{ "id": 6136144, "name": "Larry JACKSON v. STATE of Arkansas", "name_abbreviation": "Jackson v. State", "decision_date": "1996-01-31", "docket_number": "CA CR 95-44", "first_page": "7", "last_page": "10", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "52 Ark. App. 7" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "914 S.W.2d 317" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark. Ct. App.", "id": 13370, "name": "Arkansas Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "990 F.2d 422", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 10513364 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "425" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/990/0422-01" ] }, { "cite": "872 F.2d 1365", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 10539567 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1370" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/872/1365-01" ] }, { "cite": "316 Ark. 182", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1907836 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "190", "parenthetical": "quoting United States v. Brett, 872 F.2d 1365, 1370 (8th Cir. 1989)" }, { "page": "366", "parenthetical": "quoting United States v. Brett, 872 F.2d 1365, 1370 (8th Cir. 1989)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/316/0182-01" ] }, { "cite": "258 Ark. 496", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1621146 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "502" }, { "page": "626-27", "parenthetical": "footnote omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/258/0496-01" ] }, { "cite": "314 Ark. 165", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1912740 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/314/0165-01" ] }, { "cite": "6 Ark. App. 78", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6137696 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/6/0078-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 378, "char_count": 5006, "ocr_confidence": 0.902, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.119645932871841e-08, "percentile": 0.38141702469912336 }, "sha256": "8d27f67203ce76bbfdf9cdb6cbce7c7a872f54fd17d50b018faf7aa46fecf27d", "simhash": "1:4ef87466141e59aa", "word_count": 823 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:09:48.648567+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Mayfield and Rogers, JJ., agree." ], "parties": [ "Larry JACKSON v. STATE of Arkansas" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "John Mauzy Pittman, Judge.\nLarry Jackson appeals from his conviction at a jury trial of possession of a controlled substance (cocaine) with intent to deliver, for which he was sentenced to ten years in the Arkansas Department of Correction with six-and-one-half years suspended. Appellant contends only that the trial court erred in admitting into evidence cash and a pager that were found on his person at the time of his arrest. We affirm.\nThe evidence indicates that on the afternoon of September 29, 1993, Officer Rick Dunaway of the North Little Rock Police Department observed several young people standing in front of a house. Officer Dunaway testified that the people appeared to be under the age of twenty-one and that at least one of them was drinking beer. The officer stopped his car and walked toward the group. As he approached, he saw appellant throw a matchbox to the ground. The officer retrieved the matchbox, which contained thirteen rocks of what was later determined to be crack cocaine. Appellant was arrested and searched. The search revealed that appellant also possessed $121.00 in cash and a pager.\nAppellant contends on appeal that the trial court erred in admitting testimony about the money and pager. He contends that the evidence was irrelevant in the absence of some additional testimony explaining for the jury \u201cwhy and how\u201d the pager and money would prove that appellant intended to deliver the crack cocaine. We find no error.\nAs noted above, appellant was charged with possession of cocaine with intent to deliver. A person\u2019s intent can seldom be shown by direct evidence and, therefore, must often be inferred from other facts and circumstances. Johnson v. State, 6 Ark. App. 78, 638 S.W.2d 686 (1982). \u201c \u2018Relevant evidence\u2019 means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.\u201d Ark. R. Evid. 401 (emphasis added). The trial court is vested with wide discretion in determining whether evidence is relevant, and the exercise of that discretion will not be reversed in the absence of abuse. Pyle v. State, 314 Ark. 165, 862 S.W.2d 823 (1993).\nWe think that the questions presented in this case should be approached in a manner similar to that used by the supreme court in Freeman v. State, 258 Ark. 496, 527 S.W.2d 623 (1975). In Freeman, the court was faced with the similar issue of whether the trial court had properly admitted as relevant two handguns found in the appellants\u2019 possession immediately after the alleged delivery of heroin for which they were arrested and tried. In holding that evidence of possession of the weapons was properly admitted as circumstantial evidence of the appellants\u2019 intent, the court stated:\nWe would think it to be a matter of common knowledge that narcotics transactions are frequently attended by morally offensive circumstances, and immoral participants. The possession of two pistols by the appellants at the time such transaction was allegedly attempted would appear to have some probative force on the question of what business the men were about.\nFreeman, 258 Ark. at 502, 527 S.W.2d at 626-27 (footnote omitted). Subsequently, the supreme court has quoted with approval the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals\u2019 declaration that \u201ca firearm . . . [is] generally considered a tool of the narcotics dealer\u2019s trade.\u201d Hendrickson v. State, 316 Ark. 182, 190, 871 S.W.2d 362, 366 (1994) (quoting United States v. Brett, 872 F.2d 1365, 1370 (8th Cir. 1989)).\nHere, we likewise think it to be matters of common knowledge that illicit drug sales are ordinarily cash transactions and that those involved in selling drugs frequently do not conduct such transactions from an ordinary storefront during regular business hours, but instead must be reached at various times and locations. Therefore, we think that the trial court could properly conclude that this eighteen-year-old defendant\u2019s possession of a significant amount of cash and a pager was relevant to the question of his intent to deliver the cocaine that he possessed. Indeed, our supreme court has held that possession of a large sum of money is relevant to the question of delivery of a controlled substance, see Pyle v. State, supra, and the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has recently stated that a pager, like a firearm, is \u201ca tool of the drug trade,\u201d United States v. Barth, 990 F.2d 422, 425 (8th Cir. 1991). From our review, we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the challenged evidence in this case.\nAffirmed.\nMayfield and Rogers, JJ., agree.", "type": "majority", "author": "John Mauzy Pittman, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "William R. Simpson, Jr., Public Defender, by: C. Joseph Cordi, Jr., Deputy Public Defender, for appellant.", "Winston Bryant, Att\u2019y Gen., by: Clint Miller, Deputy Att\u2019y Gen., Sr. Appellate Advocate for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Larry JACKSON v. STATE of Arkansas\nCA CR 95-44\n914 S.W.2d 317\nCourt of Appeals of Arkansas Division I\nOpinion delivered January 31, 1996\nWilliam R. Simpson, Jr., Public Defender, by: C. Joseph Cordi, Jr., Deputy Public Defender, for appellant.\nWinston Bryant, Att\u2019y Gen., by: Clint Miller, Deputy Att\u2019y Gen., Sr. Appellate Advocate for appellee." }, "file_name": "0007-01", "first_page_order": 29, "last_page_order": 32 }