{ "id": 6141201, "name": "James WOODARD v. WHITE SPOT CAFE and American States Ins. Co.", "name_abbreviation": "Woodard v. White Spot Cafe", "decision_date": "1990-03-07", "docket_number": "CA 89-290", "first_page": "221", "last_page": "225", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "30 Ark. App. 221" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "785 S.W.2d 54" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark. Ct. App.", "id": 13370, "name": "Arkansas Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "5 Kan. App. 2d 298", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Kan. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 394545 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/kan-app-2d/5/0298-01" ] }, { "cite": "269 Ark. 789", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1712533 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "793" }, { "page": "918" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/269/0789-01" ] }, { "cite": "232 Ark. 50", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1693985 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1960, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/232/0050-01" ] }, { "cite": "159 A.L.R. 1395", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R.", "year": 1945, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "60 Idaho 41", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Idaho", "case_ids": [ 4388467 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1939, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "524" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/idaho/60/0041-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 22-9-401", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "4 Ark. App. 161", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6139433 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/4/0161-01" ] }, { "cite": "242 Ark. 486", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 8721042 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1967, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/242/0486-01" ] }, { "cite": "208 Ark. 692", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1478620 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1945, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/208/0692-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 11-9-401", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 415, "char_count": 6618, "ocr_confidence": 0.876, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.6439743640303716e-07, "percentile": 0.6915702421260853 }, "sha256": "f3bf82492d99066439bafeb69398046c3073a814e853bc286e17a76779a64f04", "simhash": "1:83d498466d22c410", "word_count": 1158 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:22:12.310921+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Corbin, C.J., and Cracraft, J., agree." ], "parties": [ "James WOODARD v. WHITE SPOT CAFE and American States Ins. Co." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "James R. Cooper, Judge.\nThe appellant in this workers\u2019 compensation case injured his back while getting out of his auto in the employer\u2019s parking lot five minutes before he was scheduled to begin work. The Workers\u2019 Compensation Commission found that the appellant failed to prove that the injury arose out of his employment, and denied benefits. From that decision, comes this appeal.\nFor reversal, the appellant contends that the Commission erred in finding that his injury did not arise out of and in the course of his employment. We affirm.\nThe parties stipulated that the appellant was injured in the employer\u2019s parking lot, and that the employee/employer relationship existed at the time of the injury. The appellant testified that employees were required to park behind the restaurant near the alleyway. He stated that he parked his car in this lot five minutes before work was to begin, turned off the ignition, opened the car door, placed his left foot on the ground, turned to get out of the car, and \u201cfelt something pop\u201d in his back. Finally, he stated that there was nothing different about the way he got out of the car when he was injured, but that he got out of the car the same way he always had.\nThe claimant in a workers\u2019 compensation case must prove that the injury he sustained arose during the course of his employment, and that the injury arose out of his employment. Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 11-9-401 (1987). The appellant in the case at bar argues that he met his burden of proving that his injury arose out of and in the course of his employment under the \u201cpremises exception\u201d to the going and coming rule. We do not agree.\nThe going and coming rule ordinarily precludes recovery for an injury sustained while the employee is going to or returning from his place of employment. Bales v. Service Club No. 1, 208 Ark. 692, 187 S.W.2d 321 (1945). The rationale behind the rule is that an employee is not within the course of his employment while traveling to or from his job. Brooks v. Wage, 242 Ark. 486, 414 S.W.2d 100 (1967). Although an exception to the going and coming rule may operate to place an employee traveling to or from work within the course of his employment, id.; see generally City of Sherwood v. Lowe, 4 Ark. App. 161, 628 S.W.2d 610 (1982), it does not follow that the employee\u2019s injury is therefore compensable, because the employee must still show that the injury arose out of his employment. See Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 22-9-401, supra.\nA similar issue arose in Neale v. Weaver, 60 Idaho 41, 88 P. 2d 522 (1939), where the appellant argued that the accident ipso facto arose out of and in the course of his employment because it occurred on his employer\u2019s premises. The Neale Court responded to that argument as follows:\nIt is true numerous cases have made the general statement to that effect, but on a careful examination and analysis of these cases we find there were in all an additional feature showing a causal connection between the employment or the condition of the place or means or appliance furnished, or under the control of the employer, directly or indirectly and at least to some extent, however slight, contributing to the accident, or tying it into or with the employment, which, in addition to the employee being on the premises of the employer at the time of the accident, constituted a sufficient make-weight to tip the scales and justifiably support the conclusion that the accident arose in the course of and out of the employment.\nNeale, 88 P.2d at 524; see Annot., 159 A.L.R. 1395 (1945). An examination of Arkansas cases involving the going and coming rule likewise reveals a causal connection between the employment, or the condition of the place, means, or appliance furnished or controlled by the employer, to the claimant\u2019s accident. In Davis v. Chemical Construction Co., 232 Ark. 50, 334 S.W.2d 697 (1960), the claimant\u2019s employment required him to travel one mile in eighteen minutes in order to clear a \u201ccritical area,\u201d and it was not unusual for employees to catch rides on trucks belonging to subcontractors. These employment conditions contributed to the claimant\u2019s injury when he caught his foot and fell while getting off a truck on which he had ridden to the parking area. Likewise, in Bales v. Service Club No. 1, 208 Ark. 692, 187 S.W.2d 321 (1945), there was a causal connection between the accident, in which the employee was killed after slipping on an icy sidewalk in front of her workplace, and a condition of a place under the employer\u2019s control, because, as the Bales Court noted, it was the employer\u2019s duty to keep the sidewalk clear of ice.\nWhile we agree with the appellant that this case falls within the premises exception to the going and coming rule, see Davis v. Chemical Construction Co., 232 Ark. 50, 334 S.W.2d 697 (1960), we think that the appellant was nevertheless required to prove that his injury arose out of his employment.\nThe phrase \u201carising out of the employment\u201d refers to the origin or cause of the accident, and, in order to arise out of the employment, an injury must be \u201ca natural and probable consequence or incident of the employment and a natural result of one of its risks.\u201d J. & G. Cabinets v. Hennington, 269 Ark. 789, 793, 600 S.W.2d 916, 918 (Ark. App. 1980). The appellant in the case at bar was employed as a dishwasher, and there is no evidence that either the circumstances of his employment or the condition of the employer\u2019s premises contributed to his back injury. Nor can it be said that the appellant\u2019s employment required him to be in a particular place and thus brought him within range of an external force or event which caused his injury: there is no suggestion in the record that the appellant\u2019s surroundings had any influence on his injury, and it appears that he could have injured his back in this manner any time and any place that he got out of his automobile.\nSee Martin v. Unified School District No. 233, 5 Kan. App. 2d 298, 615 P.2d 168 (1980). Under the circumstances of this case, we are unable to find any causal connection between the injury and the employment other than the bare fact that it occurred in the employer\u2019s parking lot, and we hold that the Commission did not err in finding that he failed to prove that his injury arose out of his employment.\nAffirmed.\nCorbin, C.J., and Cracraft, J., agree.", "type": "majority", "author": "James R. Cooper, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Nolan and Caddell, P.A., by: Bennett S. Nolan, for appellant.", "Warner and Smith, by: James M. Dunn, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "James WOODARD v. WHITE SPOT CAFE and American States Ins. Co.\nCA 89-290\n785 S.W.2d 54\nCourt of Appeals of Arkansas Division I\nOpinion delivered March 7, 1990\nNolan and Caddell, P.A., by: Bennett S. Nolan, for appellant.\nWarner and Smith, by: James M. Dunn, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0221-01", "first_page_order": 245, "last_page_order": 249 }