{
  "id": 6645291,
  "name": "Rucker A. HOLIMAN and Linda A. Holiman v. HAGAN'S MOTORS, INC.",
  "name_abbreviation": "Holiman v. Hagan's Motors, Inc.",
  "decision_date": "1990-10-10",
  "docket_number": "CA 90-44",
  "first_page": "62",
  "last_page": "65",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "32 Ark. App. 62"
    },
    {
      "type": "parallel",
      "cite": "796 S.W.2d 356"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ark. Ct. App.",
    "id": 13370,
    "name": "Arkansas Court of Appeals"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 34,
    "name_long": "Arkansas",
    "name": "Ark."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 4-9-504",
      "category": "laws:leg_statute",
      "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.",
      "weight": 2,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "(3)"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "31 Ark. App. 90",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark. App.",
      "case_ids": [
        6137791
      ],
      "weight": 2,
      "year": 1990,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ark-app/31/0090-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "664 S.W.2d 953",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.W.2d",
      "case_ids": [
        11765469
      ],
      "year": 1984,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/sw2d/664/0953-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "10 Ark. App. 304",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark. App.",
      "case_ids": [
        6141725
      ],
      "year": 1984,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ark-app/10/0304-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "282 Ark. 585",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
      "case_ids": [
        1740745
      ],
      "weight": 5,
      "year": 1984,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ark/282/0585-01"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "analysis": {
    "cardinality": 267,
    "char_count": 3915,
    "ocr_confidence": 0.868,
    "pagerank": {
      "raw": 7.765404242435647e-08,
      "percentile": 0.4561370180269197
    },
    "sha256": "89863b8386d425460b02958614a12a9bb08251f67c9ae71bedd62a97d3b36250",
    "simhash": "1:879d07c8538372d6",
    "word_count": 652
  },
  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:12:24.429045+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "Mayfield and Rogers, JJ., agree."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "Rucker A. HOLIMAN and Linda A. Holiman v. HAGAN\u2019S MOTORS, INC."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "James R. Cooper, Judge.\nThe appellants purchased an automobile from the appellee, stopped making payments, and returned it. The appellee gave notice of private sale, resold the automobile about eight months later for a price which exceeded the appellant\u2019s indebtedness, and brought an action against the appellants for a deficiency. The trial court entered a deficiency judgment for the appellee in the amount of $3,300.00. From that decision, comes this appeal.\nFor reversal, the appellants contend that the evidence was insufficient to support the trial court\u2019s finding of a deficiency. We agree, and we reverse.\nThe record shows that the automobile was resold for a contract price in excess of the appellant\u2019s indebtedness, but the appellee claimed at trial that the new purchaser had been given an overallowance of $2,600.00 on a vehicle taken in trade, and that the total deficiency was $3,055.00. The appellee\u2019s witness testified that the trade-in vehicle was sold, but that he did not know the price for which the trade-in vehicle was sold.\nWe agree with the appellant\u2019s contention that the trial court erred in determining there was a deficiency. Thrower v. Union Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 282 Ark. 585, 670 S.W.2d 430 (1984), holds that surplus or deficiency should be computed on the basis of the fair market value of any trade-in vehicle together with cash received by the dealer, rather than on the basis of the trade-in allowance given by the dealer to the purchaser of the collateral.\nThe primary concern of both debtor and creditor is that every aspect of the disposition of the collateral be conducted in a commercially reasonable fashion, as required by Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 4-9-504 (3) (1987). See Thrower, supra. Where the debtor is concerned over the price received for the trade-in or the collateral, he should challenge the aspect of the sale which he feels has made the disposition commercially unreasonable so as to result in an insufficient price. Id. The appellants did so in the case at bar by objecting to the appellee\u2019s failure to offer evidence proving the amount received for the sale of the vehicle taken in trade. The burden is on the secured party as the plaintiff to establish the deficiency, and if the secured party\u2019s handling of the disposition of the collateral is attacked, it has the burden of proving that every aspect of that disposition was commercially reasonable, including the value of the trade-in. Id.\nIn the case at bar, the appellee\u2019s finance manager testified that an overallowance of $2,600.00 was given on the trade-in vehicle. However, he also testified that he did not know how much was given on the trade-in, nor what the trade-in vehicle was sold for. We think it clear that the record contains no evidence,of the fair market value of the trade-in vehicle, and we hold that the appellee therefore failed to prove that the disposition was commercially reasonable under Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 4-9-504(3). We reverse. Nevertheless, because there has been a simple failure of proof, we remand the case to allow the appellee an opportunity to supply the defect. Only where the record affirmatively shows that there can be no recovery on retrial should the case be dismissed. Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Whitley, 10 Ark. App. 304, 664 S.W.2d 953 (1984). Here the record does not affirmatively show that there could be no recovery, or that the sale was conducted in a commercially unreasonable manner, see generally Cheshire v. Walt Bennett Ford, Inc., 31 Ark. App. 90, 788 S.W.2d 490 (1990), and we therefore reverse and remand for a new trial.\nReversed and remanded.\nMayfield and Rogers, JJ., agree.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "James R. Cooper, Judge."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Young & Finley, by: Dale W. Finley, for appellant.",
      "Mobley & Smith, by: William F. Smith, for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "Rucker A. HOLIMAN and Linda A. Holiman v. HAGAN\u2019S MOTORS, INC.\nCA 90-44\n796 S.W.2d 356\nCourt of Appeals of Arkansas Division II\nOpinion delivered October 10, 1990\nYoung & Finley, by: Dale W. Finley, for appellant.\nMobley & Smith, by: William F. Smith, for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0062-01",
  "first_page_order": 86,
  "last_page_order": 89
}