{
  "id": 6137051,
  "name": "FARM BUREAU MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY OF ARKANSAS, INC. v. W. R. SMITH and Wray B. SMITH",
  "name_abbreviation": "Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co. of Arkansas v. Smith",
  "decision_date": "1982-05-05",
  "docket_number": "CA 81-248",
  "first_page": "37",
  "last_page": "42",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "5 Ark. App. 37"
    },
    {
      "type": "parallel",
      "cite": "632 S.W.2d 244"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ark. Ct. App.",
    "id": 13370,
    "name": "Arkansas Court of Appeals"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 34,
    "name_long": "Arkansas",
    "name": "Ark."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "274 P. 2d 53",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "P.2d",
      "year": 1954,
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "127 Cal. App. 2d 417",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Cal. App. 2d",
      "case_ids": [
        2224633
      ],
      "year": 1954,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/cal-app-2d/127/0417-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "272 Ark. 151",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
      "case_ids": [
        1174901
      ],
      "weight": 2,
      "year": 1981,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ark/272/0151-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "273 Ark. 325",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
      "case_ids": [
        8719361
      ],
      "weight": 2,
      "year": 1981,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ark/273/0325-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "231 Ark. 426",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
      "case_ids": [
        1697145
      ],
      "weight": 2,
      "year": 1959,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ark/231/0426-01"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "analysis": {
    "cardinality": 444,
    "char_count": 7541,
    "ocr_confidence": 0.809,
    "pagerank": {
      "raw": 9.638490318500353e-08,
      "percentile": 0.5276977538072684
    },
    "sha256": "1135a60239db32ac23624e491055d930f31e8c462b6da1b184aa09b3566893b9",
    "simhash": "1:d26611a6fecc7f72",
    "word_count": 1287
  },
  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:41:16.889106+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "FARM BUREAU MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY OF ARKANSAS, INC. v. W. R. SMITH and Wray B. SMITH"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Melvin Mayfield, Chief Judge.\nThe appellant, Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company, was sued on a homeowners policy and the jury returned a verdict for the company. This appeal is from the granting of a motion for new trial. We find the motion should not have been granted.\nAppellees\u2019 motion was based on an allegation of juror misconduct consisting of a statement said to have been made by one of the jurors during jury deliberations. The motion was accompanied by the affidavit of a juror who also testified at the hearing on the motion. While it is not entirely clear from the appellant\u2019s abstract (there is no supplemental abstract by the appellees), we accept the assertion in appel-lees\u2019 brief that the affidavit and testimony by the one juror was that the other juror said \u201cit\u2019s lawsuits like this that will make all our insurance premiums go up.\u201d\nIn its order granting a new trial, the court said while the testimony did not prove that appellees did not receive a fair trial, \u201cwith this shadow over the jury\u2019s deliberations it cannot be said plaintiffs did receive a fair trial.\u201d\nThe appellant objected to the trial court\u2019s consideration of the juror\u2019s affidavit and to the introduction of the juror\u2019s testimony at the hearing. The admissibility of such evidence is governed by our Uniform Rules of Evidence 606 (b), which states:\n(b) Inquiry into Validity of Verdict or Indictment. Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror may not testify as to any matter or statement occurring during the course of the jury\u2019s deliberations or to the effect of anything upon his or any other j uror\u2019s mind or emotions as influencing him to asset [assent] to or dissent from the verdict or indictment or concerning his mental processes in connection therewith, nor may his affidavit or evidence of any statement by him concerning a matter about which he would be precluded from testifying be received, but a juror may testify on the questions whether extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury\u2019s attention or whether any outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon any juror.\nPrior to the adoption of Rule 606 (b) we had a statute which provided: \u201cA juror cannot be examined to establish a ground for a new trial, except it be to establish, as a ground for new trial, that the verdict was made by lot. \u201d In Strahan v. Webb, 231 Ark. 426, 330 S.W.2d 291 (1959), the court said the statute was based on the logic of the following statement from 53 Am. Jur. Trial \u00a7 1105 (now 76 Am. Jur. 2d Trial \u00a7 1219 [1975]):\nThe rule is founded on public policy, and is for the purpose of preventing litigants or the public from invading the privacy of the jury room, either during the deliberations of the jury or afterward. It is to prevent overzealous litigants and a curious public from prying . into deliberations which are intended to be, and should be, private, frank, and free discussions of the questions under consideration. Further, if after being discharged and mingling with the public, jurors are permitted to impeach verdicts which they have rendered, it would open the door for tampering with jurors and would place it in the power of a dissatisfied or corrupt juror to destroy a verdict to which he had deliberately given his assent under sanction of an oath.\nTestimony of the jurors to impeach their own verdict is excluded not because it is irrelevant tQ the matter in issue, but because experience has shown that it is more likely to prevent than to promote the discovery of the truth. Hence, the affidavit of a juror cannot be admitted to show anything relating to what passed in the jury room during the investigation of the cause, or the effect of a colloquy between the court and a juror, or the arguments made to a juror by a fellow juryman. The rule that a verdict cannot be impeached by the testimony of a juror is generally adhered to where it is sought to impeach a verdict on grounds of misconduct on the part of the juror or his fellow jurors, despite apprehension expressed in many cases that such rule sometimes serves the cause of injustice.\nAfter Uniform Evidence Rule 606 (b) became effective, the Arkansas Supreme Court reaffirmed the long-standing attitude demonstrated in Strahan v. Webb by affirming the trial court\u2019s refusal to grant a new trial based on juror affidavits in Sanson v. Pullum, 273 Ark. 325, 619 S.W.2d 641 (1981). The court said:\nThe jurors\u2019 affidavits ivere clearly inadmissible. Uniform Evidence Rule 606 (b) states plainly that a juror may not testify as to the effect of anything upon his mind as influencing him to assent to the verdict, nor may his affidavit be received concerning a matter about which he is precluded from testifying. We take this opportunity to state unequivocally, for the guidance of the bar, that in our opinion it is improper for a lawyer to interview jurors after a trial in an effort to obtain such inadmissible affidavits to impeach their own verdict.\nSee also Garner v. Finch, 272 Ark. 151, 612 S.W.2d 304 (1981).\nIn the instant case, the statement \u201cit\u2019s lawsuits like this that will make all our insurance premiums go up\u201d is simply an expression of opinion on the merits of the appellees\u2019 case. It therefore falls within the proscription of Rule 606 (b) and could not properly be considered as the basis for the granting of the motion for new trial. But even if the statement is not regarded as a comment on the merits of appellees\u2019 case, it would still not meet the rule\u2019s admissibility requirement of \u201cextraneous\u201d prejudicial information \u201cimproperly\u201d brought to the jury\u2019s attention.\nThis is because the appellees\u2019 claim in this case is based upon the alleged failure of the insurance company to see that the appellees\u2019 house was properly repaired by the building contractor. The amount of the premium paid for the insurance was in evidence and in closing argument appellant\u2019s attorney told the jury that premiums would have to increase if companies were required to inspect the construction on the repair jobs for which they paid. Thus, in this case, the matter of an increase in premiums was before the jury without objection and was not \u201cextraneous\u201d information \u201cimproperly\u201d brought to its attention.\nAppellees contend the evidence by the juror was admissible to show prejudice and bias against them and in favor of the insurance company. In support of that contention the appellees cite Shipley v. Permanente Hospitals, 127 Cal. App. 2d 417, 274 P. 2d 53 (1954), where the court allowed juror affidavits which stated that during deliberations other jurors had admitted their general bias against verdicts for doctors in malpractice cases.\nWe think that case involved a different situation. Here, there was no evidence that any juror admitted bias or prejudice against the claims of insureds generally or the claims of these appellees specifically. To allow the evidence in this case to impeach the jury\u2019s verdict would violate evidence Rule 606 (b) and the public policy that protects the privacy of the jury room \u2014 a policy which experience has shown helps the jury\u2019s verdict to reflect the truth.\nThe order granting a new trial is reversed and the case is remanded with directions to enter judgment in accordance with the jury\u2019s verdict.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Melvin Mayfield, Chief Judge."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Samuel N. Bird of Williamson, Ball \u00e9r Bird, for appellant.",
      "L. David Stubbs, for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "FARM BUREAU MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY OF ARKANSAS, INC. v. W. R. SMITH and Wray B. SMITH\nCA 81-248\n632 S.W.2d 244\nCourt of Appeals of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered May 5, 1982\nSamuel N. Bird of Williamson, Ball \u00e9r Bird, for appellant.\nL. David Stubbs, for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0037-01",
  "first_page_order": 57,
  "last_page_order": 62
}