{ "id": 6139066, "name": "Kenneth JOHNSON v. STATE of Arkansas", "name_abbreviation": "Johnson v. State", "decision_date": "1993-10-06", "docket_number": "CA CR 92-1374", "first_page": "145", "last_page": "149", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "43 Ark. App. 145" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "862 S.W.2d 290" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark. Ct. App.", "id": 13370, "name": "Arkansas Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "415 Pa. Super. 231", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Pa. Super.", "case_ids": [ 911151 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/pa-super/415/0231-01" ] }, { "cite": "584 N.Y.S.2d 780", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.Y.S.2d", "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "179 A.D.2d 229", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "A.D.2d", "case_ids": [ 1069074 ], "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ad2d/179/0229-01" ] }, { "cite": "34 Ark. App. 227", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6140955 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/34/0227-01" ] }, { "cite": "296 Ark. 125", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1892740 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/296/0125-01" ] }, { "cite": "496 U.S. 325", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12122945 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/496/0325-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 418, "char_count": 6044, "ocr_confidence": 0.884, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.291804728892105e-08, "percentile": 0.43375810713288687 }, "sha256": "7b548c070c0721c12128552d62e57b6c3de36fe32d8207476c060a98e71894cd", "simhash": "1:9e8ed2b51896c659", "word_count": 1052 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:49:44.592852+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Mayfield and Rogers, JJ., agree." ], "parties": [ "Kenneth JOHNSON v. STATE of Arkansas" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "John E. Jennings, Chief Judge.\nAt about 3:00 a.m. on January 10,1992, Kenneth Johnson was drivinga 1979Chevrolet Malibu on Markham Street in Little Rock. He was stopped by Little Rock Police Officer Greg Birkhead, who suspected the car might be stolen. During a pat-down search Officer Birkhead found a knife and a quantity of cocaine in Johnson\u2019s pocket. The appellant was subsequently charged with possession of cocaine with intent to deliver.\nJohnson filed a motion to suppress, contending that the officer had no reasonable suspicion to stop him. The trial court denied the motion and Johnson entered a conditional plea of guilty under Ark. R. Crim. P. 24.3(b). He was sentenced by the court to five years imprisonment under Act. 378 of 1975.\nThe sole issue presented is whether Officer Birkhead had reasonable suspicion to stop the appellant\u2019s car. We hold that the circuit court\u2019s decision that there was reasonable suspicion is not clearly against a preponderance of the evidence and affirm.\nOfficer Birkhead testified that on January 10, 1992, he was patrolling around Markham and Chester Streets in Little Rock. At a stop light he pulled up beside the car Johnson was driving and noticed that the left vent window was broken out. Birkhead testified that he immediately suspected the vehicle might be stolen and was trying to run a radio check on the license plate. Birkhead testified:\nThe light changed to green, and I allowed the vehicle to get up in front of me. I got behind it, and I followed it to Markham and Victory. As it turned the corner, I could get a good angle on the window, and I observed that it was broke out. I suspected the vehicle might be stolen at that point, so I changed my radio channel to a channel eight, which is a secondary traffic channel, and I was going to try and run a check on the license plate.\nThe vehicle then quickly turned. We turned from Markham onto Victory. We went about a half block, and then he turned right again, which would have been going west bound on Markham again, and picked up the speed. So I couldn\u2019t get a good look at the plate again.\nI sat my radio down. I tried to catch up to the vehicle. The vehicle made it to the parking lot, which would be down in the train station where Slick Willy\u2019s the club is. The vehicle did a U-turn and started to come right back at me, so I had no choice then. I was very suspicious at that time.\nIt appeared the vehicle was trying to elude me, so I cut across in front of it, put my spot light on it, put my take-down lights on it, and then I activated my blue lights and blocked the vehicle. He then came to a stop. I exited my vehicle and approached the vehicle at that time.\nOfficer Birkhead testified that in his two and one-half years with the Little Rock Police Department he had been involved in the recovery of hundreds of stolen vehicles and that \u201c80 to 90 percent of them\u201d had broken side windows. He also testified that the appellant committed no traffic offense and the car eventually turned out not to have been stolen.\n\u201cReasonable suspicion,\u201d which is something less than probable cause, is required to constitutionally justify an investigative stop. Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325 (1990); Kaiser v. State, 296 Ark. 125, 752 S.W.2d 271 (1988); Lambert v. State, 34 Ark. App. 227, 808 S.W.2d 788 (1991); Ark. R. Crim. P. 3.1. Reasonable suspicion is defined by Ark. R. Crim. P. 2.1 as \u201ca suspicion based on facts or circumstances which of themselves do not give rise to the probable cause requisite to justify a lawful arrest, but which give rise to more than a bare suspicion; that is, a suspicion that is reasonable as opposed to an imaginary or purely conjectural suspicion.\u201d The existence of reasonable suspicion is to be judged by the \u201ctotality of the circumstances.\u201d See Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325 (1990).\nTwo recent cases from other jurisdictions are almost directly on point and reach opposing conclusions. In People v. Elam, 179 A.D.2d 229, 584 N.Y.S.2d 780 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992), two police officers stopped the defendant\u2019s car after having noticed a broken rear vent window which caused them to believe that the car might be stolen. There was also evidence that the vehicle was being driven \u201crather erratically\u201d and \u201cpretty fast,\u201d although there was no indication that the defendant committed any traffic offense. A five judge panel of the appellate division of the New York Supreme Court held in a 4-1 decision that the trial court erred in finding reasonable suspicion to stop.\nIn Commonwealth v. Epps, 415 Pa. Super. 231, 608 A.2d 1095 (1992), a three judge panel of the Pennsylvania Superior Court held that the observation of a broken rear vent window was sufficient by itself to provide reasonable suspicion to justify an investigatory stop. In Epps, the officer testified that he knew from his experience in investigating automobile thefts that entry for purposes of theft is routinely gained by breaking one of the vent windows, rather than one of the larger, more conspicuous windows of the car.\nIn Elam, where the car turned out not to have been stolen, the Court said the officer simply had a hunch that the defendant had stolen the car. In Epps, where the car actually was stolen, the Court said this was not merely a hunch but rather an \u201carticulable, particularized suspicion.\u201d\nIn the case at bar we are not persuaded that the trial judge\u2019s finding of reasonable suspicion is clearly against a preponderance of the evidence. That suspicion was based not merely on the observation of the broken vent window but also on the officer\u2019s experience with stolen vehicles as well as his perception that the appellant was trying to evade him. This was enough to constitutionally justify an investigatory stop.\nAffirmed.\nMayfield and Rogers, JJ., agree.", "type": "majority", "author": "John E. Jennings, Chief Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Mark S. Cambiano, for appellant.", "Winston Bryant, Att\u2019y Gen., by: Clementine Infante, Asst. Att\u2019y Gen., for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Kenneth JOHNSON v. STATE of Arkansas\nCA CR 92-1374\n862 S.W.2d 290\nCourt of Appeals of Arkansas Division II\nOpinion delivered October 6, 1993\nMark S. Cambiano, for appellant.\nWinston Bryant, Att\u2019y Gen., by: Clementine Infante, Asst. Att\u2019y Gen., for appellee." }, "file_name": "0145-01", "first_page_order": 167, "last_page_order": 171 }