{
  "id": 6136695,
  "name": "Barry JAMES v. Leann JAMES",
  "name_abbreviation": "James v. James",
  "decision_date": "1996-02-07",
  "docket_number": "CA 94-1260",
  "first_page": "29",
  "last_page": "34",
  "citations": [
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      "cite": "52 Ark. App. 29"
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      "cite": "914 S.W.2d 773"
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      "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 9-14-237",
      "category": "laws:leg_statute",
      "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.",
      "year": 1993,
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      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
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        {
          "parenthetical": "a father cannot, on his own volition, reduce his child support payment when one of his children turns eighteen"
        },
        {
          "parenthetical": "a father cannot, on his own volition, reduce his child support payment when one of his children turns eighteen"
        }
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    {
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      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.W.2d",
      "case_ids": [
        1900953,
        6141346
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    {
      "cite": "34 Ark. App. 250",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark. App.",
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      "year": 1991,
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      "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7\u00a7 9-12-314",
      "category": "laws:leg_statute",
      "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.",
      "year": 1991,
      "pin_cites": [
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          "page": "(b)(c)"
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    {
      "cite": "313 Ark. 599",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:09:48.648567+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "Pittman and Robbins, JJ., agree."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "Barry JAMES v. Leann JAMES"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Melvin Mayfield, Judge.\nBarry James appeals from an order of the Chancery Court of Crawford County. He contends the trial court erred in awarding judgment for child support arrearage which accrued after the parties\u2019 oldest child, Jacy, reached eighteen, and in granting any relief to appellee Leann James because she failed to file any written pleadings asking for relief.\nThe parties were divorced in July 1987. At that time their three children, Jacy, Ben, and Cody were minors. Appellee Leann James was awarded custody of the children, and the appellant was ordered to pay $450 a month in child support and to maintain medical and hospitalization insurance on the children. On October 8, 1990, the court entered a supplemental order regarding visitation and the matter of claiming the children as income tax exemptions.\nOn July 8, 1992, appellant filed a statement with the chan-eery court clerk\u2019s office which said that \u201cJacy James became age 18 of July 5th. I am now stopping child support payments. Based by your pay scale I am to pay 360.00 mo.\u201d However, he did not file any motion to modify the divorce decree until May 5, 1994, when he filed a pleading entitled \u201cMotion for Modification\u201d in which he requested that the previous court orders be modified.\nAppellee, who lives in Kansas City, Kansas, did not file a response to appellant\u2019s motion, but appeared with counsel at the hearing held July 6, 1994.\nAppellant testified that since the divorce he kept a policy of medical insurance on the minor children, but he had taken Jacy off the policy despite the fact that Jacy could have been covered at no extra cost. Appellant said he chose not to keep Jacy covered because appellee would not pay $70 a month for his insurance. Appellant testified further that when Jacy turned 18 appellant began paying reduced child support of $360 based upon \u201cthe chart\u201d the clerk gave him.\nThe appellee testified that when she discussed keeping Jacy insured appellant said, \u201cPay me $80.00 a month and I will keep him on that.\u201d She said that she talked with Blue Cross and discovered the insurance was free as long as Jacy was a full-time student. The appellee also testified that appellant quit paying the full $450.00 child support on July 5, 1992.\nIn an order entered August 31, 1994, the chancellor granted judgment to the appellee in the amount of $2,160.00 for the $90.00 per month for the 24 months of reduced child support paid by the appellant. The chancellor also incorporated the standard order concerning medical and dental expenses, but directed appellant to keep the medical insurance at his place of employment in effect; did not require the appellee to obtain insurance because of the increased cost to her; and directed appellant to carry Jacy on his policy as long as he could do so at no extra cost.\nOn appeal, appellant argues the chancellor erred in awarding judgment for the arrearage and in granting any relief to the appellee because she failed to file written pleadings asking for relief. He also argues that he owed no obligation for child support after Jacy reached the age of 18.\nAppellant contends Ark. R. Civ. P. 12(a) requires a party to file \u201chis Answer within twenty (20) days after the service of Summons.\u201d\nArkansas Rule Civil Procedure 7(a) provides:\n(a) Pleadings Allowed. There shall be a complaint and an answer; a counterclaim; a reply to a counterclaim denominated as such; an answer to a cross-claim, if the answer contains a cross-claim; a third-party complaint, if a person who was not an original party is summoned under the provisions of Rule 14; and a third party answer, if a third party complaint is served. No other pleadings shall be allowed.\nBut the appellee was not served with a complaint. The appellant simply filed a \u201cMotion for Modification\u201d requesting that the trial court modify its previously entered orders. Arkansas Rule Civil Procedure 7(b) entitled \u201cMotions and Other Papers,\u201d contains no requirement of an \u201canswer.\u201d Therefore, appellee was not required to file an answer.\nAppellant also contends that he was at a \u201ccomplete disadvantage and materially prejudiced by the judgment entered herein having absolutely no notice of any claim of the Appellee.\u201d We do not agree.\nThe decree of divorce provided that the appellant shall \u201cpay the sum of $450.00 per month as and for child support\u201d and \u201cmaintain a policy of hospitalization and medical insurance on said children.\u201d Appellant\u2019s motion asked the chancellor for \u201cmodification of the Court Orders previously entered herein\u201d; to apply the \u201cStandard Medical Order\u201d; and for \u201cany and all other relief that may be necessary and proper whether prayed for herein or not.\u201d\nThe trial court granted appellant\u2019s request as to the Standard Medical Order except for the requirement that appellant continue to maintain a policy of hospitalization and medical insurance on Jacy. We do not think appellant was prejudiced by remaining in the same position in regards to providing medical insurance as before. We therefore affirm the chancellor\u2019s holding on this point.\nIn regard to appellant\u2019s child support obligation, the chancellor granted judgment in the amount of $2,160.00 because the amount ordered by the Court previously was $450; there was no court order reducing that amount; and child support becomes a judgment as it is accrued. The chancellor stated that he was relying on the statutory provision that child support payments are reduced to judgment as they accrue and become due. See Burnett v. Burnett, 313 Ark. 599, 855 S.W.2d 952 (1993), applying Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7\u00a7 9-12-314(b)(c) (Repl. 1991) and 9-14-234(a)(b) (Repl. 1991). These statutes provide that any decree, judgment, or order which contains a provision for payment of child support shall be a final judgment as to any installment or payment of money which has accrued. See Roark v. Roark, 34 Ark. App. 250, 809 S.W.2d 822 (1991). See also Jerry v. Jerry, 235 Ark. 589, 361 S.W.2d 92 (1962) (a father cannot, on his own volition, reduce his child support payment when one of his children turns eighteen).\nBecause the appellant reduced his child support payments when Jacy became 18 without filing a motion to modify child support, the chancellor held that the court could not retroactively reduce the appellee\u2019s child support arrearages which had become final judgments. However, Act 326 of 1993 [codified as Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 9-14-237 (Repl. 1993)] became effective August 13, 1993, and provides:\n(a)(1) An obligor\u2019s duty to pay child support for a child shall automatically terminate by operation of law when the child reaches eighteen (18) years of age or should have graduated from high school, whichever is later, or when the child is emancipated by a court of competent jurisdiction, marries, or dies, unless the court order for child support specifically extends child support after such circumstances.\nSection 9-14-237(b)(l) and (2) further provide:\n(b)(1) If the obligor has additional child support obli- . gations after the duty to pay support for a child terminates, the court shall reassess the remaining obligations using the family support chart pursuant to \u00a7 9-12-312(a)(2).\n(2) In the event a review is requested, the court shall apply the family support chart for the remaining number of children from the date of the termination of the duty, subject to any changed circumstances, which shall be noted in writing by the court.\nBut it is presumed that all legislation is intended to act prospectively, and statutes are to be construed as having only a prospective operation unless the purpose and intention of the legislature to give them a retroactive effect is expressly declared or necessarily implied from the language used. Chism v. Phelps, 228 Ark. 936, 311 S.W.2d 297 (1958). Looking at Act 326, we find no express language that the act is intended to operate retroactively. Nor is there an emergency clause. Therefore, we cannot say the legislature intended for that Act to operate retroactively.\nJacy turned eighteen on July 5, 1992. Appellant did not file a motion to modify child support, therefore appellant\u2019s child support obligation continued. However, under Act 326 appellant\u2019s child support obligation for Jacy terminated by operation of law on August 13, 1993, the effective date of the Act, and the chancellor erred in awarding child support arrearage for Jacy beyond that date. Pursuant to \u00a7 9-14-237(b)(l) and (2) quoted above, the chancellor should reassess the appellant\u2019s support obligation for the two younger children using the family support chart for the period beginning August 13, 1993, the effective termination date of his duty to pay support for Jacy.\nWe therefore affirm the chancellor\u2019s order in part but reverse the finding on arrearage and remand on this issue for entry of an order in keeping with this opinion.\nPittman and Robbins, JJ., agree.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Melvin Mayfield, Judge."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Michael J. Medlock, for appellant.",
      "Gary R. Cottrell, for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "Barry JAMES v. Leann JAMES\nCA 94-1260\n914 S.W.2d 773\nCourt of Appeals of Arkansas Division II\nOpinion delivered February 7, 1996\nMichael J. Medlock, for appellant.\nGary R. Cottrell, for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0029-01",
  "first_page_order": 51,
  "last_page_order": 56
}