{ "id": 6139351, "name": "Sharon BELCHER v. HOLIDAY INN and American Motorist Insurance Company", "name_abbreviation": "Belcher v. Holiday Inn", "decision_date": "1993-10-13", "docket_number": "CA 92-1332", "first_page": "157", "last_page": "160", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "43 Ark. App. 157" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "868 S.W.2d 87" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark. Ct. App.", "id": 13370, "name": "Arkansas Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "35 Ark. App. 16", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6646395 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "333" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/35/0016-01" ] }, { "cite": "38 Ark. App. 248", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6140907 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/38/0248-01" ] }, { "cite": "31 Ark. App. 104", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6137991 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/31/0104-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 11-9-522", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "weight": 3, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(b)" }, { "page": "(b)" }, { "page": "(d)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 342, "char_count": 5393, "ocr_confidence": 0.927, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.346261635438082e-07, "percentile": 0.7927516237433148 }, "sha256": "ef27e2319245af64b6e951d6a67fcc21bb7a0bdd848f8bce9ec98b10d001eb5c", "simhash": "1:832567f4ec84f20a", "word_count": 876 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:49:44.592852+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Robbins and Mayfield, JJ., agree." ], "parties": [ "Sharon BELCHER v. HOLIDAY INN and American Motorist Insurance Company" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "James R. Cooper, Judge.\nThe appellant in this workers\u2019 compensation case sustained a work-related injury while employed as a housekeeper for Holiday Inn on September 11,1987. She received temporary total disability benefits and was released to return to work in March 1988. At that time, her treating physician assessed a five percent permanent impairment rating. She then returned to work for Holiday Inn until July 1989, when she was terminated for reasons unrelated to her injury. She then obtained employment with the Brownwood Life Care Center where she worked for approximately eight months. After obtaining additional treatment for her back injury, she filed a claim for benefits contending that she was entitled to payment for the additional medical treatment, that she suffered permanent physical impairment equal to eight percent to the body as a whole, and that she was entitled to benefits for a loss in wage earning capacity. The Commission found that the appellant was entitled to payment for the additional medical treatment and that she sustained a permanent physical impairment equal to eight percent to the body as a whole, but concluded that the appellant was barred from receiving benefits for a loss in wage earning capacity pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 11-9-522(b) (1987). From that decision, comes this appeal.\nFor reversal, the appellant contends that the Commission erred in holding that Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 11-9-522(b) bars her from receiving benefits for loss of wage earning capacity. We agree, and we reverse and remand.\nArkansas Code Annotated \u00a7 11-9-522(b) provides that:\nIn considering claims for permanent partial disability benefits in excess of the employee\u2019s percentage of permanent physical impairment, the commission may take into account, in addition to the percentage of permanent physical impairment, such factors as the employee\u2019s age, education, work experience, and other matters reasonably expected to affect his future earning capacity. However, so long as an employee, subsequent to his injury, has returned to work, has obtained other employment, or has a bona fide and reasonably obtainable offer to be employed at wages equal to or greater than his average weekly wage at the time of the accident, he shall not be entitled to permanent partial disability benefits in excess of the percentage of permanent physical impairment established by a preponderance of the medical testimony and evidence.\n[Emphasis added]. The essence of the Commission\u2019s decision with respect to this subsection is that a claimant who has once returned to work at equal or greater wages is permanently barred from receiving benefits for a loss in wage earning capacity, even should her subsequent employment cease, unless the claimant is terminated for reasons relating to her compensable injury. We find that this interpretation of the statutory language was erroneous.\nAmbiguities and conflicting interpretations of workers\u2019 compensation statutes must be resolved in favor of the claimant. Noggle v. Arkansas Valley Electric Co-op., 31 Ark. App. 104, 788 S.W.2d 497 (1990). This is in keeping with the remedial purposes of the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act. Reeder v. Rheem Mfg. Co., 38 Ark. App. 248, 832 S.W.2d 505 (1992).\nIn the case at bar, the statute prohibits a claimant from receiving wage-loss disability \u201cso long as\u201d the claimant has returned to work, obtained other employment, or had a bona fide and reasonable offer of employment. The principal definition of the term \u201cso long as\u201d is \u201cduring and up to the end of the time that.\u201d Webster\u2019s New Collegiate Dictionary 1098 (1979). We indicated that our interpretation of the statute was in keeping with the concept of limitation expressed by this definition in Cook v. Aluminum Co. of America, 35 Ark. App. 16, 811 S.W.2d 329 (1991), when we analyzed the sufficiency of a similar claim on the basis of whether there was evidence to show that the claimant was employed and making equal or greater wages at the time of the hearing. Cook, 811 S.W.2d at 333. Furthermore, as the appellant notes, the intent of the legislature to impose a bar on wage-loss benefits conditioned on continued employment or offer of employment, rather than a permanent bar, is implied by the provision for reconsideration based on changed circumstances found in Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 11-9-522(d).\nInterpreting the statute in light of the remedial and beneficent purposes of the Act, we conclude that \u00a7 1 l-9-522(b) precludes a claim for wage loss benefits as a matter of law only during such time as the claimant has returned to work, obtained other employment, or has a bona fide and reasonably obtainable offer to be employed at wages equal to or greater than her average weekly wage at the time of the accident. Because the Commission\u2019s interpretation of the statute was in error, we reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.\nReversed and remanded.\nRobbins and Mayfield, JJ., agree.\nThe appellant does not argue, and we do not address, the application of \u00a7 11-9-522(c) to this case.", "type": "majority", "author": "James R. Cooper, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Walker Law Firm, by: Eddie H. Walker, Jr., and James A. Lockhart, for appellant.", "Jones, Gilbreath, Jackson & Moll, by: Charles R. Garner, Jr., for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Sharon BELCHER v. HOLIDAY INN and American Motorist Insurance Company\nCA 92-1332\n868 S.W.2d 87\nCourt of Appeals of Arkansas Division I\nOpinion delivered October 13, 1993\nWalker Law Firm, by: Eddie H. Walker, Jr., and James A. Lockhart, for appellant.\nJones, Gilbreath, Jackson & Moll, by: Charles R. Garner, Jr., for appellee." }, "file_name": "0157-01", "first_page_order": 179, "last_page_order": 182 }