{ "id": 6141177, "name": "RICELAND FOODS, INC. v. DIRECTOR OF LABOR and Alfred Crenshaw", "name_abbreviation": "Riceland Foods, Inc. v. Director of Labor", "decision_date": "1992-06-10", "docket_number": "E 91-119", "first_page": "269", "last_page": "273", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "38 Ark. App. 269" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "832 S.W.2d 295" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark. Ct. App.", "id": 13370, "name": "Arkansas Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "277 Ark. 433", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1750166 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "436-37" }, { "page": "437" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/277/0433-01" ] }, { "cite": "260 S.W. 714", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.", "year": 1924, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "163 Ark. 471", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1383839 ], "year": 1924, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/163/0471-01" ] }, { "cite": "412 U.S. 218", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6172008 ], "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/412/0218-01" ] }, { "cite": "499 S.W.2d 849", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 8718397 ], "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/255/0135-01" ] }, { "cite": "255 Ark. 155", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "703 S.W.2d 465", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 6649985 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/17/0072-01" ] }, { "cite": "11 Ark. App. 72", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6649938 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/11/0072-01" ] }, { "cite": "9 Ark. App. 177", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6139266 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "179" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/9/0177-01" ] }, { "cite": "41 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 701-707", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 424, "char_count": 6849, "ocr_confidence": 0.919, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.945995428916779e-08, "percentile": 0.4211135475465944 }, "sha256": "f30ecee633c9caa13007cdc9c91566501a7c5f73045539ea40f8abe24d313b3d", "simhash": "1:3b65c45307945452", "word_count": 1140 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:57:25.403717+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Cooper and Jennings, JJ., agree." ], "parties": [ "RICELAND FOODS, INC. v. DIRECTOR OF LABOR and Alfred Crenshaw" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Melvin Mayfield, Judge.\nIn this unemployment compensation case the employer has appealed a decision of the Arkansas Board of Review holding that appellee Alfred Crenshaw was discharged from his last work for reasons other than misconduct connected with the work.\nIn response to the Drug-Free Workplace Act of 1988 (41 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 701-707 (1988)), the employer developed a Fitness for Work Policy concerning the use and possession of drugs and alcohol and the means by which to detect their use and possession by its employees. The policy stated:\nAS A CONDITION OF YOUR EMPLOYMENT WITH RICELAND FOODS, INC., OR ONE OF ITS AFFILIATED GRAIN DRIERS, YOU MUST AGREE TO ABIDE BY THE FOLLOWING POLICY. ANY EMPLOYEE WHO DOES NOT AGREE TO ABIDE BY THE FOLLOWING POLICY SHOULD IMMEDIATELY NOTIFY THE COMPANY OF HIS INTENT TO TERMINATE HIS EMPLOYMENT.\nSection 9 of the Company Policy provided:\nAll hourly and salaried employees will be required to submit to routine scheduled examinations and testing. Persons determined to be in violation of this policy or who refuse to submit to an examination will be removed from the work site and may be discharged.\nOn May 5, 1989, appellee Crenshaw consented to that policy by signing a form entitled \u201cDrug-Free Certification\u201d which stated:\nI, Alfred Crenshaw, have read and understand Riceland Foods, Incorporated and its Affiliated Grain Driers \u201cFitness For Work\u201d Policy, and do hereby agree to abide by this Policy as long as I remain employed by Riceland Foods, Incorporated or an Affiliated Grain Drier. Also, by signing below, I am stating that I have received a personal copy of this Policy.\nI further certify that I am now drug-free, and will remain so for as long as I am employed by Riceland Foods, Incorporated or an Affiliated Grain Drier.\nOn July 6, 1989, Crenshaw was discharged when he refused to submit to the test.\nThe Appeal Tribunal reversed a decision of the Agency which denied benefits. The Board of Review affirmed the Appeal Tribunal. On appeal to this court the employer argues that the decision of the Board of Review is not supported by substantial evidence. Appellant argues Crenshaw was discharged because he willfully and knowingly disregarded a legitimate interest of his employer, and deliberately disregarded a standard of behavior which his employer had a right to expect of him. Appellant contends a deliberate violation of the employer\u2019s rules is sufficient to constitute misconduct.\nArk. Code Ann. \u00a7 ll-10-514(a)(l)(Supp. 1991) provides: \u201cIf so found by the director, an individual shall be disqualified for benefits if he is discharged from his last work for misconduct in connection with the work.\u201d As we explained in Exson v. Everett, Director, 9 Ark. App. 177, 656 S.W.2d 711 (1983):\nIn order for an employee\u2019s action to constitute misconduct so as to disqualify him, the action must be a deliberate violation of the employer\u2019s rules, an act of wanton or willful disregard of the employer\u2019s best interests, or a disregard of the standard of behavior which the employer has a right to expect of his employees.\n9 Ark. App. at 179.\nHere the evidence shows that Crenshaw received a copy of the Fitness for Work Policy and signed a form agreeing to abide by that policy. He testified he had read the policy; that he signed the agreement and certification; that he understood Section 9 would apply to all employees; and that he never had any discussion with Mr. Holloway, the employer\u2019s manager, about the policy. Crenshaw testified further that he never had any intention of ever taking \u201cthat test\u201d and the only reason he signed \u201cthat thing\u201d was because Mr. Holloway told him, if he didn\u2019t sign it, it was automatic dismissal.\nIt is well established that the findings of fact by the Board of Review are deemed conclusive if they are supported by substantial evidence. Shipley Baking Co. v. Stiles, 11 Ark. App. 72, 703 S.W.2d 465 (1986). However, as we said in Shipley. \u201cWe are not at liberty to ignore our responsibility to determine whether the standard of review has been met.\u201d 17 Ark. App. at 74.\nAfter reviewing the evidence in the present case we cannot conclude the Board\u2019s finding is supported by substantial evidence. The Board\u2019s decision stated, and the appellees in this case admit, that there are no provisions concerning drug testing in the Drug-Free Workplace Act; but the Board held, and the appellees argue, that the appellant\u2019s action in this case was encouraged by provisions in the Act which require a certification that contractors with the federal government must certify they have a drug-free workplace. Thus, the appellees argue that the Board was correct in considering the prohibitions of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution in making its decision. Now the opinion of the Board concedes, and the appellees admit, that these constitutional protections would not apply if Crenshaw consented to the drug testing policy. See Alexander v. State, 255 Ark. 155, 499 S.W.2d 849 (1973). But it is argued that Crenshaw\u2019s consent was given under duress and cannot be considered voluntary. It is contended that in determining whether consent was voluntary, the vulnerable state of the person consenting must be considered. As authority, appellees cite Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973).We do not think that case is applicable because our supreme court held in Ellis v. First National Bank of Fordyce, 163 Ark. 471, 260 S.W. 714 (1924), that it is not duress to threaten to do that which a party has a legal right to do; and in Griffin v. Erickson, 277 Ark. 433, 642 S.W.2d 308 (1982), the court said: \u201cGenerally, a contract of employment for an indefinite term is a \u2018contract at will\u2019 and may be terminated by either party.\u201d 277 Ark. at 436-37. The court in Griffin also said that its cases have adhered to the principal that either party has an absolute right to terminate the relationship and concluded:\nIt is quite clear, therefore, that in the absence of some alteration of the basic employment relationship, an employee for an indefinite term is subject to dismissal at any time without cause.\n277 Ark. at 437.\nThere is no evidence in the instant case that Crenshaw was employed for a definite term or that there was any alteration of the basic employment relationship.\nThus, we cannot agree there is substantial evidence to support the holding that Crenshaw\u2019s agreement to be tested was obtained under duress.\nReversed and remanded for the Board to enter an order denying appellee Crenshaw\u2019s claim for unemployment compensation.\nCooper and Jennings, JJ., agree.", "type": "majority", "author": "Melvin Mayfield, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Ramsay, Bridgforth, Harrelson & Starling, by: Spencer F. Robinson, for appellant.", "Ronald A. Calkins, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "RICELAND FOODS, INC. v. DIRECTOR OF LABOR and Alfred Crenshaw\nE 91-119\n832 S.W.2d 295\nCourt of Appeals of Arkansas Division I\nOpinion delivered June 10, 1992\nRamsay, Bridgforth, Harrelson & Starling, by: Spencer F. Robinson, for appellant.\nRonald A. Calkins, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0269-01", "first_page_order": 289, "last_page_order": 293 }