{ "id": 6137126, "name": "CAGLE FABRICATING AND STEEL, INC. v. Roger D. PATTERSON", "name_abbreviation": "Cagle Fabricating & Steel, Inc. v. Patterson", "decision_date": "1991-11-06", "docket_number": "CA 90-481", "first_page": "49", "last_page": "64", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "36 Ark. App. 49" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "819 S.W.2d 14" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark. Ct. App.", "id": 13370, "name": "Arkansas Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 11", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "22 Ark. App. 196", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6661438 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "203" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/22/0196-01" ] }, { "cite": "265 Ark. 496", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "26 Ark. App. 51", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6136901 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/26/0051-01" ] }, { "cite": "18 Ark. App. 18", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6136496 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/18/0018-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 11-9-523", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "a" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "30 Ark. App. 131", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6139271 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "133" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/30/0131-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 1", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "6 Ark. App. 119", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6138526 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "122" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/6/0119-01" ] }, { "cite": "266 Ark. 851", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 8723384 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "854" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/266/0851-01" ] }, { "cite": "240 Ark. 756", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1727701 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1966, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "758" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/240/0756-01" ] }, { "cite": "235 Ark. 1034", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1684826 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1963, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/235/1034-01" ] }, { "cite": "454 S.W.2d 76", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 1597714 ], "year": 1970, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/248/0810-01" ] }, { "cite": "248 Ark. 811", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "weight": 2, "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "820" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "7 Ark. App. 65", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6136996 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/7/0065-01" ] }, { "cite": "265 Ark. 489", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1664891 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "507-08" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/265/0489-01" ] }, { "cite": "24 Ark. App. 40", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6136589 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/24/0040-01" ] }, { "cite": "685 S.W.2d 813", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 1877621, 6138063 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/285/0324-01", "/ark-app/14/0095-01" ] }, { "cite": "14 Ark. App. 95", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6138063 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "103" }, { "page": "103" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/14/0095-01" ] }, { "cite": "68 So. 2d 872", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "So. 2d", "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "630 S.W.2d 75", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "26 Ark. App. 51", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6136901 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/26/0051-01" ] }, { "cite": "18 Ark. App. 18", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6136496 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/18/0018-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 11-9-523", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "a" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "6 Ark. App. 119", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6138526 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "121-122" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/6/0119-01" ] }, { "cite": "266 Ark. 851", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 8723384 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ark/266/0851-01" ] }, { "cite": "235 Ark. 1034", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1684826 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1963, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ark/235/1034-01" ] }, { "cite": "24 Ark. App. 40", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6136589 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/24/0040-01" ] }, { "cite": "685 S.W.2d 813", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 1877621, 6138063 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "818" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ark/285/0324-01", "/ark-app/14/0095-01" ] }, { "cite": "14 Ark. App. 95", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6138063 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "103" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/14/0095-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 918, "char_count": 29956, "ocr_confidence": 0.924, "pagerank": { "raw": 3.709669719180054e-07, "percentile": 0.8933217728137818 }, "sha256": "c0001e2403b342e04ee14021aa1b7a15c18c670754ab06d56f5a61e70a1a5961", "simhash": "1:fdd24d4471891888", "word_count": 4996 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:52:20.777546+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Cracraft, C.J., Cooper, and Jennings, JJ., dissent." ], "parties": [ "CAGLE FABRICATING AND STEEL, INC. v. Roger D. PATTERSON" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Melvin Mayfield, Judge.\nThis is an'appeal from a decision of the Workers\u2019 Compensation Commission which awarded compensation benefits to the claimant, Roger D. Patterson, upon a finding that he had sustained a work-related hernia. Appellant argues the decision is not supported by substantial evidence and is contrary to law.\nThe record contains evidence that on December 28, 1988, Patterson, a 29-year-old welder, was pulling a sixty-pound part from a jig when he felt a pulling sensation on his right testicle. He testified that he had a sudden flash of severe pain; that he stopped work and reported the incident to his supervisor; and that the lunch bell rang about that time. The pain subsided during the lunch hour and he went back to work. He said he worked for the next two weeks with a nagging pain which was not really severe but which got worse, and by January 16 the pain became so severe that he went to see his doctor.\nIn a letter dated March 1, 1989, Dr. W. F. Dudding stated that he saw the claimant on January 16, 1989, and his examination, \u201crevealed tenderness in the right testicle with no marked epididymal swelling, a mild fingertip inguinal hernia on the right with tenderness in this area.\u201d His letter then states that \u201ca diagnosis of inguinal strain versus small hernia versus epididymitis was entertained and patient was treated with anti-inflammatory medication for about a week.\u201d The letter also stated that the claimant suffered increasing discomfort and that Dr. Dudding sent the claimant to see a surgeon, Dr. John J. Weisse, who found an inguinal hernia and repaired it on January 20,1989. Dr. Dudding\u2019s letter of March 1,1989, also stated that the \u201cfacts are consistent with an on-the-job injury on December 28,1988, as per Mr. Patterson\u2019s story,\u201d and \u201cit is not unusual that a very small hernia be very painful, yet still be very difficult to detect even by a professional let alone a layman who could not be expected to determine what the problem was.\u201d\nThe history and physical report made by Dr. Weisse for the claimant\u2019s admission to the hospital states that the doctor\u2019s examination had \u201cconfirmed a right inguinal hernia.\u201d As his \u201cimpression at the time of admission,\u201d Dr. Weisse recorded a \u201cjob related right inguinal hernia.\u201d The \u201coperative report\u201d lists the postoperative diagnosis as a \u201cright direct inguinal hernia,\u201d and describes in detail the \u201chernia repair procedure\u201d which occurred on January 20, 1989.\nArkansas Code Annotated Section ll-9-523(a) (1987) provides:\n(a) In all cases of claims for hernia, it shall be shown to the satisfaction of the commission:\n(1) That the occurrence of the hernia immediately followed as the result of sudden effort, severe strain, or the application of force directly to the abdominal wall;\n(2) That there was severe pain in the hernial region;\n(3) That the pain caused the employee to cease work immediately;\n(4) That notice of the occurrence was given to the employer within forty-eight (48) hours thereafter;\n(5) That the physical distress following the occurrence of the hernia was such as to require the attendance of a licensed physician within seventy-two (72) hours after the occurrence.\nThe Commission held that these criteria had been met and found the claimant\u2019s hernia to be compensable. It stated:\nWe find that Patterson\u2019s effort of pulling on the jig and feeling sudden pain in his testicle constitute the sudden effort and severe pain satisfying the first two criteria. The Administrative Law Judge erred in ruling that the occurrence of a hernia did not \u201cimmediately\u201d follow the pulling incident, since \u201cimmediately\u201d does not mean \u201cinstantly\u201d; rather, it is only necessary for the hernia to occur in a time and manner making clear the causal connection between it and the strain that occurred. Osceola Foods, Inc. v. Andrew, 14 Ark. App. 95, 685 S.W.2d 813 (1985). We find such to be the case, because Patterson gave credible testimony that he was in distress throughout the two weeks before the cause of pain was diagnosed. The employer appears not to deny that Patterson ceased working and complained to his supervisor contemporaneously with the incident. Thus, it can be seen that all requirements of the statute are met if Patterson\u2019s physical distress was such that the attendance of a licensed physician was required within seventy-two (72) hours after the occurrence. The law on this point has been set out in Ayres v. Historic Preservation Associates, 24 Ark. App. 40, 747 S.W.2d 587 (1988).\nThe Commission then quoted from our opinion in Ayers, which quoted from other cases, including the final sentence of the opinion in Osceola Foods, Inc. v. Andrew, 14 Ark. App. 95, 685 S.W.2d 813 (1985), which states, \u201cThe diagnosis of a hernia would confirm the need of the services of a physician . . . .\u201d See Osceola, 14 Ark. App. at 103. The Commission stated:\nWe understand the requirements of the fifth subsection to have been effectively negated by the Ayres holding. If the diagnosis of a hernia confirms the fact that the claimant needs a physician, it logically follows that any claimant who can prove a work-related hernia has satisfied the fifth requirement. Since we find that Patterson did comply with subsections 1 through 4 and that the injury did occur within the scope and course of his employment, he has met his burden of proof under Section 523(a) and is entitled to appropriate benefits.\nAppellant cites a number of Arkansas appellate decisions and argues that the claimant in this case is not entitled to compensation because the Commission\u2019s decision is not supported by substantial evidence and because the Arkansas appellate courts have construed too liberally the statutory provisions regarding hernia. As to the five factual requirements set out in Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 ll-9-523(a), the appellant contends that the appellee did not \u201cexperience that type of severe pain as contemplated by the statute, did not experience continued severe pain after the December 28, 1988, incident, was able to perform his regular employment duties involving strenuous manual labor, and had absolutely no reason to believe medical attention was required until a few days prior to January 16, 1989.\u201d\nWhen reviewing a decision of the Workers\u2019 Compensation Commission, we must view the evidence and all reasonable inferences deducible therefrom in the light most favorable to the findings of the Commission and affirm that decision if it is supported by substantial evidence. Clark v. Peabody Testing Service, 265 Ark. 489, 579 S.W.2d 360 (1979). The issue is not whether we might have reached a different result or whether the evidence would have supported a contrary finding; if reasonable minds could reach the Commission\u2019s conclusion, we must affirm its decision. Bearden Lumber Company v. Bond, 7 Ark. App. 65, 644 S.W.2d 321 (1983). We believe that there is substantial evidence to support the Commission\u2019s findings of fact in this case.\nWe next examine the appellate decisions which the appellant contends \u201chave construed too liberally the statutory provisions regarding hernia.\u201d Those decisions were concerned with the fifth requirement of the statute which requires that \u201cthe physical distress following the occurrence of the hernia was such as to require the attendance of a licensed physician within seventy-two hours after the occurrence.\u201d The appellant argues that the Commission\u2019s decision in the present case \u201cerroneously found the fifth statutory requirement had been negated by Court decisions.\u201d\nIn the discussion of this issue, we first note that the fifth requirement does not provide that a claimant must prove that he was actually attended by a physician within seventy-two hours after the injury, but the statute provides only that the physical distress following the occurrence of the hernia was such as to require the attendance of a physician within seventy-two hours after the occurrence. The purpose of this requirement was explained in Harkleford v. Cotter, 248 Ark. 811, 454 S.W.2d 76 (1970), where the court said:\nIt is a matter of common knowledge that witnesses do not see hernias sustained by fellow workmen as they would see a broken leg or broken arm. Consequently the people have seen fit to make, and the legislature has seen fit to leave, a compensable hernia a rather dramatic occurrence under the statute, with little or no room left for question or doubt that it did occur within the course of employment....\n248 Ark. at 820. The court in Harkleford reversed a Commission decision awarding compensation for a hernia claim, but it did not hold that the claimant must actually see a physician within the required period (48 hours at that time). That issue was settled in Prince Poultry Co. v. Stevens, 235 Ark. 1034, 363 S.W.2d 929 (1963), where the court adopted the interpretation given in Mississippi to a similar statutory provision in that state. Also, Prince noted that one of the meanings of \u201crequire\u201d is \u201cto need.\u201d In Miller Milling Co. v. Amyett, 240 Ark. 756, 402 S.W.2d 659 (1966), Justice George Rose Smith said of the Prince case:\nWe followed a very similiar Mississippi case, where the court reasoned that for an injury \u201cto require\u201d a physician\u2019s attendance within a certain number of days does not invariably mean that the physician must actually be consulted within that time. A substantial compliance may be sufficient.\u201d\n240 Ark. at 758.\nThe Prince decision was again referred to in Ammons v. Meuwly Machine Works, 266 Ark. 851, 587 S.W.2d 590 (Ark. App. 1979), where the Arkansas Court of Appeals said, \u201cAs pointed out in the Prince case, the statute does not require claimant to prove he was actually attended by a physician within 72 hours after the injury.\u201d 266 Ark. at 854. In Ammons the claimant tried, but was unable, to see a doctor within 72 hours after injury, and we said the statutory requirement is met \u201cif the evidence shows that within 72 hours after the injury the claimant\u2019s condition was such that he sought and needed the services of a physician.\u201d The word \u201csought\u201d was applicable in light of the evidence in that case, but our reference to Prince made it clear that we did not think it was necessary that the services of a physician be sought within 72 hours; that it was only necessary to show that such services were required or needed within that period.\nThe Arkansas Court of Appeals again relied upon Prince in Brim v. Mid-Ark Truck Stop, 6 Ark. App. 119, 639 S.W.2d 75 (1982), where the Commission\u2019s failure to award compensation was reversed. Although the claimant in that case did not see a doctor until 36 days after her injury, we held that the claimant \u201cadequately met her burden of proof that she needed the services of a physician within 72 hours.\u201d See 6 Ark. App. at 122.\nIn the Osceola Foods, Inc. v. Andrew, case, supra, one of the contentions made by the appellant was that the claimant\u2019s distress following the hernia did not require the services of a physician within the prescribed time because the claimant went to the doctor for treatment of an allergic reaction to a pain pill, not because of the hernia that caused the pain. We relied upon Brim for the holding that the claimant was not required to prove that he was \u201cactually attended by a physician within 72 hours but only that he needed the services of a physician within that period.\u201d Therefore, in Osceola, in the context of the appellant\u2019s contention that the claimant\u2019s physical distress from the hernia did not require the attention of the doctor who diagnosed the hernia at the time he was seen for the allergic reaction, we stated, \u201cThe diagnosis of a hernia would confirm the need of the services of a physician which is all that section requires.\u201d See 14 Ark. App. at 103.\nReturning now to the Commission\u2019s decision in the present case, we think the Commission was clearly in error when it held that the fifth subsection of Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 1 l-9-523(a) (1987), was \u201ceffectively negated by the Ayres holding.\u201d Thus, the Commission was also in error in its next statement that \u201cif the diagnosis of a hernia confirms the fact that the claimant needs a physician, it logically follows that any claimant who can prove a work-related hernia has satisfied that fifth requirement.\u201d The statement that \u201cthe diagnosis of a hernia would confirm the need of the services of a physician\u201d was first made in Osceola and was correct in that case because, as we have explained, it applied to the employer\u2019s contention in that case.\nIn Ayres we cited Osceola, and relied upon its language, when we held there was no substantial evidence to support the Commission\u2019s decision that the claimant in that case had not needed the services of a physician within 72 hours of the occurrence of the hernia. We did not, however, hold that \u201cany claimant who can prove a work-related hernia has satisfied the fifth requirement\u201d of the statute, and the statutory requirement was not \u201ceffectively negated\u201d by our decision in Ayres. In fact, we specifically referred to the statement from Osceola only in the context of our discussion of the sufficiency of the evidence.\nHowever, the Commission\u2019s statement in the present case as to its \u201cunderstanding\u201d of our decision in Ayres is not a finding of fact but amounts only to a conclusion of law. It has been the rule in Arkansas for many years that the Commission must make findings of fact in sufficient detail that the reviewing court may perform its function to determine whether the Commission\u2019s findings as to the existence or nonexistence of the essential facts are supported by the evidence. Clark v. Peabody Testing Service, 265 Ark. 489, 507-08, 579 S.W.2d 360 (1979); Mosley v. McGhee School District, 30 Ark. App. 131, 133, 783 S.W.2d 871 (1990). The Commission has done this in the instant case.\nIn its opinion the Commission held that the first two requirements of Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 11-9-523 (a) (1987) were met because under the law \u201cit is only necessary for the hernia to occur in a time and manner making clear the causal connection between it and the strain that occurred.\u201d\nAs to statutory requirements three and four, the Commission\u2019s opinion states, \u201cThe employer appears not to deny that Patterson ceased working and complained to his supervisor contemporaneously with the incident.\u201d This is, of course, a finding of fact. Moreover, no one testified in this case except the claimant. We have already detailed his testimony as to the \u201csudden flash of severe pain\u201d and that he stopped work and reported the incident to his supervisor. In fact, he testified that he \u201cstepped back and put my hands on the table, waited a second\u201d and \u201chollered to the shop foreman.\u201d Certainly there is substantial evidence to support the Commission\u2019s finding that the third and fourth statutory requirements were met.\nAnd, as to the fifth requirement, the Commission said, \u201cSince we find that Patterson did comply with subsections 1 through 4 and that the injury did occur within the scope and course of his employment, he has met his burden of proof under Section 523(a) and is entitled to appropriate benefits.\u201d While the Commission was wrong in thinking that Ayres \u201ceffectively negated\u201d the fifth requirement of the statute, the Commission specifically found that the claimant \u201cmet his burden of proof under Section 523(a).\u201d That is definitely a finding of fact. Moreover, it is a summary of other factual findings which are in sufficient detail for us to determine whether they are supported by substantial evidence. The findings .here are not like those in Wright v. American Transportation, 18 Ark. App. 18, 709 S.W.2d 107 (1986), where the Commission simply found that \u201cclaimant has failed to prove her claim by a preponderance of the evidence.\u201d There, we said \u201cthe record contains no finding as to whether a compensable injury actually occurred on the job, or whether claimant became disabled, or whether she required further medical services, or whether a job-related injury aggravated a preexisting latent spinal disease.\u201d So we concluded, \u201cAbsent any findings of essential additional facts, this court is not in a position to make a meaningful review of the decision of the Commission.\u201d See also Jones v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 26 Ark. App. 51, 759 S.W.2d 578 (1988), which we said was \u201csurprisingly similar\u201d to Wright. In the instant case, however, the Commission has found:\n(1) That \u201cPatterson\u2019s effort of pulling on the jig and feeling sudden pain in his testicle constitute the sudden effort and severe pain satisfying the first two criteria.\u201d\n(2) That \u201cthe employer appears not to deny that Patterson ceased working and complained to his supervisor contemporaneously with the incident.\u201d\n(3) That \u201cPatterson gave credible testimony that he was in distress throughout the two weeks before the cause of pain was diagnosed.\u201d\nThus, the Commission found in (1) that the first two requirements of Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 1 l-9-523(a) had been satisfied. In (2), the Commission found that it did not appear that the employer even contended that the third and fourth requirements of the statute had not been met. And in (3) the Commission found from the claimant\u2019s credible testimony that he was in distress throughout the two weeks before the cause of pain was diagnosed. The Commission then summed up these findings by stating that the claimant \u201cmet his burden of proof under Section 523(a).\u201d Had the Commission made only this last statement we would be faced with the situation in Wright and Jones v. Tyson, but that is not our situation in this case. Here, the requirements of Wright and Jones v. Tyson, which were based upon Clark v. Peabody Testing Service, supra, were fully met. In appeals from the Commission, it is our duty to\nview and interpret the evidence and all reasonable inferences deducible therefrom in the light most favorable to the findings of the commission and give the testimony its strongest probative force in favor of the action of the commission, whether it favored the claimant or the employer.\nClark v. Peabody Testing Service, supra, at 265 Ark. 496-97. See also Fowler v. McHenry, 22 Ark. App. 196, 203, 737 S.W.2d 663 (1987).\nObviously, it can be argued that the Commission\u2019s understanding of the law in Ayres caused it to make the factual findings that it made in regard to the requirements of Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 11 -9-523(a); but it nevertheless made those findings, and they are in sufficient detail for us to review. Therefore, although we do not agree with the Commissions\u2019s conclusion of law that our decision in Ayres \u201ceffectively negated\u201d the fifth requirement of Ark. Code Ann.\u00a7 ll-9-523(a) (1987), when we consider that the only evidence in the record comes from the claimant and the medical reports, and that the Commission\u2019s opinion states the claimant gave \u201ccredible testimony,\u201d and \u201cmet his burden of proof under Section 523(a)\u201d (which includes the fifth subsection), we think the Commission\u2019s findings of fact are so clearly supported by substantial evidence that we do not believe those findings were affected by the Commission\u2019s misunderstanding of our decision in Ayres.\nAffirmed.\nCracraft, C.J., Cooper, and Jennings, JJ., dissent.", "type": "majority", "author": "Melvin Mayfield, Judge." }, { "text": "James R. Cooper, Judge,\ndissenting. The majority opinion turns on the conclusion that the Workers\u2019 Compensation Commission found that the appellee\u2019s distress was such that the attendance of a physician was required within seventy-two hours after the occurrence. I think it clear that the Commission made no such finding, and that its decision was instead based on an erroneous interpretation of the applicable law. Arkansas Code Annotated \u00a7 11 -9-523(a) provides that:\n(a) In all cases of claim for hernia, it shall be shown to the satisfaction of the commission:\n(1) That the occurrence of the hernia immediately followed as the result of sudden effort, severe strain, or the application of force directly to the abdominal wall;\n(2) That there was severe pain in the hernial region;\n(3) That the pain caused the employee to cease work immediately;\n(4) That notice of the occurrence was given to the employer within forty-eight (48) hours thereafter;\n(5) That the physical distress following the occurrence of the hernia was such as to require the attendance of a licensed physician within seventy-two (72) hours after the occurrence.\nIn its opinion, the Commission tracked the statutory language and found that the first four requirements of Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 11-9-523 (a) had been satisfied. However, as the following excerpt from the Commission\u2019s opinion plainly shows, the Commission made no finding with the respect to the fifth requirement because it concluded that the fifth requirement had been eliminated by our holding in Ayres v. Historic Preservation Associates, 24 Ark. App. 40, 747 S.W.2d 587 (1988). The Commission stated in its opinion that:\nWe find that Patterson\u2019s effort of pulling on the jig and feeling sudden pain in his testicle constitute the sudden effort and severe, pain satisfying the first two criteria. The Administrative Law Judge erred in ruling that the occurrence of the hernia did not \u201cimmediately\u201d follow the pulling incident, since \u201cimmediately\u201d does not mean \u201cinstantly\u201d; rather, it is only necessary for the hernia to occur in a time and manner making clear the causal connection between it and the strain that occurred. Osceola Foods, Inc. v. Andrew, 14 Ark. App. 95, 685 S.W.2d 813 (1985). We find such to be the case, because Patterson gave credible testimony that he was in distress throughout the two weeks before the cause of pain was diagnosed. The employer appears not to deny that Patterson ceased working and complained to his supervisor contemporaneously with the incident. Thus, it can be seen that all requirements of the statute are met ifPatterson\u2019s physical distress was such that the attendance of a licensed physician was required within seventy-two (72) hours after the occurrence. The law on this point has been set out in Ayres v. Historic Preservation Associates, 24 Ark. App. 40, 747 S.W.2d 587 (1988):\nIn Brim v. Mid-Ark. Truck Stop, 6 Ark. App. 119, 630 S.W.2d 75 (1982), this court reversed a Commission decision denying benefits to a claimant who sustained a hernia on July 28, 1980, and did not see a physician until September 2, 1980 \u2014 thirty-six days later. Explaining subsection (5), we said:\nThe statute does not require a claimant to prove that he was actually attended by a physician within 72 hours after the injury. The statutory requirement is met if the evidence shows that within 72 hours after the injury the claimant\u2019s condition was such that he sought and needed the services of a physician. Prince Poultry Co. v. Stevens, 235 Ark. 1034, 363 S.W.2d 929 (1963); Ammons v. Meuwly Machine Works, 266 Ark. 851, 587 S.W.2d 590 (Ark. App. 1979).\n***\nIn Prince Poultry Co. v. Stevens, supra, the Arkansas Supreme Court cited with the interpretation given the word \u201crequired\u201d by the Supreme Court of Mississippi in Lindsey v. Ingalls Shipbuilding Corporation, 68 So. 2d 872, which was as follows:\nTo demand or exact as necessary or appropriate; hence to warrant; to need; call for.\n6 Ark. App. at 121-122, 693 S.W.2d at 76. The only condition for satisfaction of the statutory requirement under Brim, then, was that a claimant \u201crequired\u201d the services of a physician within seventy-two hours of the occurrence of the injury.\nSubsequently, this court in Osceola Foods, Inc. v. Andrew, 14 Ark. App. 95, 685 S.W.2d 813 (1985), affirmed the award of benefits to a claimant seeking compensation for a hernia. We cited Brim and held specifically that \u2018The diagnosis of a hernia would confirm the need of the services of a physician which is all that section requires.\u2019 14 Ark. App. at 103, 685 S.W.2d at 818.\nWe understand the requirements of the fifth subsection to have been effectively negated by the Ayres holding. If the diagnosis of a hernia confirms the fact that the claimant needs a physician, it logically follows that any claimant who can prove a work-related hernia has satisfied thefifth requirement. Since we find that Patterson did comply with subsections 1 through 4 and that the injury did occur within the scope and course of his employment, he has met his burden ofproof under Section 523(a) and is entitled to appropriate benefits. [Emphasis supplied.]\nI submit that a fair reading of the Commission\u2019s opinion shows that the Commission merely found that the first four requirements of the statute had been met, and that all that was required was to determine whether the fifth requirement had been satisfied. However, based on its interpretation of our holding in Ayres, supra, the Commission concluded that it was unnecessary for the claimant to go further and prove compliance with the fifth requirement because he had been ultimately diagnosed with a hernia.\nI disagree with the majority\u2019s holding that the Commission made a finding of fact regarding the fifth statutory requirement when it stated that the claimant \u201cmet his burden of proof under Section 523(a).\u201d We rejected a similar \u201cfinding\u201d of the Commission in Jones v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 26 Ark. App. 51, 759 S.W.2d 578 (1988), where the Commission \u201cfound\u201d that the claimant failed to meet her burden of proof by a preponderance of the credible evidence. Noting that a claimant is entitled to know the factual basis upon which his claim is denied and that we were unable to determine what the Commission found the facts to be, we reversed and remanded that case for a new decision based upon findings of fact set out in sufficient detail to permit our meaningful review. It would seem that an employer is likewise entitled to know the factual basis upon which a claim is granted; in any event, the Commission\u2019s statement in the case at bar that the claimant met this burden of proof is not a finding of fact, but is instead a conclusion of law. In contrast, a finding of fact is:\n[A] simple, straightforward statement of what happened. A statement of what the Board finds has happened; not a statement that a witness, or witnesses, testified thus and so. It is stated in sufficient relevant detail to make it mentally graphic, i.e., it enables the reader to picture in his mind\u2019s eye what happened. And when the reader is a reviewing court the statement must contain all the specific facts relevant to the contested issue or issues so that the court may determine whether the Board has resolved those issues in conformity with the law.\nWright v. American Transportation, 18 Ark. App. 18, 709 S.W.2d 107 (1986).\nThe Commission\u2019s decision in the case at bar does not enable us to picture whether the claimant needed a physician within the 72-hour statutory period. Nor does the Commission\u2019s conclusion that the claimant met his burden of proof under the statute allow us to determine whether the Commission decided this issue in conformity with the law.\nThe majority opinion recites the oft-repeated rule that we are duty-bound to view the evidence and all inferences deducible therefrom in the light most favorable to the Commission. While this is unquestionably the law, it is important to note that this rule applies to the Commission\u2019s findings of fact, not to its opinions or conclusions of law. See 3 Larson, The Law of Workmen\u2019s Compensation \u00a7 80:13 (1983). It is apparent that in cases such as this one the presumption in favor of the Commission\u2019s findings is of no help in resolving the more basic question of what those findings are.\nThe Commission was required to find as facts the basic component elements on which its conclusion was based. Id. Whether or not the attendance of a physician was required within 72 hours is a necessary component element of the conclusion that the claimant met his burden of proof under the statute. Because the Commission\u2019s opinion does not give us a \u201csimple, straightforward statement\u201d concerning the claimant\u2019s need for a physician, we are left to speculate regarding the manner in which the Commission arrived at its decision: Was the Commission convinced that the attendance of a physician was in fact required within the statutory period, or did the Commission instead omit this requirement from its analysis because of its erroneous belief that the requirement had been \u201ceffectively negated by the Ayres holding\u201d?\nI believe that the Commission followed the latter course of reasoning because that is precisely what it said it was doing in its opinion. The majority believes that the Commission was convinced that a physician\u2019s attendance was in fact required. I am at a loss to understand how the majority arrived at this understanding of the Commission\u2019s opinion which, in a single paragraph, states in unbroken sequence that the fifth statutory requirement was negated by Ayres, and that, since the first four statutory requirements had been met, the claimant met his burden of proof under the statute. Nevertheless, the very existence of this disagreement among the judges of this Court concerning what the Commission found exemplifies the inadequacy of the Commission\u2019s findings. We are, at best, left to guess what course the Commission took in arriving at its conclusion, and no meaningful review is possible when we are reduced to guessing whether the Commission resolved an issue in conformity with the law.\nThe Commission\u2019s opinion should be reversed and the case remanded because it contains no finding of fact regarding the fifth statutory requirement and because all member of this Court, both in the dissent in the majority, are in agreement that the Commission\u2019s interpretation of our holding in Ayres was erroneous. I respectfully dissent.\nCracraft, C.J., and Jennings, J., join in this dissent.", "type": "dissent", "author": "James R. Cooper, Judge," } ], "attorneys": [ "Warner & Smith, by: Wayne Harris, for appellant.", "Daily, West, Core, Coffman & Canfield, by: Eldon F. Coffman and Douglas M. Carson, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "CAGLE FABRICATING AND STEEL, INC. v. Roger D. PATTERSON\nCA 90-481\n819 S.W.2d 14\nCourt of Appeals of Arkansas En Banc\nOpinion delivered November 6, 1991\nWarner & Smith, by: Wayne Harris, for appellant.\nDaily, West, Core, Coffman & Canfield, by: Eldon F. Coffman and Douglas M. Carson, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0049-01", "first_page_order": 73, "last_page_order": 88 }