{
  "id": 6137048,
  "name": "LEVI STRAUSS & COMPANY v. Ramona LAYMANCE",
  "name_abbreviation": "Strauss v. Laymance",
  "decision_date": "1992-04-15",
  "docket_number": "CA 91-222",
  "first_page": "55",
  "last_page": "60",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "38 Ark. App. 55"
    },
    {
      "type": "parallel",
      "cite": "828 S.W.2d 356"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ark. Ct. App.",
    "id": 13370,
    "name": "Arkansas Court of Appeals"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 34,
    "name_long": "Arkansas",
    "name": "Ark."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "36 Ark. App. 76",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark. App.",
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        6137407
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      "weight": 2,
      "year": 1991,
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    {
      "cite": "294 Ark. 412",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
      "case_ids": [
        1895723
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      "weight": 3,
      "year": 1988,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ark/294/0412-01"
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    {
      "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 11-9-506",
      "category": "laws:leg_statute",
      "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.",
      "weight": 4,
      "year": 1987,
      "opinion_index": 0
    }
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  "analysis": {
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:57:25.403717+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "Jennings, J., agrees.",
      "Rogers, J., concurs."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "LEVI STRAUSS & COMPANY v. Ramona LAYMANCE"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Elizabeth W. Danielson, Judge.\nIn this workers\u2019 compensation case, appellant Levi Strauss & Company appeals the decision of the full commission, which found that appellee Ramona Laymance was entitled to temporary partial disability during her healing period, when she was also drawing unemployment benefits. The commission also found that appellee was entitled to permanent partial disability equal to 3 % to the hand. We affirm.\nAppellee began working for appellant on February 22,1986, and her duties involved \u201cstitching vents.\u201d Later that year, appellee was assigned a different duty, \u201changing collars,\u201d which caused swelling and pain in the middle finger of appellee\u2019s left hand. Appellee was diagnosed by Dr. McCollum as having tendonitis and was later released to return to work. Upon her return, appellee went back to \u201cstitching vents,\u201d but in September of 1987, was again assigned to \u201changing collars.\u201d On December 24, 1987, appellee again complained of pain in her finger and returned to Dr. McCollum for treatment.\nFollowing Christmas vacation, appellee returned to work on January 4, 1988. She continued to work for appellant until January 15, 1988, when she was terminated for failure to meet her production quotas. Appellee applied for unemployment insurance benefits, which commenced on January 30, 1988, at a rate of $114.00 per week.\nOn February 9, 1988, appellee returned to Dr. McCollum and was referred to Dr. Garbutt, who diagnosed appellee as having \u201cstenosing tenosynovitis\u201d of the left long finger. Outpatient surgery was performed on May 26, 1988. As of the date of her hearing, appellee had not been released by Dr. Garbutt.\nAppellee filed for workers\u2019 compensation benefits, contending that she was entitled to temporary total disability benefits from January 15,1988, to a date yet to be determined, or at least to temporary partial disability benefits during the period in which she was drawing unemployment benefits. Appellant contended Dr. Garbutt\u2019s treatment was unreasonable and unnecessary. Appellant also contended that appellee was not temporarily totally disabled, but that if she were found to be temporarily totally or partially disabled, she was disqualified from receiving workers\u2019 compensation benefits because she had been drawing unemployment benefits during that time. Appellant bases this argument on Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 11-9-506 (1987), which deals with limitations on compensation for recipients of unemployment benefits.\nThe administrative law judge found that Dr. Gar butt\u2019s medical treatment was reasonable and necessary and that, although appellant was temporarily totally disabled from January 15,1988, to a date yet to be determined, she was disqualified from receiving any benefits subsequent to January 30, 1988, because she was drawing unemployment benefits during this time.\nOn appeal, the full commission reversed the decision of the administrative law judge on the issue of the denial of temporary total disability benefits. The commission found that Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 11-9-506 does not preclude temporary partial disability benefits when a claimant is also receiving unemployment benefits during the same time. The commission reasoned that appellee\u2019s disability was not total during that time period and that she did have some physical capacity for work, as evidenced by her work for respondent in January 1988 and her receipt of unemployment benefits. Therefore, the commission determined, appellee was entitled to compensation for temporary partial disability during that time. Upon remand, the administrative law judge offset the amount of appellee\u2019s weekly unemployment benefits ($114.00) against the amount of workers\u2019 compensation benefits for the temporary partial disability that she would have been entitled to ($147.39) and awarded appellee the difference ($33.39) for the period from January 30, 1988, through June 28, 1988. The administrative law judge also determined that appellee was entitled to permanent partial disability benefits equal to 3 % to the left hand as a whole. The full commission incorporated its previous decision and affirmed the decision of the administrative law judge.\nAppellant\u2019s first contention is that the award of temporary partial disability is not supported by substantial evidence and is contrary to the provisions of Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 11-9-506 (1987). This statute provides that \u201cno compensation in any amount for temporary total or permanent total disability shall be payable to an injured employee with respect to any week for which the injured employee receives unemployment insurance benefits. . . .\u201d The issue before us is whether \u00a7 11-9-506 precludes compensation for temporary partial disability during the same time period unemployment benefits are received.\nThe first rule in interpreting a statute is to construe it just as it reads by giving words their ordinary and usually accepted meaning. Arkansas Vinegar Co. v. Ashby, 294 Ark. 412, 743 S.W.2d 798 (1988). Provisions of the Arkansas Workers\u2019 Compensation Act are construed liberally in favor of the claimant. Id. The commission found, and we agree, that the statute by its language is limited to temporary total disability and permanent total disability. If the legislature had intended to preclude receipt of temporary or permanent partial disability benefits, the statute could have easily been so worded.\nAppellant argues that this award allows a claimant to represent himself to one administrative body as \u201cready, willing, and able to work\u201d in order to draw unemployment benefits, and then present himself to another administrative body as \u201cunable to work\u201d in order to draw workers\u2019 compensation benefits. In the following excerpt, Larson explains why the two positions are not necessarily inconsistent:\nAt first glance the two positions may appear mutually exclusive; but the inconsistency disappears when the special meaning of disability in workmen\u2019s compensation is remembered, involving . . . the possibility of some physical capacity for work which is thwarted by the inability to get a job for physical reasons. Thus, the injured claimant may honestly represent to the Employment Security Office that he is able to do some work, and with equal honesty tell the Compensation Board later that he was totally disabled during the same period since, although he could have done some kinds of work, no one would give him a job because of physical handicaps.\n2 Arthur Larson, The Law of Workmen\u2019s Compensation \u00a7 57.65 (1992). We affirm the finding of the commission that Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 11-9-506 does not preclude receipt of temporary partial disability benefits. We recognize that there appears to be a discrepancy in the offset formula set out by the commission and that which was actually employed by the administrative law judge, but we do not address this issue as it was not raised by the parties.\nAppellant\u2019s second contention is that the commission erred in finding appellee is entitled to permanent partial disability benefits in the amount of 3 % to the hand instead of 3 % to the left long finger. Although the injury was to appellee\u2019s left long finger in particular, Dr. Garbutt\u2019s medical report found that appellee had a 3% permanent partial impairment to her left hand. Appellee testified that her disability includes her entire left hand. When reviewing a decision of the Workers\u2019 Compensation Commission, we view the evidence and all reasonable inferences deducible therefrom in the light most favorable to the commission\u2019s findings and affirm if those findings are supported by substantial evidence. Shaw v. Commercial Refrigeration, 36 Ark. App. 76, 818 S.W.2d 589 (1991). Dr. Garbutt\u2019s findings and appellee\u2019s testimony regarding her disability constitute substantial evidence to support the findings of the commission.\nAffirmed.\nJennings, J., agrees.\nRogers, J., concurs.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Elizabeth W. Danielson, Judge."
      },
      {
        "text": "Judith Rogers, Judge,\nconcurring. In this case, the Commission allowed the award of weekly compensation to be reduced by the amount appellee received in unemployment benefits. Although I question the propriety of such an offset, this has not been raised as an issue on appeal. Therefore, I concur in the decision in this case, but I write separately to point out that this opinion should not be construed as an endorsement of the offset.",
        "type": "concurrence",
        "author": "Judith Rogers, Judge,"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Bassett Law Firm, by: Woody Bassett, for appellant.",
      "Law Offices of Laura A. McKinnon, by: Harry E. Dermott, for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "LEVI STRAUSS & COMPANY v. Ramona LAYMANCE\nCA 91-222\n828 S.W.2d 356\nCourt of Appeals Division I\nOpinion delivered April 15, 1992\nBassett Law Firm, by: Woody Bassett, for appellant.\nLaw Offices of Laura A. McKinnon, by: Harry E. Dermott, for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0055-01",
  "first_page_order": 75,
  "last_page_order": 80
}