{ "id": 6137757, "name": "Virginia Snyder ADAMS v. SOUTHERN STEEL & WIRE and Cigna Insurance Company", "name_abbreviation": "Adams v. Southern Steel & Wire", "decision_date": "1993-12-08", "docket_number": "CA 93-1093", "first_page": "108", "last_page": "110", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "44 Ark. App. 108" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "866 S.W.2d 432" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark. Ct. App.", "id": 13370, "name": "Arkansas Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "38 Ark. App. 13", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6136255 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/38/0013-01" ] }, { "cite": "29 Ark. App. 80", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6137835 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/29/0080-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 236, "char_count": 3826, "ocr_confidence": 0.842, "pagerank": { "raw": 8.672939310263459e-08, "percentile": 0.492136414130708 }, "sha256": "f5a8d8e8ac7bd312fc63a8b0b30d5c842d1397b8b3b91608e1231182b9d8708b", "simhash": "1:6d20d49057875388", "word_count": 610 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:54:08.484473+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "Virginia Snyder ADAMS v. SOUTHERN STEEL & WIRE and Cigna Insurance Company" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Per Curiam.\nIn this workers\u2019 compensation case, the employer, Southern Steel & Wire, and its insurance carrier, Cigna Insurance Company, have filed a motion to dismiss the appeal filed in this court.\nFrom the briefs filed by the appellees and the appellant, we learn that the Workers\u2019 Compensation Commission filed an opinion in this case on August 19, 1992, in which the Commission reversed an administrative law judge\u2019s order directing that the claimant-appellant undergo a psychiatric or psychological evaluation at the appellees\u2019 expense. The Commission\u2019s order stated that appellant had suffered a compensable injury while working for the employer-appellee, and at a hearing on permanent disability entitlement, the law judge stated he believed the claimant might be suffering from depression and ordered that she be evaluated by a doctor in that regard. The Commission\u2019s order found that the law judge had abused his discretion in ordering the independent psychological \u00e9xamination.\nAfter this order of the Commission was filed on August 19, 1992, the claimant submitted various psychological evaluations to the law judge, and over the employer\u2019s objection, the law judge issued a prehearing order scheduling a second hearing on the permanent disability issue at which the psychological evaluations would be admissible. This order was appealed to the Commission and in an opinion filed on September 1, 1993, the Commission held that the law judge had \u201cabused his discretion by setting this matter for a second hearing\u201d and he was \u201cdirected, on remand, to render a decision based upon the evidence\u201d which was presented at the first hearing on claimant\u2019s permanent disability entitlement.\nThe claimant has filed a notice of appeal to this court appealing this September 1, 1993, decision of the Commission. The employer and its insurance carrier (appellees) have filed a motion to dismiss the appeal based on their contention that the Commission\u2019s September 1, 1993, order was \u201cnot a final order.\u201d\nAppellees cite Baldor Electric Company v. Jones, 29 Ark. App. 80, 777 S.W.2d 586 (1989), in support of their contention. In that case the Commission had remanded the matter to the law judge to take \u201csuch additional evidence that may be necessary in order to determine the full extent of any benefits to which the appellee is entitled.\u201d We held this was not a final, appealable order, and we dismissed the appeal. This issue of what constitutes an appealable order in workers\u2019 compensation cases has not always been a unanimous decision in this court. See, e.g., the dissenting opinion in TEC v. Falkner, 38 Ark. App. 13, 827 S.W.2d 661 (1992). However, we do not think the Commission has entered a final, appealable order in this case even under the \u201cseparable branch\u201d concept of an appealable order as discussed in the dissent in TEC v. Falkner.\nThe effect of the Commission\u2019s action in this case, regardless of its intention, has been to require the law judge to determine the appellant\u2019s entitlement to permanent disability without evidence of psychological injury or evaluation. Evidence in that regard has already been proffered and additional evidence may be proffered, but the law judge cannot consider such evidence in making his determination as to permanent disability. When this determination has been made by the Commission there will then be a final, appealable order in this case, and whether the Commission was in error in excluding the psychological evidence can then be decided on appeal to this court.\nAppeal dismissed.", "type": "majority", "author": "Per Curiam." } ], "attorneys": [ "Robert S. Blatt, for appellant.", "Shaw, Ledbetter, Hornberger, Cogbill & Arnold, by: Gill A. Rogers, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Virginia Snyder ADAMS v. SOUTHERN STEEL & WIRE and Cigna Insurance Company\nCA 93-1093\n866 S.W.2d 432\nCourt of Appeals of Arkansas En Banc\nOpinion delivered December 8, 1993\nRobert S. Blatt, for appellant.\nShaw, Ledbetter, Hornberger, Cogbill & Arnold, by: Gill A. Rogers, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0108-01", "first_page_order": 130, "last_page_order": 132 }