{ "id": 6137104, "name": "Reynaldo MEEKINS v. STATE of Arkansas", "name_abbreviation": "Meekins v. State", "decision_date": "1991-03-20", "docket_number": "CA CR 90-81", "first_page": "67", "last_page": "71-B", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "34 Ark. App. 67" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "806 S.W.2d 9" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark. Ct. App.", "id": 13370, "name": "Arkansas Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "292 Ark. 421", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1871399 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/292/0421-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-65-103", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-2-302", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "23 Ark. 36", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "year": 1861, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "257 Ark. 538", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 8721468 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ark/257/0538-01" ] }, { "cite": "23 Ark. 36", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "weight": 2, "year": 1861, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "38" } ], "opinion_index": 1 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 602, "char_count": 11280, "ocr_confidence": 0.873, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.77084526399421e-08, "percentile": 0.4095418304310406 }, "sha256": "1c31d9d7d56cc5d4a9a6104962f4d58a56ea74ba1ca71cff1b5ff78c67c36fe2", "simhash": "1:a8d983c4070318b2", "word_count": 1908 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:49:46.151700+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Rogers, J., dissents." ], "parties": [ "Reynaldo MEEKINS v. STATE of Arkansas" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "George K. Cracraft, Chief Judge.\nReynaldo Meekins appeals from his conviction of delivery of a controlled substance for which he was sentenced as a habitual offender to twenty years in the Arkansas Department of Correction. He contends that the trial court erred in refusing to grant a continuance and that he was denied effective assistance of counsel. We affirm.\nPrior to trial, the prosecuting attorney advised the trial court that it had been brought to his attention that appellant possibly was intoxicated. The prosecutor stated that a breathalyzer test had just been conducted by two police officers and that appellant had registered .19 percent blood alcohol. The prosecutor indicated that he would object to a continuance because, based on his observations of appellant and appellant\u2019s conversations with the officers, appellant appeared to be coherent and able to assist attorney in his defense.\nAppellant\u2019s counsel moved for a continuance, stating that since appellant registered .19 on the breathalyzer test, he was unable to help pick a jury or go through the rigors of a trial. Counsel admitted, however, that he had not spoken to appellant since the night before and \u201cI fully defer to the [prosecuting attorney] and the police officers, if they say he can respond effectively, I\u2019ll go with that. But, I personally have no knowledge as to whether he can talk to me or aid me this morning.\u201d\nThe trial judge then called the two officers to the bench and they testified as follows:\nMR. VINES: Yes, sir, he run .19 percent on the breathalyzer. I\u2019ve asked him his name and his address and his date of birth and he has responded to the four questions. He tells me he\u2019s fine and whatever, and he you know, and I asked him to bring \u2014 up here and let the Judge ask his name and address and date of birth, and he\u2019s give it probably right back to you. He has so far. His rights was read and he understood and did sign his rights for his breathalyzer at the City Police Department.\n[PROSECUTING ATTORNEY]: I\u2019ll ask Mr. Porter the same questions. Sir, were you involved in transportation of Mr. Meekins to and from the City for the breathalyzer test?\nMR. PORTER: Yes, sir, we gave him a breathalyzer. The lady hooked the breathalyzer up. She asked him the questions \u2014 name, address, how old he was, his date of birth, and he answered her fine. Didn\u2019t have any problem. He acted coherently and knew what was going on. Matter of fact wanted \u2014 there was a detective came in, he talked to him about that he\u2019d remembered seeing him, his name on the subpoena list and all that stuff. He knows what\u2019s going on. He\u2019s not out of it. He knows what\u2019s going on.\nIn light of the officers\u2019 testimony, the court denied appellant\u2019s request for a continuance, finding that appellant was able to understand the proceedings. The court stated that \u201cif at such time that the Court is convinced that the defendant is unable to understand the proceedings then the Court will take an appropriate action at that time.\u201d\nAppellant contends that the trial court erred in refusing to grant a continuance, arguing that his sixth amendment rights were violated when he was forced to trial in an intoxicated condition. We agree that a person who is so intoxicated as to be unable to understand the proceedings or effectively participate in his defense ought not to be tried until that incapacity has been removed. See Taffe v. State, 23 Ark. 36 (1861); Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-2-302 (1987). However, we cannot conclude from our review of the record that appellant was in such a condition.\nThe record reflects that the prosecuting attorney stated, when he first entered the courtroom, that he observed appellant reading a newspaper. Both police officers, who had closely observed appellant, opined that he was not incapacitated, but was coherent and in control of his faculties. Although appellant\u2019s counsel initially denied any knowledge of appellant\u2019s condition, he failed to renew his motion at any time during the trial, after he had full opportunity to observe and confer with his client.\nThe record also reflects that, after the State had offered its proof, appellant\u2019s counsel announced that, although he had advised appellant that it would not be in his best interest for him to take the witness stand in his own behalf, appellant refused to accept his counsel\u2019s advise. The court then questioned appellant to make sure that he knew of his right to remain silent, and appellant insisted that he wished to exercise his right to testify. From our review of the record, we find that appellant\u2019s testimony was clear, precise, and candid and that there was nothing to indicate that he was unable to assist in his own defense. Appellant has not pointed out to us, and we have been unable to find, anything in the record indicating action on the part of appellant that would require the trial court to continue the case or declare a mistrial.\nWe find no merit in appellant\u2019s argument that, because his blood alcohol level exceeded .10, we must conclude, based on Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-65-103 (1987), that he was too intoxicated to stand trial. That section provides that it is unlawful for any person to operate a motor vehicle if his blood alcohol level is .10 percent or more. It does not declare or imply that a person in such condition is incompetent for any other purposes.\nNor do we find merit in appellant\u2019s argument that the trial court should not have relied entirely on the testimony of the police officers and should have interrogated appellant in person. The trial court did conduct a hearing to determine whether appellant was competent to participate in the trial, interrogating those persons who purportedly had knowledge of appellant\u2019s condition and to whose judgment appellant\u2019s counsel deferred. Furthermore, the trial court had full opportunity to see and observe appellant throughout the trial. Whether to grant a continuance is within the sound discretion of the trial court and we will not reverse unless there has been an abuse of that discretion. Parker v. State, 292 Ark. 421, 731 S.W.2d 756 (1987). From our review of the record, we cannot conclude, under the circumstances of this case, that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to grant a continuance.\nAppellant also contends that he was denied effective assistance of counsel. We do not address that issue because it was not properly preserved for appeal by motion for a new trial on that ground. Ark. R. Crim. P. 36.4.\nAffirmed.\nRogers, J., dissents.", "type": "majority", "author": "George K. Cracraft, Chief Judge." }, { "text": "Judith Rogers, Judge,\ndissenting. I respectfully dissent for two reasons. First, I depart with the majority\u2019s view that the record does not reflect that the appellant was so intoxicated that he was unable to stand trial. The appellant had registered. 19 on a breathalyzer test just before the trial, which is an objective indication of appellant\u2019s intoxicated condition. Despite the officer\u2019s testimony, the fact that they were even prompted to test the appellant is particularly revealing on this question. I also cannot agree with the characterization of appellant\u2019s testimony as being \u201cclear, precise and candid.\u201d In my view, his testimony reflects a high degree of confusion, and is replete with instances of contradiction, beyond that normally displayed by a defendant on trial and when subjected to the rigors of cross-examination. On the whole, his testimony was damaging to his defense, in which appellant claimed that the undercover officer had mistaken him for someone else. In this regard, the credibility of the appellant as opposed to that of the officer was crucial. While the majority does not deny that appellant was intoxicated, I believe the record objectively demonstrates that he was so impaired as to be unable to fully understand the proceedings of or effectively participate in his defense, and that ultimately he was prejudiced by having to go forward with the trial. I cannot improve upon the eloquence of the supreme court in Taffe v. State, 23 Ark. 36 (1861), wherein it stated:\nIf the intoxication of a juror be sufficient cause for discharging a jury: If a court, upon discovering the intoxication of a material witness, should adjourn it till the witness becomes sober, or if necessary, defer the trial a term, certainly the intoxication of a defendant on trial for his liberty should be deferred by the court, upon discovery of the fact during the trial; or if not brought to its notice till a verdict was rendered, that should be set aside.\nId. at 38. (citations omitted.)\nSecondly, rather than relying on the subjective impressions of the police officers who testified, I believe that the better course for the trial court, when confronted with this question, would be to examine the defendant personally in order to evaluate his fitness to stand trial. To await the progress of trial for decision on this matter, without first addressing the defendant, is akin to putting the cart before the horse, so to speak. In sum, I believe that the trial court should have granted appellant\u2019s motion for a continuance, and that this cause should be reversed and remanded for a new trial.\nSUPPLEMENTAL OPINION ON DENIAL ON REHEARING APRIL 10, 1991\nDarrell F. Brown and Assoc., by: David O. Bowden, for appellant.\nSteve Clark, Att\u2019y Gen., by: Lynley Arnett, Asst. Att\u2019y Gen., for appellee.\nPer Curiam. Appellant has filed this petition for rehearing contending that our original opinion is flawed. He argues that we erred in holding that he had failed to preserve the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel since, he argues, \u201cthe record is devoid of any proceeding on the record indicating that the personal advisment [sic] of the appellant as to his right to allege ineffective assistance of counsel was ever carried out by the trial court.\u201d See Ark. R. Crim. P. 36.4. We deny the petition.\nInitially, we note that appellant failed to raise any such alleged failure by the trial court in either his original brief or his reply brief, despite the State\u2019s contention in its brief that he had failed to preserve the issue of ineffective assistance.\nIn any event, we find that the record does show that appellant was informed of his rights under Rule 36.4. That rule requires that the admonition as to ineffective assistance of counsel be given at the time sentence is imposed. Here, the record furnished us ends with the reading of the jury\u2019s verdict. It does not contain a transcript of appellant\u2019s formal sentencing by the court. However, the judgment and commitment order recites that appellant appeared before the court personally and through his attorney and was informed of both his right to appeal and his right to assert ineffective assistance of counsel. Under these circumstances, in the absence of something in the record showing the contrary, it will be presumed that the court did its duty according to the rule and as recited in the order. See Coleman v. State, 257 Ark. 538, 518 S.W.2d 487 (1975).", "type": "dissent", "author": "Judith Rogers, Judge," } ], "attorneys": [ "Darrell F. Brown & Associates, by; David O. Bowden, for appellant.", "Steve Clark, Att\u2019y Gen., by: Lynley Arnett, Asst. Att\u2019y Gen., for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Reynaldo MEEKINS v. STATE of Arkansas\nCA CR 90-81\n806 S.W.2d 9\nCourt of Appeals of Arkansas En Banc\nOpinion delivered March 20, 1991\n[Supplemental Opinion on Denial of Rehearing April 10, 1991.]\nDarrell F. Brown & Associates, by; David O. Bowden, for appellant.\nSteve Clark, Att\u2019y Gen., by: Lynley Arnett, Asst. Att\u2019y Gen., for appellee." }, "file_name": "0067-01", "first_page_order": 91, "last_page_order": 97 }