{ "id": 6138626, "name": "Jane DOE; Local No. 704 of the Amalgamated Transit Union; Paul Mathews, President, et al. v. CENTRAL ARKANSAS TRANSIT", "name_abbreviation": "Doe v. Central Arkansas Transit", "decision_date": "1995-06-28", "docket_number": "CA 93-713", "first_page": "132", "last_page": "147", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "50 Ark. App. 132" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "900 S.W.2d 582" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark. Ct. App.", "id": 13370, "name": "Arkansas Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "504 N.W.2d 751", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 10630948 ], "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nw2d/504/0751-01" ] }, { "cite": "715 F.2d 1322", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 1882303 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1325" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/715/1322-01" ] }, { "cite": "721 F.2d 121", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 1908812 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/721/0121-01" ] }, { "cite": "861 F.2d 665", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 10531200 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "public policy condemns operation of passenger airliner by pilots who are under the influence of alcohol contrary to FAA regulations" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/861/0665-01" ] }, { "cite": "834 F2d. 1424", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 10552101 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "affirming the reversal of an award that reinstated an employee who intentionally violated federally mandated safety regulations defeating an interlock system [after being denied permission] for no better reason than to get an early start for lunch" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/834/1424-01" ] }, { "cite": "896 F.2d 507", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 10533236, 10533151 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "award reinstating chronic heavy drug user who had sufficient levels of THC metabolic in his body at the time of the drug screening to make it probable that he was under the influence of marijuana violated public policy" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/896/0507-02", "/f2d/896/0507-01" ] }, { "cite": "707 F. Supp. 531", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 7389215 ], "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/707/0531-01" ] }, { "cite": "993 F.2d 357", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 10513361 ], "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/993/0357-01" ] }, { "cite": "31 Ark. App. 81", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6137496 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "failing a required drug test constituted misconduct connected with the work for the purposes of unemployment benefits" }, { "parenthetical": "failing a required drug test constituted misconduct connected with the work for the purposes of unemployment benefits" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/31/0081-01" ] }, { "cite": "484 U.S. 29", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 600957 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "43" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/484/0029-01" ] }, { "cite": "461 U.S. 757", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11299394 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "766" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/461/0757-01" ] }, { "cite": "206 Ark. 906", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1485024 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1943, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "909-10", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/206/0906-01" ] }, { "cite": "44 Ark. 166", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1893451 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1884, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "173-74", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/44/0166-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7\u00a7 16-108-201", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "318 Ark. 679", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1455942 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/318/0679-01" ] }, { "cite": "88 S.W. 915", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.", "year": 1905, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "76 Ark. 153", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1501047 ], "year": 1905, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "157" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ark/76/0153-01" ] }, { "cite": "46 Ark. App. 105", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6137888 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "109" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/46/0105-01" ] }, { "cite": "289 Ark. 248", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1875397 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "251" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ark/289/0248-01" ] }, { "cite": "484 U.S. 29", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 600957 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "36" }, { "page": "38" }, { "page": "44" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/484/0029-01" ] }, { "cite": "44 Ark. 166", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1893451 ], "year": 1884, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "173" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ark/44/0166-01" ] }, { "cite": "958 F.2d 154", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 10520444 ], "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/958/0154-01" ] }, { "cite": "363 U.S. 593", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6166577 ], "year": 1960, "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/us/363/0593-01" ] }, { "cite": "832 F.2d 81", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 10543223 ], "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/832/0081-01" ] }, { "cite": "46 Ark. App. 105", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6137888 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/46/0105-01" ] }, { "cite": "715 F.2d 1322", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 1882303 ], "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/715/1322-01" ] }, { "cite": "484 U.S. 29", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 600957 ], "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/us/484/0029-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1117, "char_count": 28775, "ocr_confidence": 0.879, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.3396447812370634e-07, "percentile": 0.6308680544695849 }, "sha256": "ba6532496049b29c3c8dd624b5ffc7a4c0e2b3da97c08454570f768f6293ce16", "simhash": "1:81a57dad97428511", "word_count": 4649 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:44:23.701832+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Rogers, J., concurs.", "Pittman, J., dissents." ], "parties": [ "Jane DOE; Local No. 704 of the Amalgamated Transit Union; Paul Mathews, President, et al. v. CENTRAL ARKANSAS TRANSIT" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Melvin Mayfield, Judge.\nThis is an appeal from the order of the Pulaski County Chancery Court which granted the appellee\u2019s motion for summary judgment and vacated an award granted by an arbitrator.\nOn January 3, 1995, we certified this case to the Arkansas Supreme Court pursuant to Rule l-2(d)(2) of the Rules of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals. The supreme court declined to accept the case and remanded it to this court for decision. Jurisdiction to determine the issues presented on appeal is therefore in this court.\nAppellant, Jane Doe, was a bus driver for the appellee, Central Arkansas Transit Authority, which is a public transportation company. She was off work beginning January 4, 1991, through March 26, 1991, due to a job-related injury. Several days before her return to work, appellant took a return-to-work physical, including a drug test, pursuant to appellee\u2019s anti-drug policy. On March 26, 1991, appellant returned to work and, after completing work that day, was notified that her drug test was positive for cocaine and she was discharged.\nThe appellant\u2019s union filed a grievance on appellant\u2019s behalf pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement entered into between the union and the appellee in April of 1990. The union alleged that the appellant was not discharged for \u201cjust cause\u201d under the terms of the parties\u2019 labor contract. The appellee refused to reinstate the appellant and the matter was submitted to arbitration pursuant to Article 4 of the agreement. The sole issue to be decided was whether appellant was discharged for \u201cjust cause.\u201d On November 12, 1992, the arbitrator issued an opinion ruling that although appellant had violated the anti-drug program, appellee did not have \u201cjust cause\u201d to discharge her. The arbitrator reinstated appellant subject to another return-to-duty drug test; random drug testing for five years; and the satisfactory completion of an Employee Assistance Program.\nAppellee filed a complaint in Pulaski County Chancery Court to vacate the arbitrator\u2019s award alleging that there is a well-defined public policy against having drug-impaired employees in the work place; that there is a well-defined public policy against having drug users operate commercial vehicles such as a public transit bus; and that enforcing the arbitrator\u2019s award violates public policy.\nOn April 1, 1993, the chancellor entered an order granting the appellee\u2019s motion for summary judgment and vacated the award. This action was based upon a finding that the arbitrator\u2019s award reinstating appellant was contrary to public policy and that the arbitrator acted in excess of his authority.\nOn appeal, appellant argues: (1) the trial court failed to give proper deference to the arbitrator\u2019s findings; (2) the trial court erred in concluding the award violated public policy; (3) the trial court erred in concluding the award did not draw its essence from the labor agreement; and (4) the trial court erred in concluding the arbitrator exceeded his authority.\nAt the outset, we note two things. One, our opinion is confined to the facts in this case and does not hold that a driver for a public transit company may drive a bus while under the influence of drugs. Second, the facts in this case were uncontested before the chancellor. Normally on a summary judgment appeal the evidence is viewed most favorably for the party resisting the motion and any doubts and inferences are resolved against the moving party. In a case where the parties agree on the facts that rule is inapplicable, and we simply determine whether the appellee was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. City of Little Rock v. Pfeifer, 318 Ark. 679, 887 S.W.2d 296 (1994). And because our Uniform Arbitration Act (Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7\u00a7 16-108-201 \u2014 16-108-224 (1987)) does not apply to employee-employer disputes, we look to prior Arkansas law, to the common law, and, at the parties\u2019 request, to the federal law for the resolution of the issues involved in this appeal.\nI. JUDICIAL DEFERENCE\nIn the early case of Kirten v. Spears, 44 Ark. 166 (1884), our supreme court said unless the illegality of the decision appears upon its face:\n[T]he court will not interfere on the ground merely that the arbitrators have mistaken the law, or have advisedly decided contrary to the rules of established practice observed by courts of law and equity.\nIf the parties wanted exact justice administered according to the forms of law, they should have allowed their case to take the usual course. But for reasons satisfactory to themselves, they have chosen to substitute for the courts of law a private forum, and there is no injustice in holding them bound by the result.\n44 Ark. at 173-74 (citations omitted). In Alexander v. Fletcher, 206 Ark. 906, 175 S.W.2d 196 (1943), the court stated:\nThe general rule and the one supported by the great weight of authority, with reference to awards is: \u201cEvery reasonable intendment and presumption is in favor of the award, and it should not be vacated unless it clearly appears that it was made without authority, or was the result of fraud or mistake, or of the misfeasance or malfeasance of the appraisers.\u201d\n206 Ark. at 909-10 (citations omitted).\nII. PUBLIC POLICY\nIn W.R. Grace & Company v. Local 759, 461 U.S. 757 (1983), the United States Supreme Court recognized a public policy exception to the enforcement of an arbitrator\u2019s award. The Court stated:\nAs with any contract, however, a court may not enforce a collective-bargaining agreement that is contrary to public policy.. .. Such a public policy, however, must be well defined and dominant, and is to be ascertained \u201cby reference to the laws and legal precedents and not from general considerations of supposed public interests.\u201d (Citations omitted.)\n461 U.S. at 766.\nIn United Paperworkers International Union, AFL-CIO v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29 (1987), the United States Supreme Court emphasized that the courts play only a limited role when asked to review the decision of an arbitrator. The Court stated:\nIn W.R. Grace, we recognized that \u201ca court may not enforce a collective-bargaining agreement that is contrary to public policy,\u201d and stated that \u201cthe question of public policy is ultimately one for resolution by the courts.\u201d We cautioned, however, that a court\u2019s refusal to enforce an arbitrator\u2019s interpretation of such contracts is limited to situations where the contract as interpreted would violate \u201csome explicit public policy\u201d that is \u201cwell defined and dominant, and is to be ascertained \u2018by reference to the laws and legal precedents and not from general considerations of supposed public interests.\u2019\u201d In W.R. Grace, we identified two important public policies that were potentially jeopardized by the arbitrator\u2019s interpretation of the contract: obedience to judicial orders and voluntary compliance with Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. We went on to hold that enforcement of the arbitration award in that case did not compromise either of the two public policies allegedly threatened by the award. Two points follow from our decision in W.R. Grace. First, a court may refuse to enforce a collective-bargaining agreement when the specific terms contained in that agreement violate public policy. Second, it is apparent that our decision in that case does not otherwise sanction a broad judicial power to set aside arbitration awards as against public policy. Although we discussed the effect of that award on two broad areas of public policy, our decision turned on our examination of whether the award created any explicit conflict with other \u201claws and legal precedents\u201d rather than an assessment of \u201cgeneral considerations of supposed public interests.\u201d At the very least, an alleged public policy must be properly framed under the approach set out in W.R. Grace, and the violation of such a policy must be clearly shown if an award is not to be enforced (citations omitted).\n484 U.S. at 43.\nWe do not believe the arbitrator\u2019s decision in the instant case violated public policy under the standards enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in Grace and Misco.\nAn Arkansas case cited by the appellee has recognized a public policy in favor of a drug policy which was initiated due to the high accident rate and risk factors relating to the nature of the drilling business and which prohibited an employee from having any detectable level of alcohol or drugs in the employee\u2019s body while on the employer\u2019s work site. See Grace Drilling Co. v. Director of Labor, 31 Ark. App. 81, 790 S.W.2d 907 (1990)(failing a required drug test constituted misconduct connected with the work for the purposes of unemployment benefits). And the parties cite and discuss a federal case that has recognized a public policy against the operation of a vessel while under the influence of drugs or alcohol. See Exxon Shipping Co. v. Exxon Seamen\u2019s Union, 993 F.2d 357 (3d Cir. 1993) (award reinstating helmsman terminated for a positive drug test taken after ship ran aground violates public policy expressed in Coast Guard Regulations requiring testing and providing that employees who test positive for drugs be denied employment as a crew member or removed from duties directly affecting the safety of the vessel\u2019s navigation or operations). Also, a federal case has recognized a public policy against the operation of potentially hazardous equipment and machinery by employees under the influence of illegal drugs. See Georgia Power Company v. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 84, 707 F. Supp. 531 (N.D. Ga. 1989), aff\u2019d, 896 F.2d 507 (11th Cir. 1990) (award reinstating chronic heavy drug user who had sufficient levels of THC metabolic in his body at the time of the drug screening to make it probable that he was under the influence of marijuana violated public policy). And a federal court has recognized that public policy requires strict adherence to nuclear safety rules. See Iowa Electric Light and Power Company v. Local 204, IBEW, 834 F2d. 1424 (8th Cir. 1987)(affirming the reversal of an award that reinstated an employee who intentionally violated federally mandated safety regulations defeating an interlock system [after being denied permission] for no better reason than to get an early start for lunch). See also Delta Air Lines Pilots Assn. International, 861 F.2d 665 (11th Cir. 1988) (public policy condemns operation of passenger airliner by pilots who are under the influence of alcohol contrary to FAA regulations).\nWe think the above factual situations are distinguishable from those in the instant case. The Grace Drilling Company case was not decided by an arbitrator and, therefore, the standard of deference given to the decision of an arbitrator was not required in that case. Also, that case involved the question of whether a discharged employee could draw unemployment benefits, and the case turned on employee misconduct not on public policy considerations with regard to enforcing an arbitrator\u2019s decision under a collective-bargaining agreement. The other cases involved situations where an employee was under the influence of drugs or alcohol while actually performing his duties or where the employee intentionally violated safety regulations.\nBut the appellant in the instant case did not actually drive a bus under the influence of illegal drugs. Moreover, the arbitrator found that the appellant was a good employee with a 10-year proven track record; that she was reliable, \u201cyear in and year out,\u201d a safe bus driver; that her \u201cone recent miscue\u201d was a one-shot aberration and occurred when she attended a party, the night before the drug test, at which she drank \u201cspiked\u201d punch; that there was no evidence of drug use on the job; and that it was possible to condition her reinstatement on adequate safety measures to protect bus riders and other vehicle occupants. The arbitrator recognized that public safety is \u201cthe most important consideration\u201d and based appellant\u2019s reinstatement on certain conditions including random drug testing for a period of 60 months and the completion of an employee assistance program. He also stated that he would \u201cwithout any apprehension\u201d ride in a vehicle driven by the appellant.\nII. AUTHORITY OF ARBITRATOR\nBecause appellant\u2019s next two arguments are related, we discuss them together. The appellant contends the chancellor erred in concluding that the award did not draw its \u201cessence\u201d from the labor agreement and that the arbitrator exceeded his authority.\nArticle 2, Mutual Cooperation, Section 2 of the collective bargaining agreement states:\nThe Company will continue to exercise the exclusive right to set its policies; . . . and to make reasonable rules and regulations governing the operation of its business and the conduct of its employees.\nArticle 3, Violation of Company Rules, Section 1 of the agreement states:\nA) No employee will be discharged or disciplined without sufficient and just cause. No employee will be discharged, disciplined, or taken out of service for violation of Company\u2019s rules for improper conduct without a fair and impartial hearing (except that the Company shall have the right to remove forthwith any employee against whom there is evidence of dishonesty beyond a reasonable doubt the same right applying to employees under the influence of intoxicating liquors or controlled drugs that are illegal by law).\nAppellee\u2019s anti-drug policy is contained in Resolution No. 91-1 of the Board of Directors of Central Arkansas Transit Authority which was revised in January of 1991 to provide:\nSection 5.. Any employee, or applicant for employment, of the Authority who fails to pass any required drug screening procedure shall be terminated and shall be prohibited from employment related to Central Arkansas Transit Authority.\nSection 6. All employees shall be subject to urine drug testing . . . :\n4. Return to Duty. Prior to returning to duty after having refused a drug test, or after an on-the-job injury which results in a two week absence from duty. Those employees who refuse a drug test will be given an initial return to duty drug test and additional unannounced drug tests for a period up to 60 months. More than one refusal of a drug test will result in termination.\nUnless the arbitral decision does not draw its essence from the collective bargaining agreement a court is bound to enforce the award and is not entitled to review the merits of the contract dispute. W.R. Grace & Co., supra. An award draws its essence from the agreement if the interpretation can in any rational way be derived from the agreement, viewed in the light of its language, its context, and any other indicia of the parties\u2019 intention; only where there is a manifest disregard of the agreement, totally unsupported by principles of contract construction and the law, may a reviewing court disturb the award. Super Tire Engineering Co. v. Teamsters Local Union No. 676, 721 F.2d 121 (3d Cir. 1983). Reviewing courts cannot interfere with an arbitrator\u2019s interpretation unless it can be said with positive assurance that the contract is not susceptible of the arbitrator\u2019s interpretation. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers v. Sho-Me Power Corp., 715 F.2d 1322, 1325 (8th Cir. 1983).\nThe parties agree that the scope of the arbitrator\u2019s authority is a question of contract interpretation. Under the law, that is to be determined from reading the arbitration agreement, and the award will be set aside by the court only when the objecting party proves that the arbitrator clearly exceeded the power granted in the agreement. State Auditor v. Minnesota Assn. of Professional Employees, 504 N.W.2d 751 (Minn. 1993).\nHere, Article 3 of the bargaining agreement provides that an employee shall not be discharged or disciplined without sufficient and just cause. Further, the agreement provides that an employee shall not be discharged, disciplined, or taken out of service without a fair and impartial hearing, except in the case of an employee against whom there is evidence of dishonesty beyond a reasonable doubt and employees under the influence of intoxicating liquors or controlled drugs that are illegal by law. However, the exception does not apply to employees who simply fail a drug test.\nThe appellant took a drug test on March 22 and it was not until she returned to work on March 26, and had driven the bus all that day, that she was told that her test on March 22 was positive. The arbitrator specifically found that \u201cthere was no evidence\u201d of impairment of her job functions when she drove the bus on March 26. Thus, it is clear that under Article 3, the appellant could not be discharged forthwith because of the result of the drug test and could not be discharged after a hearing unless the positive test on March 22 constituted \u201cjust cause.\u201d Under the law discussed previously, the interpretation of the contract and the facts involved in the dispute are both matters to be determined by the arbitrator. See Super Tire Engineering Co. v. Local 676, supra. See also, Carnes, Arbitration in Arkansas, Arkansas Law Notes 17 (1992).\nAlthough the arbitrator found there was not just cause to discharge appellant, he found just cause to discipline her. In making this determination the arbitrator took into account appellant\u2019s unblemished record of service and the fact that her positive drug test was a one-shot aberration, and he required random tests for five years. This was in keeping with the collective bargaining agreement since the policy adopted by appellee provided that \u201cemployees who refuse a drug test will be given an initial return to duty and additional unannounced drug tests for a period of up to 60 months.\u201d\nWe cannot conclude there was a \u201cmanifest disregard of the agreement,\u201d that the award did not draw its essence from the collective bargaining agreement, or that the arbitrator exceeded his authority.\nWe have considered the statement in the dissenting opinion that \u201cappellee proposed a resolution to the collective bargaining agreement\u201d and the dissent\u2019s leap from that statement to the implied conclusion that the union\u2019s failure to pursue its grievance contesting the implementation of the drug policy had the effect of changing the contract between the union and the appellee. But what actually happened was that the appellee adopted the resolution establishing an anti-drug policy in keeping with Article 2 of the contract. Although the union could have pursued its grievance as to the adoption of the policy, its failure to do so did not change the collective bargaining agreement between the union and the company. Thus, it was the arbitrator\u2019s job to interpret the bargaining agreement \u2014 which he did. Moreover, the arbitrator did not decide that the drug policy was unreasonable. He simply considered the issue of \u201cjust cause\u201d to discharge the appellant under a provision of the agreement between the parties.\nAlso, we are not unmindful of appellee\u2019s argument that the arbitrator exceeded his authority because the parties stipulated that \u201cthe sole issue to be decided\u201d by the arbitrator was \u201cwhether Jane Doe was discharged by Respondent for just cause, i.e. whether Jane Doe had violated the Anti-Drug Program for Employees.\u201d However, if the only issue to be decided was whether Ms. Doe failed the drug test, there was no need to submit this matter to arbitration. But, to say that is the only issue is to ignore the plain language of the collective bargaining agreement and render it worthless. The fact of the matter is that the parties agreed to the \u201cjust cause\u201d provision in their agreement and to the arbitration process, and we find no public policy under the specific factual circumstances here involved or in the interpretation of the contract by the arbitrator that would give the trial court authority to usurp the method selected by the parties to resolve their dispute in this case.\nReversed.\nRogers, J., concurs.\nPittman, J., dissents.", "type": "majority", "author": "Melvin Mayfield, Judge." }, { "text": "Judith Rogers, Judge,\nconcurring. I concur with the majority decision because I believe the chancellor\u2019s act of vacating the award violated an important and recognized public policy of the state of Arkansas which favors arbitration as an alternative method of resolving disputes.\nIn Arkansas, arbitration is strongly favored by public policy and is looked upon with approval by courts as a less expensive and expeditious means of settling litigation and relieving congestion of court dockets. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Deislinger, 289 Ark. 248, 251, 711 S.W.2d 771 (1986). After entering into an agreement to arbitrate a dispute, the parties have a moral and legal duty to abide by the award in the absence of a valid reason not to do so; simply being dissatisfied with the results is not a good reason to set aside the award. Id. Judicial review of an arbitration award is more limited than appellate review of a trial court\u2019s decision; whenever possible, a court must construe an award so as to uphold its validity. Chrobak v. Edward D. Jones & Company, 46 Ark. App. 105, 109, 878 S.W.2d 760 (1994). Every reasonable presumption is in favor of the award, and it should not be vacated unless it clearly appears that it was made without authority or was the result of fraud or mistake, or of misfeasance or malfeasance. Id.; Niagara Fire Ins. Co. v. Boon, 76 Ark. 153, 157, 88 S.W. 915 (1905). Accord Kirten v. Spears, 44 Ark. 166, 173 (1884).\nThe United States Supreme Court recognized the courts\u2019 limited role in reviewing arbitration decisions in United Paper-workers International Union, AFL-CIO v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 36 (1987). There, the Court stated that, if courts had the final say on the merits of arbitration awards, the federal policy of settling labor disputes by arbitration would be undermined. The Court also stated:\nThe arbitrator may not ignore the plain language of the contract; but the parties having authorized the arbitrator to give meaning to the language of the agreement, a court should not reject an award on the ground that the arbitrator misread the contract. . . . [T]he arbitrator\u2019s award settling a dispute with respect to the interpretation or application of a labor agreement must draw its essence from the contract and cannot simply reflect the arbitrator\u2019s own notions of industrial justice. But as long as the arbitrator is even arguably construing or applying the contract and acting within the scope of his authority, that a court is convinced he committed serious error does not suffice to overturn his decision.\n484 U.S. at 38.\nIt is clear that the public policy of the state of Arkansas favoring the enforcement of arbitration awards is as strong as that policy recognized by the federal courts. In accordance with this public policy, which limits the courts\u2019 scope of review of arbitration awards, I agree with the majority that the chancellor\u2019s decision must be reversed.\nI must also stress that I have no doubt that the public policy of this state requires or should require that all bus drivers for agencies providing public transportation not be under the influence of cocaine while at work. I also believe that the safety of the public requires employers\u2019 policies to forbid the drivers\u2019 use of cocaine at any time, even while off duty, if there is even a remote chance that the drug might remain in the drivers\u2019 systems long enough to affect their driving.\nIf there is such a public policy, I believe appellee failed to adequately demonstrate it. At trial, appellee bore the burden of establishing this public policy by reference to the laws and legal precedents, and not from general considerations of supposed public interests. United Paperworkers Int\u2019l Union, AFL-CIO v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. at 44. If appellee had supplied sufficient evidence of a clearly-defined public policy on this issue, then our question on review would be more clearly delineated and we would be faced more clearly with competing public policies.", "type": "concurrence", "author": "Judith Rogers, Judge," }, { "text": "John Mauzy Pittman, Judge,\ndissenting. I dissent because I believe that the prevailing opinion has missed the point involved and fails to recognize longstanding precedent. I do not believe the chancellor erred in concluding that the award did not draw its essence from the labor agreement or that the arbitrator exceeded his authority.\nIn its original form, the collective bargaining agreement provided: \u201cNo employee will be discharged or disciplined without sufficient and just cause.\u201d Subsequently, appellee proposed a resolution to the collective bargaining agreement to promote an anti-drug program. The resolution provided: \u201cAny employee, or applicant for employment, of the [Central Arkansas Transit] Authority who fails to pass any required drug screening procedure shall be terminated.\u201d The union filed a grievance contesting the implementation of the anti-drug program but abandoned its grievance. Because the union failed to pursue the grievance, the resolution containing the anti-drug program became effective on January 22, 1991. The collective bargaining agreement provided that, if an abandoned grievance has not been settled nor arbitration requested by the company or the union, the grievance is \u201cforever barred and extinguished.\u201d The arbitrator stated that the issue before him was whether appellant Jane Doe was discharged for just cause when she failed a drug test. He acknowledged that he could not consider the union\u2019s protest against the anti-drug policy because the union dropped the earlier grievance. Appellants do not dispute that the union\u2019s failure to pursue the grievance rendered the implementation and terms of the drug program non-arbitrable. I think the majority opinion ignores the fact that the reasonableness of the drug policy (which required termination in this instance) was not an issue the arbitrator could decide.\nAn arbitrator\u2019s award draws its essence from the collective bargaining agreement so long as the interpretation can in some rational manner be derived from the agreement, viewed in the light of its language and context. Id. The award does not draw its essence from the collective bargaining agreement when the arbitrator apparently based his award on thought, feeling, policy, or law outside the contract. Tootsie Roll Indus. Inc. v. Local Union No. 1, 832 F.2d 81 (7th Cir. 1987). I agree that every reasonable presumption should be in favor of the arbitrator\u2019s award, and it should not be vacated unless it clearly appears that it was made without authority or was the result of fraud or mistake. Chrobak v. Edward D. Jones & Company, 46 Ark. App. 105, 878 S.W.2d 760 (1994). However, if the arbitration award does not \u201cdraw its essence\u201d from the contract, the reviewing court must vacate or modify it. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Sho-Me Power Corp., 715 F.2d 1322 (8th Cir. 1983); see United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel and Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960). Courts cannot interfere with an arbitrator\u2019s interpretation unless positive assurance exists that the contract is not susceptible to the arbitrator\u2019s interpretation. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, supra. Additionally, when the arbitrator creates a contract term that does not exist in the bargaining agreement, he impermissibly administers \u201chis own brand of industrial justice.\u201d International Assoc. of Machinists and Aerospace Workers v. Lourdes Hosp., Inc., 958 F.2d 154 (6th Cir. 1992).\nAn arbitrator is commissioned to interpret and apply the collective bargaining agreement. When the arbitrator\u2019s words manifest an infidelity to this obligation, courts have no choice but to refuse enforcement of the award. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel and Car Corp., supra. Although the agreement provides that no employee will be discharged without \u201csufficient and just cause,\u201d the anti-drug policy clearly states that an employee who fails.a drug test \u201cshall be terminated.\u201d The arbitrator did not enforce the plain provisions of the anti-drug policy but instead rewrote the policy so that appellant Jane Doe would be disciplined rather than discharged. I believe the arbitrator had no authority to modify the discharge penalty and that the chancellor correctly held that the anti-drug policy and collective bargaining agreement were not susceptible to the arbitrator\u2019s interpretation.", "type": "dissent", "author": "John Mauzy Pittman, Judge," } ], "attorneys": [ "Youngdahl, Sadin & McGowan, by: James P. O\u2019Connor and Jay Thomas Youngdahl, for appellants.", "Jack, Lyon & Jones, P.A., by: Philip K. Lyon and Gary D. Jiles', and Kemp, Duckett, Hopkins & Spradley, by: Hal Joseph Kemp, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Jane DOE; Local No. 704 of the Amalgamated Transit Union; Paul Mathews, President, et al. v. CENTRAL ARKANSAS TRANSIT\nCA 93-713\n900 S.W.2d 582\nCourt of Appeals of Arkansas En Banc\nOpinion delivered June 28, 1995\n[Rehearing denied August 16, 1995.]\nYoungdahl, Sadin & McGowan, by: James P. O\u2019Connor and Jay Thomas Youngdahl, for appellants.\nJack, Lyon & Jones, P.A., by: Philip K. Lyon and Gary D. Jiles', and Kemp, Duckett, Hopkins & Spradley, by: Hal Joseph Kemp, for appellee.\nPittman, J., would grant." }, "file_name": "0132-01", "first_page_order": 156, "last_page_order": 171 }