{ "id": 6139917, "name": "Alfred James COUCH v. FIRST STATE BANK of Newport", "name_abbreviation": "Couch v. First State Bank", "decision_date": "1995-05-10", "docket_number": "CA 94-711", "first_page": "102", "last_page": "106", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "49 Ark. App. 102" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "898 S.W.2d 57" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark. Ct. App.", "id": 13370, "name": "Arkansas Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 11-9-714", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "10 Ark. App. 402", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6142998 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/10/0402-01" ] }, { "cite": "238 So.2d 639", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "So. 2d", "case_ids": [ 9770065 ], "year": 1970, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/so2d/238/0639-01" ] }, { "cite": "408 So. 2d 842", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "So. 2d", "case_ids": [ 9568077 ], "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/so2d/408/0842-01" ] }, { "cite": "95 Cal. Rptr. 219", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. Rptr.", "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "217 Cal. Rptr. 630", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. Rptr.", "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "28 Ark. App. 180", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6138970 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/28/0180-01" ] }, { "cite": "401 S.W.2d 161", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 10124404 ], "year": 1966, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/sw2d/401/0161-01" ] }, { "cite": "240 Ark. 571", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1727712 ], "year": 1966, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/240/0571-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 11-9-809", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 11-9-102", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(9)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "268 Ark. 770", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1715501 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "776" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/268/0770-01" ] }, { "cite": "39 Ark. App. 62", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6137045 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/39/0062-01" ] }, { "cite": "7 Ark. App. 65", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6136996 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/7/0065-01" ] }, { "cite": "44 Ark. App. 5", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6135992 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/44/0005-01" ] }, { "cite": "265 Ark. 489", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1664891 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/265/0489-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 442, "char_count": 6988, "ocr_confidence": 0.884, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.8125954442729806e-07, "percentile": 0.7180156063152716 }, "sha256": "4e2f91a99184c681e461174a4692ead315ba1903ebd0f8c253c4b1d7fba86f60", "simhash": "1:913bece3733e68da", "word_count": 1130 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:40:19.098525+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Cooper and Robbins, JJ., agree." ], "parties": [ "Alfred James COUCH v. FIRST STATE BANK of Newport" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "John Mauzy Pittman, Judge.\nAppellant Alfred James Couch, Jr. appeals the Arkansas Workers\u2019 Compensation Commission\u2019s calculation of his temporary total disability benefits, the failure to impose a penalty for untimely payment of interest on permanent partial disability benefits, and the failure to award attorney\u2019s fees. We affirm in part and reverse and remand in part.\nWhen reviewing decisions from the Workers\u2019 Compensation Commission, we view the evidence and all reasonable inferences deducible therefrom in the light most favorable to the Commission. We must uphold those findings unless there is no substantial evidence to support them. Clark v. Peabody Testing Service, 265 Ark. 489, 579 S.W.2d 360 (1979). Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Wright v. ABC Air, Inc., 44 Ark. App. 5, 864 S.W.2d 871 (1993). The issue is not whether we might have reached a different result or whether the evidence would have supported a contrary finding; if reasonable minds could reach the Commission\u2019s conclusion, we must affirm its decision. Bearden Lumber Co. v. Bond, 7 Ark. App. 65, 644 S.W.2d 321 (1983).\nThe parties agreed that appellant was entitled to 110 days of temporary total disability benefits and that for 60 of those days that he did not work, he received sick pay that he had accumulated as an employment benefit. Appellant\u2019s first argument concerns calculation of the 60 days of temporary total disability benefits for which he received sick pay from appellee. The Commission affirmed appellee\u2019s payment of $1,620.00 for the 60 days of temporary disability benefits. Appellee calculated the benefits by dividing a weekly wage rate of $189.00 by seven days to arrive at a daily rate of $27.00 and multiplying $27.00 by 60 days. Appellant argues that the correct amount is $2,268.00 calculated by multiplying the weekly wage of $189.00 by twelve weeks, i.e., 60 days based on his five-day work week. In other words, appellant argues that the weekly wage rate should be divided by five rather than seven to arrive at a daily rate. From our review of the abstract, there is no evidence that appellant worked a five-day work week. It is appellant\u2019s burden to abstract the record to demonstrate error, and we will not go to the record to determine whether reversible error occurred. Death & Permanent Total Disability Trust Fund v. Whirlpool Corp., 39 Ark. App. 62, 837 S.W.2d 293 (1992). Accordingly, we cannot conclude that the calculation of the 60 days of temporary disability benefits is not supported by substantial evidence.\nAppellant\u2019s second argument concerns appellee\u2019s untimely payment of interest accrued on the award of permanent partial disability benefits. Appellant contends that he is entitled to a 20 percent penalty on the owed interest pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 ll-9-802(c) (1987). That section provides:\nIf any installment, payable under the terms of an award, is not paid within fifteen (15) days after it becomes due, there shall be added to such unpaid installment an amount equal to twenty percent (20%) thereof, which shall be paid at the same time as, but in addition to, the installment unless review of the compensation order making the award is had as provided in \u00a7\u00a7 11-9-710 -11-9-712.\nAppellee argues that \u201cinstallment\u201d can mean only compensation and does not include accrued interest on compensation. We agree that \u201cinstallment\u201d for purposes of \u00a7 ll-9-802(c) includes compensation. See Model Laundry & Dry Cleaning v. Simmons, 268 Ark. 770, 596 S.W.2d 337 (Ark. App. 1980). In subsections (a) and (b) of \u00a7 11-9-802 \u201cinstallment\u201d is referred to as an \u201cinstallment of compensation.\u201d\nWe conclude that an \u201cinstallment\u201d for purposes of \u00a7 11-9-802(c) includes interest awarded on compensation benefits. \u201cCompensation\u201d as defined by Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 11-9-102(9) (1987) is \u201cthe money allowance payable to the employee or his dependents. . . .\u201d Arkansas Code Annotated \u00a7 11-9-809 (1987) provides that accrued and unpaid compensation shall bear interest. When a claimant is entitled to compensation, he may also receive an award of interest from the date the benefits should have been paid. Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 11-9-809 (1987); see Clemons v. Bearden Lumber Company, 240 Ark. 571, 401 S.W.2d 161 (1966). In Eureka Log Homes v. Mantonya, 28 Ark. App. 180, 772 S.W.2d 365 (1989), we held that an award of compensation benefits implied an award of interest even though interest was not specifically mentioned in the award. Further, Section ll-9-802(c) speaks of an \u201cinstallment, payable under the terms of an award.\u201d See Model Laundry, supra, dissenting opinion (emphasis should be on \u201caward,\u201d not on \u201cinstallment,\u201d to determine the amounts to which a penalty applies).\nSimilarly, several jurisdictions impose a penalty for late payments of interest accrued on compensation awards based on statutory language analogous to our \u00a7 ll-9-802(c). Gellie v. W.C.A.B., 217 Cal. Rptr. 630 (Cal. App. 1985); Laucirica v. W.C.A.B., 95 Cal. Rptr. 219 (Cal. App. 1971); Brazil v. School Board of Alachua County, 408 So. 2d 842 (Fla. App. 1982); Torres v. Eden Roc Hotel, 238 So.2d 639 (Fla. 1970). We reverse and remand for the Commission to impose a penalty in accordance with \u00a7 ll-9-802(c) on the untimely payment of interest accrued on appellant\u2019s permanent disability benefits.\nAppellant also argues that he is entitled to interest on the penalty from the date that the penalty was due until paid. However, appellant failed to raise this argument below, so we decline to address it. Hill v. White-Rodgers, 10 Ark. App. 402, 665 S.W.2d 292 (1984).\nAppellant\u2019s final argument is that he is entitled to additional attorney\u2019s fees under Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 11-9-714 (1987) for appellee\u2019s alleged unreasonable delay in resolving the claim. Section 11-9-714 provides only for costs to be awarded in such instances. There is substantial evidence to support the Commission\u2019s refusal to award attorney\u2019s fees.\nAffirmed in part; reversed and remanded in part.\nCooper and Robbins, JJ., agree.\nin Model Laundry, supra, the court held that no penalty could be imposed for untimely payments of medical benefits and attorneys\u2019 fees, reasoning that \u201ccompensation\u201d as defined in \u00a7 11-9-102 includes only amounts payable to the employee. There is no statutory provision that medical benefits and attorneys\u2019 fees be paid directly to the employee, and there is no statutory provision for these benefits to be paid in installments. The court stated that \u201cthe General Assembly would not have made the penalty applicable only for installments had it intended it to apply to the other payments as well.\u201d Id., 268 Ark. at 776.", "type": "majority", "author": "John Mauzy Pittman, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Dover & Dixon, P.A., by: David A. Couch, for appellant.", "Anderson & Kilpatrick, by: Randy Murphy, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Alfred James COUCH v. FIRST STATE BANK of Newport\nCA 94-711\n898 S.W.2d 57\nCourt of Appeals of Arkansas Division I\nOpinion delivered May 10, 1995\n[Rehearing denied June 14, 1995.]\nDover & Dixon, P.A., by: David A. Couch, for appellant.\nAnderson & Kilpatrick, by: Randy Murphy, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0102-01", "first_page_order": 130, "last_page_order": 134 }