{ "id": 6657004, "name": "Jim BRUNSON v. STATE of Arkansas", "name_abbreviation": "Brunson v. State", "decision_date": "1994-03-30", "docket_number": "CA CR 93-563", "first_page": "163", "last_page": "166", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "45 Ark. App. 163" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "873 S.W.2d 562" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark. Ct. App.", "id": 13370, "name": "Arkansas Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-4-306", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-4-403", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(c)(2)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "27 Ark. App. 24", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6136289 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/27/0024-01" ] }, { "cite": "271 Ark. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1756249 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/271/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "291 Ark. 504", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1872625 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/291/0504-01" ] }, { "cite": "36 Ark. App. 85", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6137668 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/36/0085-01" ] }, { "cite": "315 Ark. 91", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1910533 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/315/0091-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 352, "char_count": 5228, "ocr_confidence": 0.87, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.1796015906718886 }, "sha256": "9d163589a54195a3dd7b2cfc62b45bc5e71efb1c20246a69fdca7af8fe592cb5", "simhash": "1:a7282945788ec394", "word_count": 860 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:09:36.699911+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Pittman and Rogers, JJ., agree." ], "parties": [ "Jim BRUNSON v. STATE of Arkansas" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "James R. Cooper, Judge.\nThe appellant in this criminal case was charged with two counts of delivery of a controlled substance. After a jury trial, he was found guilty of two misdemeanor counts of possession of a controlled substance. He was sentenced to a term of eighteen months probation with fourteen days in the Grant County Jail, and fined $2,000.00 to be paid at the rate of $100.00 per month. From that decision, comes this appeal.\nFor reversal, the appellant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a directed verdict due to the insufficiency of the evidence. We do not agree.\nAn appeal from the denial of a motion for a directed verdict is a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, and the test for determining the sufficiency of the evidence in a criminal case is whether there is substantial evidence to support the verdict. Cleveland v. State, 315 Ark. 91, 865 S.W.2d 285 (1994). In making our review, we do not weigh the evidence favorable to the State against any conflicting evidence favorable to the accused, but instead we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the State and affirm if the finding of guilt is supported by substantial evidence. Lowe v. State, 36 Ark. App. 85, 819 S.W.2d 23 (1991). Substantial evidence is evidence which is forceful enough to compel a conclusion one way or the other without resorting to suspicion or conjecture. Cleveland v. State, supra.\nViewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the appellee, the record shows that Larry Witcher, a confidential informant, testified that he purchased marijuana from the appellant while in Sheridan on September 27, 1991. Mr. Witcher also stated that, during one purchase, he made a recording of the transaction which was later transcribed. The transcription of this recording, which was included in the record, is partially inaudible. Nevertheless, the audible portions of the transcription tend to support Mr. Witcher\u2019s testimony to the effect that he purchased marijuana from the appellant on two separate occasions on the day in question.\nThe appellant\u2019s argument is ultimately addressed to the credibility of the confidential informant. He argues that the jury\u2019s guilty verdicts for possession of marijuana, rather than the greater offense of delivery with which the appellant was charged, indicates that the jury found that the testimony of the confidential informant lacked credibility. In essence, the appellant argues that, because the jury found the confidential informant\u2019s testimony to lack sufficient credibility to support the charge of delivery of a controlled substance, it necessarily follows that the same testimony lacks the requisite weight to support a conviction for the lesser included offense of possession of a controlled substance. We do not agree. It is not the function of the appellate court to weigh the evidence. Instead, that function is entrusted to the jury, which may accept or reject any part of a witness\u2019s testimony; when it has done so, we are bound by the jury\u2019s conclusion concerning a witness\u2019s credibility. Harris v. State, 291 Ark. 504, 726 S.W.2d 267 (1987). We have no right to disregard the testimony of a witness after the jury has given it full credence, at least where it cannot be said with assurance that it was inherently improbable, physically impossible, or so clearly unbelievable that reasonable minds could not differ thereon. Kitchen v. State, 271 Ark. 1, 607 S.W.2d 345 (1980). None of these circumstances apply to the testimony of the confidential informant in the case at bar, and we consequently affirm the appellant\u2019s conviction.\nNevertheless, we find it necessary to modify the sentence imposed by the trial court because our review of the record has disclosed a sentencing error. When a trial court has imposed an illegal sentence on a defendant, we will review it regardless of whether an objection was raised below, and we may raise the issue on our own. See Jones v. State, 27 Ark. App. 24, 765 S.W.2d 15 (1989). An illegal sentence is one which is illegal \u201con its face.\u201d Id. In the case at bar, the appellant was convicted of two counts of misdemeanor possession of marijuana, and was sentenced to eighteen months probation. However, pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-4-403(c)(2) (Repl. 1993), the aggregate of consecutive terms for misdemeanors shall not exceed one year. This one-year maximum is applicable to the appellant\u2019s probationary sentence by virtue of Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-4-306(a) (Repl. 1993), which provides that a period of probation shall not exceed the maximum jail or prison sentence allowable for the offense charged. Consequently, the probationary period imposed by the trial court exceeds the maximum allowable by six months. Therefore, although we affirm the appellant\u2019s conviction, we modify the sentence imposed by the trial court so as to reduce the appellant\u2019s probationary period to one year.\nAffirmed as modified.\nPittman and Rogers, JJ., agree.", "type": "majority", "author": "James R. Cooper, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Robert N. Jeffrey, for appellant.", "Winston Bryant, Att\u2019y Gen., by: Clint Miller, Senior Asst. Att\u2019y Gen., for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Jim BRUNSON v. STATE of Arkansas\nCA CR 93-563\n873 S.W.2d 562\nCourt of Appeals of Arkansas Division I\nOpinion delivered March 30, 1994\nRobert N. Jeffrey, for appellant.\nWinston Bryant, Att\u2019y Gen., by: Clint Miller, Senior Asst. Att\u2019y Gen., for appellee." }, "file_name": "0163-01", "first_page_order": 187, "last_page_order": 190 }