{ "id": 6138255, "name": "Ilee WILLMON v. ALLEN CANNING CO.", "name_abbreviation": "Willmon v. Allen Canning Co.", "decision_date": "1992-05-06", "docket_number": "CA 91-251", "first_page": "105", "last_page": "111", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "38 Ark. App. 105" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "828 S.W.2d 868" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark. Ct. App.", "id": 13370, "name": "Arkansas Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "268 N.W.2d 1", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.2d", "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "403 Mich. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Mich.", "case_ids": [ 1960921 ], "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/mich/403/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "244 Ark. 132", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 8718316 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1968, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "141" }, { "page": "869" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/244/0132-01" ] }, { "cite": "22 Ark. App. 103", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6659205 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/22/0103-01" ] }, { "cite": "661 S.W.2d 403", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 6136734, 6136615 ], "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/10/0034-01", "/ark-app/10/0028-01" ] }, { "cite": "10 Ark. App. 28", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6136615 ], "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/10/0028-01" ] }, { "cite": "271 Ark. 96", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1756154 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/271/0096-01" ] }, { "cite": "10 Ark. App. 313", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6141834 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/10/0313-01" ] }, { "cite": "238 Ark. 499", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1734328 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1964, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/238/0499-01" ] }, { "cite": "22 Ark. App. 157", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6660433 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "166" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/22/0157-01" ] }, { "cite": "18 Ark. App. 18", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6136496 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/18/0018-01" ] }, { "cite": "33 Ark. App. 59", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 11-9-705", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)(3)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "26 Ark. App. 51", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6136901 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/26/0051-01" ] }, { "cite": "28 Ark. App. 187", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6139108 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/28/0187-01" ] }, { "cite": "265 Ark. 365", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1664697 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/265/0365-01" ] }, { "cite": "33 Ark. App. 56", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6650349 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/33/0056-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 645, "char_count": 10821, "ocr_confidence": 0.899, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.2236693070638733e-07, "percentile": 0.9140554140415136 }, "sha256": "7b9d85fbf2170b0504269b4a5ab7958c3bdf53a615598b08dce7eb8ee07ea5e5", "simhash": "1:6723c40aa38c87de", "word_count": 1770 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:57:25.403717+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Cooper, and Danielson, JJ., agree." ], "parties": [ "Ilee WILLMON v. ALLEN CANNING CO." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Melvin Mayfield, Judge.\nIlee Willmon has appealed a decision of the Workers\u2019 Compensation Commission which dismissed her claim because \u201cthe claimant has failed to meet her burden of proof.\u201d\nAppellant\u2019s first argument is that the Commission did not base its decision on a de novo review of the entire record and the case should be remanded. The Commission, after reciting \u2022 that it had conducted a de novo review of the entire record and finding that the appellant had failed to meet her burden of proof, affirmed and adopted the opinion of the law judge. In White v. Air Systems, Inc., 33 Ark. App. 56, 800 S.W.2d 726 (1990), we explained the Commission\u2019s duty in reviewing a decision of an administrative law judge.\nThe Arkansas Workers\u2019 Compensation Commission is not an appellate court. Shippers Transport, supra. [Shippers Transport v. Stepp, 265 Ark. 365, 578 S.W.2d 232 (1979)] It is, instead, the factfinder, and as such its duty and statutory obligation is to make specific findings of fact, on de novo review based on the record as a whole, and to decide the issues before it by determining whether the party having the burden of proof on an issue has established it by a preponderance of the evidence. See Shippers Transport, supra: Johnson v. Hux, 28 Ark. App. 187, 772 S.W.2d 362 (1989); Jones v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 26 Ark. App. 51, 759 S.W.2d 578 (1988); Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 11-9-705(a)(3) (1987).\n33 Ark. App. 59. And in Wright v. American Transportation, 18 Ark. App. 18, 709 S.W.2d 107(1986), we held that the Commission must make sufficient factual findings to justify the decision made so that the appellate court can conduct a meaningful review of the commission\u2019s decision. However, we held in Second Injury Fund v. Robison, 22 Ark. App. 157, 737 S.W.2d 162 (1987), that a Commission opinion may contain findings of fact sufficient to satisfy the Wright standard when it adopts an opinion of the law judge which contains adequate findings. 22 Ark. App. at 166. By affirming and adopting the decision of the law judge in the instant case, the Commission supplied us with adequate findings of fact so that we can conduct a meaningful review.\nAppellant also argues that the Commission\u2019s decision is not supported by substantial evidence. On reviewing a decision of the Workers\u2019 Compensation Commission, we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the findings of the Commission and give the testimony its strongest probative force in favor of the action of the Commission. McCollum v. Rogers, 238 Ark. 499, 382 S.W.2d 892 (1964). Our standard of review on appeal is whether the decision of the Commission is supported by substantial evidence. City of Fayetteville v. Guess, 10 Ark. App. 313, 663 S.W.2d 946 (1984). Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Phillips v. State, 271 Ark. 96, 607 S.W.2d 664 (1980). We do not reverse a decision of the Commission unless we are convinced that fair-minded persons with the same facts before them could not have arrived at the conclusion reached. Silvicraft, Inc. v. Lambert, 10 Ark. App. 28, 661 S.W.2d 403 (1983). These rules insulate the Commission from judicial review and properly so, as it is a specialist in this area and we are not. But a total insulation would obviously render our function in these cases meaningless. Boyd v. General Industries, 22 Ark. App. 103, 733 S.W.2d 750 (1987).\nAppellant testified that on March 16, 1990, while she was employed by appellee canning company, her apron got caught in a conveyor belt and as the apron was released she was flipped over onto a concrete floor. She was taken by ambulance to the Crawford County Memorial Hospital where she stayed until March 29. She has not returned to work since her injury. She testified she is unable to work because her foot turns inward, swells, and is painful. She said Dr. R.W. Ross, her treating physician, had not released her to return to work, but she had not seen him for several months. She explained that when she returned to see him in April she discovered appellee had controverted her claim and would no longer pay the medical bills and she was unable to afford to pay the bills herself.\nDr. William L. Griggs, a neurologist, in a report dated March 24, 1990, diagnosed appellant as suffering from:\n1. Conversion Reaction. Inversion Right Foot. Nondermatomal Numbness Involving Trunk, Left Hand, Right Leg.\n2. No Neurological Disease Found.\nIn the hospital discharge summary dated March 29, 1990, Dr. Ross stated:\nAs each day progressed, there were fewer and fewer findings but more complaints on the part of the patient. On about the third hospital day the patient announced to this attending physician that something was severely wrong with her back and right leg, that the right leg had shorten itself, was rotating the foot inward and that there was no way that she could control this. At this point, she was seen in consultation with Dr. Albert MacDade, a local neurosurgeon, Dr. Claude Martimbeau, a local orthopaedist, and Dr. William Griggs, a local neurologist. Tho[r]ough neurologic, neurosurgerical [sic] and orthopaedic investigation and studies] were done and there were no forthcoming positive findings. All modalities of investigation indicated that indeed there was no neurologic involvement, no fractures, no.dislocations and no other abnormalities. Dr. Griggs\u2019 very thorough neurologic and musculoskeletal evaluation in fact showed that the patient could straight [en] her leg and did not have abnormal function to that right lower extremity. It is therefore our conclusion that she is suffering a conversion hysteria and really believes that she cannot straighten the leg.\nAnitra Fay, Ph. D., a psychologist, reported that appellant was \u201cvery defensive\u201d in responding to the MMPI and the profile validity was reduced. Nevertheless, she said the appellant produced an abnormal profile, tending to be hypochondriacal in outlook, and she (Fay) recommended psychiatric consultation.\nOn April 11, Dr. Griggs reported that appellant\u2019s neurological exam continued to show multiple functional findings with no organic findings, and that she \u201chas a conversion reaction.\u201d And on May 18, 1990, the doctor reported motor nerve conduction velocity of the right lower extremity was normal as was the EMG. He concluded there had been no change from the April study.\nIn his opinion, which by adoption became the opinion of the Commission, the law judge stated:\nDrs. Ross, Griggs and Fay all shared the same opinion that the claimant in all probability was suffering from a conversion reaction. Conversion reaction is defined in Taber\u2019s Cyclopedic Medical Dictionary as follows:\nA conversion type of hysterical neurosis in which there is loss of or alteration in physical functioning suggesting a physical disorder but instead representing the expression of a psychological conflict or need.\nThe Arkansas appellate courts have recognized conversion reaction as a compensable condition. In Boyd v. General Industries, 22 Ark. App. 103, 733 S.W.2d 750 (1987), we reversed the Commission\u2019s refusal to award benefits for a psychological reaction to a compensable injury. We stated:\nThe threshold issue is whether the effects of this kind of mental disorder or psychoneurosis, if causally related to an on-the-job injury, are compensable. In Wilson & Co. v. Christman, 244 Ark. 132, 141, 424 S.W.2d 863, 869 (1968), the supreme court approved the following statement from Larson:\n. . . [W]hen there has been a physical accident or trauma, and claimant\u2019s disability is increased or prolonged by traumatic neurosis, conversion hysteria or hysterical paralysis, it is now uniformly held that the full disability including the effects of the neurosis is compensable. Dozens of cases, involving almost every conceivable kind of neurotic, psychotic, depressive, or hysterical symptom or personality disorder have accepted this rule.\nClearly the disabling effects of this type of disorder are compensable if the requirement of a causal connection is met. Although arguments can be made that this type of mental disorder ought not to be compensable, see e.g., the discussion in Deziel v. Difco Laboratories, Inc., 403 Mich. 1, 268 N.W.2d 1 (1978), neither we nor the Commission are free to disregard the supreme court\u2019s holding in Christman.\n22 Ark. App. at 108-109.\nThe law judge\u2019s opinion in the instant case stated that \u201cthe two questions that must be addressed\u201d were (1) is the conversion reaction causally connected to the claimant\u2019s injury of March 16, 1990, and (2) if there is a causal connection, is the condition disabling.\nWe note that the opinion assumes that the appellant suffered from a \u201cconversion reaction.\u201d Certainly, the evidence supports that assumption. But the law judge\u2019s opinion goes on to say that even if there was such a causal connection \u201cthere is absolutely no medical proof that this condition is disabling.\u201d\nThis statement completely overlooks the March 24, 1990, report of Dr. Griggs which stated that appellant had an \u201cinversion\u201d of her right foot. The law judge\u2019s statement also overlooks the March 29,1990, discharge summary of Dr. Ross which stated it was his and Dr. Grigg\u2019s conclusion that appellant \u201cis suffering a conversion hysteria and really believes that she cannot straighten the leg.\u201d And the law judge\u2019s statement also overlooks the April 16, 1990, \u201cprogress notes\u201d of Dr. Ross which state he had observed that appellant \u201ccarries her right foot internally rotated and gives to it as if there was a difference in the length of her legs.\u201d The \u201cprogress notes\u201d also state, \u201cI do not think it advisable that she try to work at the present time because of the way she walks and carriers her foot, she would probably stumble and hurt herself.\u201d\nThe law judge\u2019s opinion concluded that the appellant failed to prove by a preponderance of evidence that \u201cthe conversion disorder as diagnosed by the treating physicians was and is causally related to her compensable injury of March 16, 1990,\u201d or that \u201cthe conversion disorder is disabling.\u201d Guided by our standard of review as set out above, we do not think the law judge\u2019s opinion, adopted by the Commission, is supported by substantial evidence. Therefore, we reverse the Commission\u2019s decision and remand this case for a determination of the workers\u2019 compensation benefits to which appellant is entitled as a result of the conversion reaction she suffered as a result of the compensa-ble injury, sustained on March 16, 1990.\nReversed and remanded.\nCooper, and Danielson, JJ., agree.", "type": "majority", "author": "Melvin Mayfield, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Joseph C. Self, for appellant.", "Davis, Cox & Wright, by: Constance G. Clark, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Ilee WILLMON v. ALLEN CANNING CO.\nCA 91-251\n828 S.W.2d 868\nCourt of Appeals of Arkansas Division I\nOpinion delivered May 6, 1992\nJoseph C. Self, for appellant.\nDavis, Cox & Wright, by: Constance G. Clark, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0105-01", "first_page_order": 125, "last_page_order": 131 }