{ "id": 6141118, "name": "HOLIDAY INN-WEST and Crum & Forster Commercial Insurance v. Darryl COLEMAN", "name_abbreviation": "Holiday Inn-West v. Coleman", "decision_date": "1990-07-05", "docket_number": "CA 89-377", "first_page": "224", "last_page": "230", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "31 Ark. App. 224" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "792 S.W.2d 345" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark. Ct. App.", "id": 13370, "name": "Arkansas Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 11-9-715", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)(2)(B)" }, { "page": "(c)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "72 Calif. L. Rev. 68", "category": "journals:journal", "reporter": "Calif. L. Rev.", "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "230 Ark. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1700056 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1959, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/230/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "268 Ark. 961", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1715310 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/268/0961-01" ] }, { "cite": "252 Ark. 1236", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1630069 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/252/1236-01" ] }, { "cite": "295 Ark. 246", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1893742 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/295/0246-01" ] }, { "cite": "262 Ark. 564", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1675918 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/262/0564-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 11-9-102", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(9)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "21 Ark. App. 94", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6138444 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/21/0094-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 11-9-715", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "opinion_index": 1 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 583, "char_count": 10446, "ocr_confidence": 0.907, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.870871211028613e-08, "percentile": 0.45953567177082527 }, "sha256": "5304ac7c47850049ec660ba4345533032931ddf7a6587341a0e21deb0e25e16d", "simhash": "1:da137584fc1e6ecb", "word_count": 1673 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:22:35.733205+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Cracraft and Mayfield, JJ., dissent." ], "parties": [ "HOLIDAY INN-WEST and Crum & Forster Commercial Insurance v. Darryl COLEMAN" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "John E. Jennings, Judge.\nOn April 20, 1987, Darryl Coleman was injured while working for appellant Holiday Inn-West. The administrative law judge found the injury to be compensable and awarded benefits. The ALJ also entered the following orders relating to the claimant\u2019s attorney fees:\nIT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that attorney fees are awarded to the claimant\u2019s attorney at the maximum level.\nIT IS FURTHER ORDERED that pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 11-9-715, one-half (V2) of said attorney fees shall be paid by respondents based upon the total compensation awarded, to include medical and indemnity benefits.\nIT IS FURTHER ORDERED that pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 11-9-715, one-half (V2) of said attorney fees shall be paid by the claimant based upon the compensation payable to him, indemnity benefits.\nIT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the respondents shall pay its portion of the attorney fees to the claimant\u2019s attorney directly and shall deduct the claimant\u2019s portion of the attorney fees out of compensation payable to claimant, indemnity benefits, and likewise submit same to claimant\u2019s attorney directly.\nThe claimant appealed, challenging the method of calculating attorney\u2019s fees, and the full Commission reversed and held that under the applicable statute the proper procedure is for the carrier to pay one-half the claimant\u2019s attorney\u2019s fee on its own behalf and pay the remaining one-half attorney\u2019s fee by deducting proportionate amounts from bills payable to medical providers and indemnity payments due. to the claimant.\nOn appeal to this court the employer and carrier argue that the method of payment of attorney\u2019s fees devised by the Commission is not in accordance with the statute and that the Commission\u2019s decision violates the due process rights of the medical provider. Because we reverse the Commission\u2019s decision on the first point argued we do not reach the second.\nThe applicable statute is Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 11-9-715(a)(2)(B) (1987) which provides in part:\nIn all other cases whenever the commission finds that a claim has been controverted, in whole or in part, the commission shall direct that fees for legal services be paid to the attorney for the claimant as follows: One-half (V2) by the employer or carrier in addition to compensation awarded; and one-half (V2) by the injured employee or dependents of a deceased employee out of compensation payable to them. (Emphasis added.)\nThe Commission decided that the word \u201ccompensation\u201d in the phrase \u201cout of compensation payable to them\u201d included medical benefits. In doing so the Commission overlooked the first rule of statutory construction: if the language of the statute is plain and unambiguous it must be applied as it reads. Tolhurst v. Reynolds, 21 Ark. App. 94, 729 S.W.2d 25 (1987).\nIn arriving at its conclusion the Commission considered a number of factors:\n(1) That the definition of \u201ccompensation\u201d found in Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 11-9-102(9) includes medical benefits.\n(2) That Arkansas courts have held that \u201ccompensation\u201d includes medical benefits for purposes of determining the full amount of the claimant\u2019s attorney\u2019s fee, citing Hulvey v. Kellwood Co., 262 Ark. 564, 559 S.W.2d 153 (1977), and for purposes of determining whether the statute of limitations has run, citing Northwest Tire Service v. Evans, 295 Ark. 246, 748 S.W.2d 134 (1988).\n(3) That the 1986 revisions to the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act did not reduce the total fee to be awarded to claimant\u2019s attorney.\n(4) That the 1986 amendments did exclude some forms of compensation for purposes of calculating attorney\u2019s fees, citing Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 11-9-715(c) (1987).\n(5) That the statutorily provided attorney\u2019s fees in workers\u2019 compensation cases are \u201cwoefully small\u201d in comparison to fees in other areas of the practice of law and that attorneys might decline to accept workers\u2019 compensation cases were fees to be further reduced.\n(6) That in a case involving substantial medical bills, a contrary interpretation could leave the claimant with no net indemnity benefits.\n(7) That medical providers benefit from the efforts of the claimant\u2019s attorney and therefore it is \u201cfair and proper\u201d to require that they bear a proportionate burden of those fees.\n(8) That the situation is analogous to the apportionment of attorneys fees in certain tort cases, citing Burt v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 252 Ark. 1236, 483 S.W.2d 218 (1972).\nBoth the Commission and this court are required to construe the provisions of the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act liberally, in accordance with its remedial purposes. Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 ll-9-704(c)(3). However, liberal construction does not mean enlargement or restriction of any plain provision of the law. If a statutory provision is plain and unambiguous, it is the duty of the court to enforce it as it is written. Hart\u2019s Exxon Service Station v. Prater, 268 Ark. 961, 597 S.W.2d 130 (Ark. App. 1980). The rule of liberal construction does not mean that the plain provisions of the Act can be ignored. Jobe v. Capitol Products Corp., 230 Ark. 1, 320 S.W.2d 634 (1959).\nThe Commission erred in focusing on the word \u201ccompensation\u201d rather than the phrase used in the statute, \u201cout of compensation payable to them.\u201d The word \u201cthem\u201d obviously refers to the claimant or his dependents; it cannot be read to include medical providers. When the language of a statute is clear, our duty is to follow it, not to interpret it. We conclude that the statute does not authorize the Commission to direct the carrier to withhold proportionate amounts due to medical providers for payment of the claimant\u2019s portion of the attorney\u2019s fee.\nThe appellee questions appellants\u2019 standing to complain. The question is one of \u201cissue standing\u201d not \u201caccess standing\u201d \u2014 the appellants are obviously proper parties to the litigation. See generally Nichol, Rethinking Standing, 72 Calif. L. Rev. 68 (1984). The question is whether these appellants are entitled to argue that the Commission\u2019s interpretation of the statute was wrong. Clearly appellants have been directed by order of the Commission to do something they contend the statute does not provide for. Appellants also argue that a requirement that they calculate a fractional amount to be withheld from all medical providers will impose a significant administrative burden. While we may not agree with appellants on the extent of this burden, we think they have a sufficient interest to entitle them to raise the issue.\nBecause of our holding on appellants\u2019 first point we need not address the argument that the Commission\u2019s order violates the due process rights of medical providers, nor the appellee\u2019s counter-argument that the appellants lack standing to raise this issue. We reverse and remand the case to the Commission for the entry of an order that is consistent with this opinion.\nReversed and remanded.\nCracraft and Mayfield, JJ., dissent.\nStanding in the federal courts is an aspect of the justiciability doctrine. Jus-ticiability, in turn, is a term of art used to give expression to the limitations placed on federal courts by the \u201ccase or controversy\u201d provisions of article III of the United States Constitution. See L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law \u00a7 3-7 (1978). In state court jurisprudence, standing is judge-made or common law doctrine. 59 Am. Jur. 2nd Parties \u00a7 30 (1987). For this reason pronouncements of federal courts on standing are not wholly transplantable into state law settings.", "type": "majority", "author": "John E. Jennings, Judge." }, { "text": "George K. Cracraft, Judge,\ndissenting. I dissent. As I understand appellants\u2019 first point, they primarily argue that the Commission erred in ordering them to make direct remittance of any portion of the claimant\u2019s share of the attorney\u2019s fee, as Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 11-9-715 (1987) provides that one-half of the total fee be paid \u201cby the claimant.\u201d Appellants also argue under their first point that, in any event, the Commission erred in requiring that sums be deducted from amounts otherwise due to the medical providers and applied to the claimant\u2019s share of the attorney\u2019s fee, since the statute provides that the claimant\u2019s share of the fee is to be paid \u201cout of compensation payable to [him].\u201d As I understand the prevailing opinion, it fails to address the first of these arguments, but does address the second one.\nAlthough I have no problem with the majority\u2019s interpretation of the statute as it relates to the responsibility of medical providers, I do not think that these appellants have standing to raise that issue on appeal. The employer and the carrier cannot be aggrieved by the Commission\u2019s holding that a portion of the claimant\u2019s attorney\u2019s fee be paid by third persons. For perfectly valid and sensible reasons, our appellate courts refuse to issue declaratory judgments and address only those issues presented by an \u201caggrieved party\u201d. While I prefer to avoid dissents, I feel more comfortable in adhering to the time-honored wisdom of not deciding issues that are not properly before us, even though they are advanced by the parties and amici or are of particular interest to some segments of the public.", "type": "dissent", "author": "George K. Cracraft, Judge," }, { "text": "Melvin Mayfield, Judge,\ndissenting. I dissent for two reasons. First, for the reasons stated in Judge Cracraft\u2019s dissent, I do not think the appellants have a standing to raise the issue they argue on appeal. Second, I do hot agree with the majority opinion. Actually, I cannot understand what the opinion holds. Obviously, it asks more questions than it answers. Surely the statute is not as plain and unambiguous as the opinion suggests. Hopefully, the General Assembly will remedy the problems the statute presents.", "type": "dissent", "author": "Melvin Mayfield, Judge," } ], "attorneys": [ "Barber, McCaskill, Amsler, Jones & Hale, P.A., by: Micheal L. Alexander and R. Kenny McCulloch, for appellants.", "Philip M. Wilson; and Holiman, Fox and Coleman, by: Richard E. Holiman, for appellee.", "Walter A. Murray Law Firm, for amicus curiae Arkansas Self-Insured Association.", "Mitchell & Roachell, by: Michael W. Mitchell; and Friday, Eldredge & Clark, by: Diane S. Mackey, for amicus curiae Arkansas Hospital Association, Arkansas Medical Society, Arkansas Chiropractic Association, Arkansas Chapter of American Physical Therapy Association, Arkansas Podiatric Medical Association, and Arkansas State Dental Association.", "Youngdahl & Youngdahl, P.A., by: Thomas H. McGowan, for amicus curiae Arkansas AFL-CIO." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "HOLIDAY INN-WEST and Crum & Forster Commercial Insurance v. Darryl COLEMAN\nCA 89-377\n792 S.W.2d 345\nCourt of Appeals of Arkansas En Banc\nOpinion delivered July 5, 1990\nBarber, McCaskill, Amsler, Jones & Hale, P.A., by: Micheal L. Alexander and R. Kenny McCulloch, for appellants.\nPhilip M. Wilson; and Holiman, Fox and Coleman, by: Richard E. Holiman, for appellee.\nWalter A. Murray Law Firm, for amicus curiae Arkansas Self-Insured Association.\nMitchell & Roachell, by: Michael W. Mitchell; and Friday, Eldredge & Clark, by: Diane S. Mackey, for amicus curiae Arkansas Hospital Association, Arkansas Medical Society, Arkansas Chiropractic Association, Arkansas Chapter of American Physical Therapy Association, Arkansas Podiatric Medical Association, and Arkansas State Dental Association.\nYoungdahl & Youngdahl, P.A., by: Thomas H. McGowan, for amicus curiae Arkansas AFL-CIO." }, "file_name": "0224-01", "first_page_order": 254, "last_page_order": 260 }