      "year": 1979,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ark/267/0061-01"
      ]
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    {
      "cite": "164 S.W. 720",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.W.",
      "year": 1914,
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "111 Ark. 554",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
      "case_ids": [
        1540406
      ],
      "year": 1914,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ark/111/0554-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "244 Ark. 1145",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
      "case_ids": [
        8725714
      ],
      "weight": 2,
      "year": 1968,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ark/244/1145-01"
      ]
    }
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  "analysis": {
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:59:48.660557+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "Shari Sue FINNEY v. STATE of Arkansas"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "James R. Cooper, Judge.\nAppellant was charged in Clark County Circuit Court with violating Ark. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 82-2619 (a) (2) (Supp. 1979), by obtaining a controlled substance by forgery from a pharmacy in Arkadelphia, Arkansas. The jury found her guilty and she was sentenced to six years in the Arkansas Department of Corrections.\nAppellant presented herself at a physician\u2019s office in Gordon, Arkansas, complaining of various symptoms which resulted in the physician prescribing a scheduled II drug for her. The evidence indicated that she obtained several blank prescription forms from the physician\u2019s office and later filled in the blank forms and obtained additional drugs with the forged prescription. Appellant gave a statement to the police and it was introduced into evidence. The physician from whom she obtained the original prescription and from whose office she obtained the blank prescription forms, testified as to the circumstances surrounding her visit to his office and her opportunity to obtain the prescription forms.\nThe only point for reversal is that the trial court should not have allowed the physician to testify about information received from appellant without appellant\u2019s waiver of the physician-patient privilege. We find this argument to.be without merit and therefore we affirm.\nThe state cites Edwards v. State, 244 Ark. 1145, 429 S.W. 2d 92 (1968) as controlling on this issue. We agree that the logic of that case is persuasive here. In the Edwards case, the appellant faked a robbery and contended he had been hit on the head by the thief. The Supreme Court construed Ark. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 28-607 (Repi. 1962) which provided a privilege for patients relating to any \u201cinformation which the physician may have acquired from his patient while attending in a professional character \u2018and which information was necessary to enable him to prescribe as a physician. . . \u2019 \u2019\u2019. The Court held that the testimony of the physician who treated Edwards was admissible and stated:\n[T]he purpose of the privilege is to permit a patient to communicate freely with his physician about his disease and to prevent physicians from disclosing the infirmities of their patients. Mutual Life insurance Company v. Owen, 111 Ark. 554, 164 S.W. 720 (1914). Neither reason has the slightest relevancy here. Edwards, who did not testify or offer any witnesses at the trial below, obviously had no basis for communicating with Dr. Baker about his disease, because he knew perfectly well that he had none. To permit one in such a situation to feign injury and then exclude the doctor\u2019s testimony would enable a criminal to conceal by deliberate falsehood the most trustworthy evidence of his offense. As we said in the Wimberly case, supra: \u2018It could not have been intended by the Legislature that... the Act should be the means of protecting a criminal from just punishment.\u2019\nAppellant seeks to distinguish the Edwards case on the theory that it was decided prior to the adoption of the Uniform Rules of Evidence by the legislature. Appellant argues that the testimony in Edwards was admissible since Edwards\u2019 condition was an element of his defense. Although obtaining the prescription forms is not an element of the forgery, the testimony was certainly relevant in showing the appellant\u2019s plan and opportunity to obtain the prescription forms.\nThe physician-patient privilege is now codified in the Uniform Rules of Evidence, Rule 503, Ark. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 28-1001 (Repl. 1979). This rule provides that \u201cconfidential communications made for the purpose of diagnosis or treatment of [a patient\u2019s] . . . condition ...\u201d are generally privileged information and cannot be disclosed without the patient\u2019s consent. There are a number of exceptions, but they are not relevant to this case.\nThe purpose of the physician-patient privilege under the Uniform Rules of Evidence is the same as the purpose of the physician-patient privilege under Ark. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 28-607 (Repl. 1962). The policy behind the physician-patient privilege is to encourage patients to communicate openly with their physicians and to prevent the physicians from revealing the infirmities of the patient. Arkansas State Medical Bd. v. Leonard, 267 Ark. 61, 590 S.W. 2d 849 (1979). We hold that the trial court was correct in allowing the physician to testify concerning his contact with the appellant. We hold that the physician-patient privilege under Rule 503 of the Uniform Rules of Evidence does not exclude the physician\u2019s testimony in this case.\nAffirmed.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "James R. Cooper, Judge."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Wayne R. Williams of Williams & Williams, for appellant.",
      "Steve Clark, Atty. Gen., by: Alice Ann Burns, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "Shari Sue FINNEY v. STATE of Arkansas\nCA CR 81-92\n623 S.W. 2d 847\nCourt of Appeals of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered November 18, 1981\nWayne R. Williams of Williams & Williams, for appellant.\nSteve Clark, Atty. Gen., by: Alice Ann Burns, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0180-01",
  "first_page_order": 200,
  "last_page_order": 202
}