{ "id": 6139875, "name": "GENCORP POLYMER PRODUCTS v. Sadie LANDERS", "name_abbreviation": "Gencorp Polymer Products v. Landers", "decision_date": "1991-12-18", "docket_number": "CA 91-7", "first_page": "190", "last_page": "197", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "36 Ark. App. 190" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "820 S.W.2d 475" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark. Ct. App.", "id": 13370, "name": "Arkansas Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "5 Ark. App. 78", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6137840 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/5/0078-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 11", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 1", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 11-9-705", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)(3)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "33 Ark. App. 56", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6650349 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/33/0056-01" ] }, { "cite": "12 Ark. App. 274", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6141988 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/12/0274-01" ] }, { "cite": "15 Ark. App. 205", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6140679 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/15/0205-01" ] }, { "cite": "33 Ark. App. 103", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6652169 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/33/0103-01" ] }, { "cite": "34 Ark. App. 208", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6140451 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/34/0208-01" ] }, { "cite": "767 S.W.2d 544", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 6139506 ], "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/27/0159-01" ] }, { "cite": "21 Ark. App. 159", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "688 S.W.2d 959", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "15 Ark. App. 53", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6137386 ], "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/15/0053-01" ] }, { "cite": "278 Ark. 357", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1748280 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ark/278/0357-01" ] }, { "cite": "290 Ark. 367", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1873705 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ark/290/0367-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 1", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "opinion_index": 1 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 639, "char_count": 12497, "ocr_confidence": 0.922, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.9495989675769774e-07, "percentile": 0.8487545026756386 }, "sha256": "67c571b3142ae47aea7716ebebd219febf3bf6891434b3c9cd41b14311a6cfcf", "simhash": "1:e5a5efb6094e9a89", "word_count": 2060 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:52:20.777546+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Rogers, J., concurs in the result.", "Jennings and Mayfield, JJ., concur in part; dissent in part." ], "parties": [ "GENCORP POLYMER PRODUCTS v. Sadie LANDERS" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "James R. Cooper, Judge.\nThis appeal comes from the decision of the Arkansas Workers\u2019 Compensation Commission. The appellant contends there is no substantial evidence to support the Commission\u2019s finding that the appellee sustained a compensa-ble injury to her wrists and hands in February 1989, and that the Commission erred in reserving the issue of the appellee\u2019s entitlement to temporary total disability benefits for the period from February to June 1989. We affirm on the substantial evidence issue but we reverse as to the reservation of the temporary total disability issue.\nAs of February 1989, the appellee had been employed by the appellant for four years as a splicer on the appellant\u2019s production line. The job required extensive use of her hands which she testified caused her to have pain in her hands and wrists. During the four year period, she was treated by the company doctor who prescribed medication for the condition which flared up sporadically. About two weeks prior to February 1989, the appellee noticed an increased amount of pain in her wrists after operating a certain gasket. The pain slacked off until she operated this gasket again on February 14, 1989, when she experienced extreme pain in her neck, shoulders and upper arms. Shortly thereafter, she saw a local orthopedic surgeon and was diagnosed with cervical myofascitis. This condition improved, and it was not until May 1989 that she was diagnosed with carpal tunnel syndrome in both wrists and hands which worsened until she ultimately had surgery performed on the left wrist in September 1989, and on the right wrist in November 1989. She had missed some work between February and June 1989, and was off continuously after June 10, 1989. In December 1989, she was examined by another orthopedic surgeon at the appellant\u2019s request, and that doctor did not contest the previous doctor\u2019s diagnosis.\nThe appellee filed a workers\u2019 compensation claim as a result of the bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome. A hearing was held before an administrative law judge in December 1989. He found that the appellee had sustained a compensable injury, or injuries, during February 1989, or some subsequent date prior to May 1989. He found her to be temporarily totally disabled beginning June 10,1989, and continuing to a date yet to be determined. He also found the record incomplete to determine the appropriate periods of temporary total disability benefits between February and June 1989, and reserved this issue for future determination. The decision was appealed to the Arkansas Workers\u2019 Compensation Commission, and in October 1990, the decision of the administrative law judge was affirmed and adopted without any further determination of entitlement to benefits for the period reserved.\nOn appeal, the appellant concedes that the appellee may have had a compensable injury to her neck, shoulders, and upper arms in February 1989, but it contests the finding of a causal connection between any compensable injury the appellee may have suffered and the manifestation of carpal tunnel syndrome. In a workers\u2019 compensation case, the burden rests on the claimant to establish her claim for compensation by a preponderance of the evidence. Bragg v. Evans St. Clair, Inc., 15 Ark. App. 53, 688 S.W.2d 959 (1985). In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support the findings of the Workers\u2019 Compensation Commission, we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commission\u2019s findings and affirm if they are supported by substantial evidence. Tiller v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 21 Ark. App. 159, 767 S.W.2d 544 (1989).\nThe appellee was the only witness at the hearing. She testified that the problems with her wrists decreased until she had to operate a particular gasket sometime just before February 1989, and again on February 14, 1989. She also stated that the pain in her neck and shoulders ceased after the surgery on each wrist. The question of credibility and the weight to be given testimony is a matter exclusively within the province of the Commission. Hardin v. Southern Compress Co., 34 Ark. App. 208, 810 S.W.2d 501 (1991).\nThe orthopedic surgeon\u2019s opinion letters which were introduced as evidence stated that the carpal tunnel syndrome was \u201cmost likely secondary to multiple repetitious use of the hands at work, and that, therefore, it would seem to be reasonable that it was directly related to her employment.\u201d This Court has stated that causal connection is generally a matter of inference, and possibilities may play a proper and important role in establishing that relationship. Moreover, medical opinions need not be expressed in terms of reasonable medical certainty when there is supplemental evidence supporting the causal connection. Hope Brick Works v. Welch, 33 Ark. App. 103, 802 S.W.2d 476 (1991). The claimant\u2019s own testimony was that her job involved extensive use of hands for eight hours per day, and that she had lived with this pain for the four years she was employed as a splicer. In view of this evidence coupled with the doctor\u2019s opinion, one could infer her injury was causally connected to her employment. On this evidence, the Commission found that the appellee\u2019s carpal tunnel syndrome was directly related to her employment.\nWe may reverse the Commission\u2019s factual decisions only when we are convinced that fair-minded persons, with the same facts before them, could not have reached the conclusion arrived at by the Commission. Snow v. Alcoa, 15 Ark. App. 205, 691 S.W.2d 194 (1985). The question is whether the evidence supports the findings made by the Commission and even if the decision is against the preponderance of the evidence, we will not reverse where its decision is supported by substantial evidence. Id. Though the causal connection here may only be by mere inference, we believe that reasonable minds could reach the same conclusion as that of the Commission, and we therefore hold that substantial evidence supports the Commission\u2019s conclusion that the appellee sustained a compensable injury to her wrists and hands subsequent to February 1989, but prior to June 10, 1989.\nThe appellant also contends that the Commission erred in reserving the issue of the appellee\u2019s entitlement to temporary total disability benefits between February 1, 1989 and June 10, 1989. We agree. The Commission affirmed and adopted the decision of the administrative law judge, which includes the following:\n7. The record concerning the appropriate periods of temporary disability prior to June 10, 1989, and subsequent to February 1, 1989, is not sufficiently complete to allow a determination which would be fair and just to all parties concerned, and a determination in regard to the claimant\u2019s entitlement to such benefits during this period is reserved for future determination upon further development of the record, if necessary.\nIt is the duty of the Workers\u2019 Compensation Commission to translate the evidence on all issues before it into findings of fact. Sanyo Manufacturing Corporation v. Leisure, 12 Ark. App. 274, 675 S.W.2d 841 (1984). The Commission\u2019s statutory obligation is to make specific findings of fact and to decide the issues before it by determining whether the party having the burden of proof on an issue has established it by a preponderance of the evidence. White v. Air Systems, Inc., 33 Ark. App. 56, 800 S.W.2d 726 (1990); Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 11-9-705(a)(3) (1987). The quoted paragraph is not a finding of fact, but is a declination to find a fact.\nArk. Code Ann. \u00a7 1 l-9-705(c)(l) provides that all evidence shall be presented to the Commission at the initial hearing on the controverted claim. The burden of proving a case beyond speculation and conjecture is on the claimant. Bragg, supra; 3 Arthur Larson, The Law of Workmen\u2019s Compensation, \u00a7 80.33(a) (1952).\nBy reserving the issue of whether the appellee was entitled to temporary total disability benefits for the period from February to June 1989, the Commission simply declined to say that the appellee failed to meet her burden of proof on this issue. This constitutes error on the part of the Commission as our workers\u2019 compensation statute states that the evidence shall be weighed impartially, and without giving the benefit of the doubt to any party. Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 11 -9-704(c) (4). The Commission has allowed the appellee a \u201csecond bite at the apple\u201d by giving her another opportunity to present evidence substantial enough to carry her burden. Though we do not interfere with the actions of the Commission unless we find it has acted without or in excess of its authority, Allen Canning Company v. McReynolds, 5 Ark. App. 78, 632 S.W.2d 450 (1982), disregarding its duty to find the facts in order to give the appellee the benefit of the doubt is not within the Commission\u2019s authority.\nTherefore, we hold that reserving the issue of the appellee\u2019s entitlement to temporary total disability benefits from February 1 to June 10,1989 is reversed. We hold that the appellee failed to meet her burden of proof on this issue, and therefore, she is denied benefits for the reserved period.\nAffirmed in part; reversed in part.\nRogers, J., concurs in the result.\nJennings and Mayfield, JJ., concur in part; dissent in part.", "type": "majority", "author": "James R. Cooper, Judge." }, { "text": "John E. Jennings, Judge,\nconcurring in part, dissenting in part. I agree with the majority\u2019s view that there is substantial evidence to support the Commission\u2019s finding of a causal connection between the claimant\u2019s injury and her employment. I disagree, however, with the majority\u2019s view that the administrative law judge exceeded his authority in reserving the issue of temporary disability for the period of time between February 1, 1989, and June 10,1989. The majority is of course right in saying that the Commission has a duty to make findings of fact and to decide the issues presented to it. It is also true that the claimant had the burden of proof.\nThe duty to decide issues does not arise, however, until all the evidence is in. Until that point is reached the \u201cburden of proof\u2019 is irrelevant. The determination as to whether all the evidence is in, or stated another way, whether the record is fully developed, is one which must be made initially by the administrative law judge who hears the case. Arkansas statute law expressly authorizes the action taken by the administrative law judge in this case. \u201cFurther hearings for the purpose of introducing additional evidence will be granted only at the discretion of the hearing officer or commission.\u201d Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 ll-9-705(c)(l) (1987). So do the Commission\u2019s own rules: \u201cThe Commission may, in its discretion, postpone or recess hearings at the instance of either party or on its own motion.\u201d W.C.C. Rule 13(1988). Although an agency\u2019s interpretation of its own rules is not binding upon the courts, it is highly persuasive. Sparks Reg. Med. Ctr. v. Arkansas Dept. of Human Serv., 290 Ark. 367, 719 S.W.2d 434 (1986). Arkansas Code Annotated Section 1 l-9-705(a)(1) provides that the Commission, in conducting a hearing, is not bound by technical rules of procedure, but may conduct the hearing \u201cin a manner as will best ascertain the rights of the parties.\u201d The Commission may even institute an investigation of a claim on its own. See Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 1 l-9-205(b)(1) and (c) (1987).\nIn the case at bar there is no inconvenience to appellant, nor for that matter to this court, associated with the administrative law judge\u2019s decision. Necessarily, the question of when the claimant\u2019s healing period ends remains to be decided. There is no apparent reason why the issue reserved cannot be decided at the same time.\nEven in a criminal case, where the court is undoubtedly \u201cbound by technical rules of procedure,\u201d after the state has rested and the defendant has moved for a directed verdict, a circuit judge has the discretionary authority to permit the state to reopen. See Cameron v. State, 278 Ark. 357, 645 S.W.2d 943 (1983). That authority is inherent, not statutory. Surely the ALJ likewise had the inherent authority to recess the hearing for the purpose of taking additional evidence, but that question need not be reached because the action taken was expressly authorized by statute and the Commission\u2019s own rule.\nI would affirm the Commission\u2019s decision.\nMayfield, J., joins.", "type": "concurring-in-part-and-dissenting-in-part", "author": "John E. Jennings, Judge," } ], "attorneys": [ "Bill H. Walmsley, for appellant.", "Bill B. Wiggins, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "GENCORP POLYMER PRODUCTS v. Sadie LANDERS\nCA 91-7\n820 S.W.2d 475\nCourt of Appeals of Arkansas En Banc\nOpinion delivered December 18, 1991\nBill H. Walmsley, for appellant.\nBill B. Wiggins, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0190-01", "first_page_order": 214, "last_page_order": 221 }