{
  "id": 6650116,
  "name": "Rodney Maurice RAGLIN v. STATE of Arkansas",
  "name_abbreviation": "Raglin v. State",
  "decision_date": "1991-10-02",
  "docket_number": "CA CR 90-287",
  "first_page": "181",
  "last_page": "185",
  "citations": [
    {
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      "cite": "35 Ark. App. 181"
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      "cite": "816 S.W.2d 618"
    }
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    "name_abbreviation": "Ark. Ct. App.",
    "id": 13370,
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          "parenthetical": "defendant explicitly agreed to continue his case and expressly waived any speedy trial claims"
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      "cite": "305 Ark. 393",
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      "reporter": "Ark.",
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        1916738
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      "year": 1991,
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:21:33.038957+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "Cooper and Rogers, JJ., agree."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "Rodney Maurice RAGLIN v. STATE of Arkansas"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "George K. Cracraft, Chief Judge.\nRodney Maurice Raglin appeals from his conviction of the crime of possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver. The sole issue on appeal is whether he was denied his right to a speedy trial under the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure. We conclude that he was and reverse the conviction.\nIt is undisputed that appellant was arrested for possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver on May 12,1989. On October 18, 1989, while on bail, appellant was arrested for an unrelated homicide. On January 2, 1990, appellant was arraigned on both charges and entered pleas of not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect. As a result, a psychiatric examination of appellant was ordered. On January 30, 1990, the psychiatric evaluation of appellant was received by the court and the court found him fit to proceed. On April 25, 1990, appellant was tried for the homicide, convicted of murder, and sentenced to forty years in the Arkansas Department of Correction.\nAt some point thereafter, appellant\u2019s trial on the charge of possession with intent to deliver was set for August 3, 1990. On August 2,1990, appellant filed a motion to dismiss that charge for lack of a speedy trial. Although the court\u2019s reasons are not clearly stated in the record, appellant\u2019s motion was denied after a hearing on August 3. Appellant was thereafter tried and convicted of possession with intent to deliver, and this appeal followed.\nThe parties agree that, under Ark. R. Crim. P. 28.1(c) and 28.2(a), appellant was entitled to have the drug charge dismissed with an absolute bar to prosecution if not brought to trial within twelve months of the date of his arrest, May 12,1989, subject only to any excludable periods authorized under Rule 28.3. It is undisputed that appellant\u2019s trial on this charge was not held until eighty-three days after the twelve-month period had elapsed. The parties further agree that the twenty-eight day period between January 2 and January 30, 1990, was properly excludable. Therefore, it is the exclusion of an additional fifty-five days that is at issue on this appeal.\nAppellant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss. He argues that, because no written orders were entered or docket entries made concerning any delays in trying him on the drug charge, the court erred in excluding the additional fifty-five days. We agree.\nOnce it has been shown that a trial is to be held after the speedy trial period has expired, the State has the burden of showing that any delay was the result of the defendant\u2019s conduct or that it was otherwise legally justified. McConaughy v. State, 301 Ark. 446, 784 S.W.2d 768 (1990). Rule 28.3(i) of the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that \u201c[a] 11 excluded periods shall be set forth by the court in a written order or docket entry.\u201d Although not expressly stated in the rule, the supreme court has said that \u201ca court should enter written orders or make docket notations at the time continuances are granted to detail the reasons for the continuances and to specify, to a day certain, the time covered by such excluded periods.\u201d Hicks v. State, 305 Ark. 393, 397, 808 S.W.2d 348, 351 (1991). Our courts have also said that this language must be adhered to in order to provide any impetus behind Rule 28.3. Hicks v. State, supra; Reed v. State, 35 Ark. App. 161, 814 S.W.2d 560 (1991). Here, although appellant failed to abstract the docket sheet, it is clear from the court clerk\u2019s extensive testimony from the docket and the statements made by the trial judge at the hearing on the motion to dismiss that no such orders were entered or docket entries made.\nThe State contends that the trial court\u2019s ruling was correct because the eighty-five day period between January 30,1990, and April 25, 1990, was excludable despite the lack of any appropriate written orders or docket entries. According to the transcript of the hearing of January 30, the trial court stated that it was going to set appellant\u2019s murder trial first. The transcript of a short hearing held on February 2, 1990, shows that the court set the murder trial for April 25. The State argues that, because appellant failed to object when these statements were made, he \u201ctacitly agreed\u201d to the delay caused by holding the murder trial first and, thereby, lost his right to contend that the delay violated his right to a speedy trial. We cannot agree.\nThe State\u2019s reliance on Jenkins v. State, 301 Ark. 586, 786 S.W.2d 566 (1990), and Key v. State, 300 Ark. 66, 776 S.W.2d 820 (1989), is misplaced. Those cases hold that when a case is delayed by the accused and that delaying act is memorialized by a record taken at the time it occurred, that record may be sufficient to satisfy the. requirements of Ark. R. Crim. P. 28.3(i). In Jenkins, the defendant had been offered a speedy trial but his attorney requested and received a continuance to a date beyond the end of the twelve-month period. In Key, upon being asked by the court for her views, the defendant\u2019s attorney stated that she \u201chad no problems with\u201d the court granting a continuance requested by a co-defendant. See also McConaughy v. State, supra (defendant delayed the proceedings by changing his plea to not guilty by reason of mental defect on the original trial date, thus necessitating an excludable committment to the State Hospital); Cox v. State, 299 Ark. 312, 772 S.W.2d 336 (1989) (defendant explicitly agreed to continue his case and expressly waived any speedy trial claims). Here, on the other hand, appellant\u2019s trial on the drug charge was not delayed by him. He made no request for a continuance in either this case or the murder case. The record is clear that holding the murder trial first was ordered on the court\u2019s own motion. Appellant was not consulted. See Reed v. State, supra.\nThe fact that appellant did not affirmatively object to the court\u2019s statements in question does not alter our conclusion. Rule 28.2 provides that the speedy trial period commences to run \u201cwithout demand by the defendant.\u201d The State\u2019s argument that a defendant must protest court-ordered delays, whether or not he is responsible for the delays or is even consulted about them, would place the burden on the accused to demand a speedy trial at every stage of the proceedings. Moreover, the court\u2019s decision to hold appellant\u2019s murder trial on April 25 would not cause appellant to know that his drug case would be continued past the required time period. See Hicks v. State, supra; Reed v. State, supra. In light of the admittedly excludable twenty-eight day period in January 1990, appellant\u2019s trial in this case would have been timely if held at any time prior to June 10, 1990.\nIt was argued at the hearing on appellant\u2019s motion to dismiss that appellant\u2019s failure to appear for his originally scheduled arraignment in this case created an additional excludable period. However, the evidence showed, and the prosecuting attorney had conceded at a previous hearing, that appellant was not properly notified of that arraignment. Appellant\u2019s notice had been sent to the wrong address. In any event, the argument is not presented on appeal, and we need not address it further.\nWe conclude that the State failed to show that the remaining fifty-five day delay was attributable to appellant or was otherwise legally justified. Therefore, appellant\u2019s conviction for possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver is reversed and the case is dismissed.\nCooper and Rogers, JJ., agree.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "George K. Cracraft, Chief Judge."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "William R. Simpson, Jr., Public Defender, by: Llewellyn J. Marczuk, Deputy Public Defender, for appellant.",
      "Winston Bryant, Att\u2019y Gen., by: Catherine Templeton, Asst. Att\u2019y Gen., for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "Rodney Maurice RAGLIN v. STATE of Arkansas\nCA CR 90-287\n816 S.W.2d 618\nCourt of Appeals of Arkansas Division I\nOpinion delivered October 2, 1991\nWilliam R. Simpson, Jr., Public Defender, by: Llewellyn J. Marczuk, Deputy Public Defender, for appellant.\nWinston Bryant, Att\u2019y Gen., by: Catherine Templeton, Asst. Att\u2019y Gen., for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0181-01",
  "first_page_order": 205,
  "last_page_order": 209
}