{ "id": 6140025, "name": "Arnold LUNSFORD v. RICH MOUNTAIN ELECTRIC COOP, et al.", "name_abbreviation": "Lunsford v. Rich Mountain Electric Coop", "decision_date": "1992-06-03", "docket_number": "CA 91-223", "first_page": "188", "last_page": "192", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "38 Ark. App. 188" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "832 S.W.2d 291" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark. Ct. App.", "id": 13370, "name": "Arkansas Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "698 S.W.2d 302", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 1876597, 6654245 ], "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/287/0345-01", "/ark-app/16/0133-01" ] }, { "cite": "16 Ark. App. 133", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6654245 ], "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/16/0133-01" ] }, { "cite": "19 Ark. App. 40", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6643873 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/19/0040-01" ] }, { "cite": "18 Ark. App. 18", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6136496 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/18/0018-01" ] }, { "cite": "2 Ark. App. 273", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6141531 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/2/0273-01" ] }, { "cite": "18 Ark. App. 210", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6140653 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/18/0210-01" ] }, { "cite": "33 Ark. App. 66", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6650856 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "70" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/33/0066-01" ] }, { "cite": "23 Ark. App. 26", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6136545 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/23/0026-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 403, "char_count": 7486, "ocr_confidence": 0.898, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.5314261719416348e-07, "percentile": 0.6711690527131119 }, "sha256": "41a793f2baff42e1a55896af2716b573a378edf5756b7e6c689f51c6616bfc88", "simhash": "1:cf4f2c8d200aca90", "word_count": 1189 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:57:25.403717+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Cracraft, C.J., and Jennings, J., dissent." ], "parties": [ "Arnold LUNSFORD v. RICH MOUNTAIN ELECTRIC COOP, et al." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "James R. Cooper, Judge.\nThe appellant in this workers\u2019 compensation case sustained a compensable back injury in 1983. On March 7,1988, the appellant went horseback riding and, after dismounting, experienced pain which caused him to faint, fall, and injure his spine. The appellant sought benefits for the medical expenses resulting from his 1988 injury, contending that the 1988 incident was a continuation and recurrence of his 1983 injury. The Workers\u2019 Compensation Commission found that the appellant\u2019s horseback riding was an unreasonable activity constituting an independent intervening cause,, and concluded that the employer was therefore not liable for medical expenses resulting from the 1988 incident. In our opinion delivered December 26, 1990, we noted that the question before the Commission was whether the 1988 injury was triggered by activity on the part of the appellant which was unreasonable under the circumstances, and held that the Commission erred by failing to consider the appellant\u2019s knowledge of his condition in determining whether his horseback riding was unreasonable under the circumstances. Lunsford v. Rich Mountain Electric Co-op, 33 Ark. App. 66, 800 S.W.2d 732 (1990). Noting that the Commission found that the appellant \u201cbelieved he had cleared this activity with Dr. MacDade,\u201d his physician, but failed to find whether the appellant\u2019s horseback riding was unreasonable in light of his belief that the activity had been cleared with the doctor, we reversed and remanded for the latter finding to be made. Lunsford, 33 Ark. App. at 70. On remand, the Commission again denied and dismissed the appellant\u2019s claim. From that decision, comes this appeal.\nFor reversal, the appellant contends that the Commission erred in failing to follow this Court\u2019s instructions on remand, and that the Commission\u2019s dismissal of the claim is not supported by substantial evidence. We agree with both points, and we reverse.\nThe appellant correctly asserts that the Commission failed to follow our instructions on remand. We observed in our prior opinion that the Commission found that the appellant believed his horseback riding activity had been cleared with Dr. MacDade, and remanded with specific instructions which directed the Commission to find whether the appellant\u2019s activity was unreasonable in light of his belief that it had been cleared by his physician. The Commission did not comply with these instructions, but instead found that the appellant\u2019s testimony lacked credibility and stated that it had not intended to find that the appellant believed that Dr. MacDade had cleared his horseback riding activity.\nRegardless of what the Commission may have intended, the Commission found in its previous opinion that the appellant believed Dr. MacDade had cleared the activity. Having once so found, the Commission cannot now say that the appellant\u2019s testimony was not sufficiently credible to permit such a finding, because the doctrine of res judicata, which is applicable to the decisions of the Commission, forbids the reopening of matters once judicially determined by competent authority. Tuberville v. International Paper Co., 18 Ark. App. 210, 711 S.W.2d 840 (1986). Moreover, matters decided on our prior appeal are the law of the case and govern our actions on the present appeal to the extent that we would be bound by them even if we were now inclined to say that we were wrong in those decisions. Ouachita Hospital v. Marshall, 2 Ark. App. 273, 621 S.W.2d 7 (1981). We are not so inclined, because the Commission plainly stated in its opinion that the appellant \u201cbelieved that he had cleared this activity with Dr. MacDade.\u201d A simple, straightforward statement of what happened, like the statement quoted above, is a finding of fact. See Wright v. American Transportation, 18 Ark. App. 18, 709 S.W.2d 107 (1986). Our interpretation of the Commission\u2019s language as a finding of fact was essential to our prior opinion in that our instruction on remand was premised on our conclusion that the Commission found that the appellant believed his doctor had cleared the activity. As such, the matter was decided, and therefore governs the actions of the Commission on remand and our actions on a second appeal. See Pickle v. Zunamon, 19 Ark. App. 40, 716 S.W.2d 770 (1986). By ignoring our instructions on remand and our decision in this matter, the Commission committed error.\nWe also find merit in the appellant\u2019s argument that the Commission\u2019s decision was not supported by substantial evidence. The Commission concluded in its opinion that \u201chorseback riding by a man in the Claimant\u2019s condition was unreasonable, even assuming arguendo that he did believe that his doctor had cleared the activity.\u201d The Commission\u2019s conclusion was based on the appellant\u2019s testimony that he suffered episodes of intense pain from time to time which could cause him to lose consciousness; given evidence to this effect, the Commission found that it was unreasonable for the appellant to ride horses even if he believed that his doctor had authorized that activity. This holding was premised on the Commission\u2019s conclusion that horseback riding was dangerous per se to the appellant and caused an increased potential for the episodes of intense pain described above. However, we find no evidence in the record to show that horseback riding would exacerbate the appellant\u2019s back injury. Although we defer to the Commission\u2019s experience and knowledge when employed to make a finding based on the evidence before it, the Commission\u2019s expertise is not evidence and cannot be substituted for evidence. See Perry v. Mar-Bax Shirt, 16 Ark. App. 133, 698 S.W.2d 302 (1985). Under these circumstances, where the appellant believed that his doctor had approved the activity, where medical evidence of the effect of the activity on the appellant\u2019s condition is absent from the record, and where the appellant was not riding a horse when the incident occurred, we hold that the Commission\u2019s finding that the appellant engaged in an unreasonable activity is not supported by substantial evidence. We reverse and remand for the Commission to award benefits.\nReversed and remanded.\nCracraft, C.J., and Jennings, J., dissent.", "type": "majority", "author": "James R. Cooper, Judge." }, { "text": "John E. Jennings, Judge,\ndissenting. While I agree that the Commission may not, on remand, change its findings of fact, I do not agree that the Commission\u2019s opinion fails to display a substantial basis for the denial of the relief sought. See Linithicum v. Mar-Bax Shirt Co., 23 Ark. App. 26, 741 S.W.2d 275 (1987).\nMr. Lunsford suffered a herniated disc in 1985 and underwent a laminectomy. In 1986 he suffered a \u201creoccurrence\u201d of the herniated disc and underwent a second laminectomy. After the second surgery he continued to suffer from severe back pain.\nThe Commission might reasonably decide, as it did, that regardless of any conversations between the claimant and his doctor, the undertaking of a \u201clong sojourn on horseback\u201d was an unreasonable activity under the circumstances so as to break the chain of causation between Mr. Lunsford\u2019s compensable injury and his subsequent spinal fracture.\nI respectfully dissent.\nCracraft, C.J., joins in this dissent.", "type": "dissent", "author": "John E. Jennings, Judge," } ], "attorneys": [ "Eddie II. Walker, Jr., and Melissa E. Smith, for appellant.", "Friday, Eldredge & Clark, by: Scott J. Lancaster and J. Michael Pickens, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Arnold LUNSFORD v. RICH MOUNTAIN ELECTRIC COOP, et al.\nCA 91-223\n832 S.W.2d 291\nCourt of Appeals of Arkansas En Banc\nOpinion delivered June 3, 1992\nEddie II. Walker, Jr., and Melissa E. Smith, for appellant.\nFriday, Eldredge & Clark, by: Scott J. Lancaster and J. Michael Pickens, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0188-01", "first_page_order": 208, "last_page_order": 212 }